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All philosophy, my dear Cicero, is fecund and fruitful, and no part of it is 
wasteland and barren; but no topic within it is more fertile and productive 
than that of obligations, for from them are derived the principles 
of consistent and honourable living.
Cicero
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INTrODuCTION 
Warum wird aber die Sittenlehre (Moral) gewöhnlich (namentlich 
vom Cicero) die Lehre von den Pflichten und nicht auch von den 
Rechten betitelt?1
The Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio rightly spoke of the primacy of rights 
in current political and legal discourse as a radical overturning of the millen-
nia-old practice of considering moral philosophy’s chief task to consist in the 
drafting of a catalog of duties, rather than of rights.2 From Moses’s two tablets, 
to Cicero’s De officiis, onto even Immanuel Kant – who viewed his Sittenlehre as 
a “doctrine of duties,”3 –, moral philosophy was believed to be a study of man’s 
duties. Thus, the overarching question of Kant’s second Critique is not “What 
are my rights?,” but rather “What should I do?”. 
This traditional prevalence of duties over rights in moral philosophy, Bob-
bio goes on to say, was mirrored by the privileging of the viewpoint of the ruler 
over that of the ruled in political philosophy. Naturally, one also owed duties 
to one’s fellow citizens – e.g., one ought to refrain from assaulting them and 
from stealing from them –, though often these were considered to be, in fact, 
duties to the sovereign. For instance, if one assaulted a fellow citizen, one did 
thereby not merely (perhaps not even especially) wrong him or her, but one 
also (or perhaps even especially) violated one’s duty to the political community 
in general and therefore wronged the sovereign in particular, who is tasked, 
after all, with maintaining the laws and peace in the community. It is such a 
train of thought that lies at the foundation of Hobbes’s statement that even the 
intention of breaking the law is not so much (or not merely) a sin against the 
potential victim of one’s crime, but rather “the purpose to breake the Law, is 
some degree of Contempt of him, to whom it belongeth to see it executed,”4 i.e. 
the sovereign. The performance of our duties was thus owed to the sovereign 
1. Kant, I. (1907). Die Metaphysik der Sitten. In Kants Werke. Bd. 6: Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen 
der bloßen Vernunft. Die Metaphysik der Sitten (pp. 203–493). Ausgabe der Königlich Preußischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 239.
2. Bobbio, N. (2009). Il primato dei diritti sui doveri. In M. Bovero (Ed.), Teoria Generale della Politica 
(pp. 431–440). Torino: Giulio Einaudi. 432.
3. Kant, I. (1996). The Metaphysics of Morals. In M. Gregor (Ed.), M. Gregor (Trans.), Practical Philoso-
phy (pp. 363–603). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ak 6:239.
4. Hobbes, T. (1996). Leviathan. (R. Tuck, Ed.) (Revised Student Edition). Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. Ch. 27, 201.
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and the political community as a whole, rather than to individuals as bearers 
of rights. 
The importance of the gradual shift from duties to rights is thus clear: no 
longer would only the political community at large (and the sovereign at its 
head) enjoy the attention of our political and moral considerations; from this 
moment on, political and moral issues would also be viewed from the standpoint 
of the individual. The shift from duties to rights was thus also a movement away 
from the overarching whole and towards the individual as a bearer of rights. 
This shift, it seems, has been nearly complete in Western liberal democracies; 
political theory, public policy and moral philosophy are now predominantly con-
cerned with the individual and her rights. 
It is important to realize that the shift from duties to rights could not have 
taken place without a fundamental critique of the relation between the political 
community and the individual. Bobbio perceptively points out that the doctrine 
of natural or human rights presupposes an individualistic understanding of so-
ciety and thus a rejection of the older, “organic” conception of society.5 The un-
derstanding of society as an organic whole can be found throughout the history 
of political philosophy: from Plato who compared the well-managed city “to the 
human body in its relation to the pleasure and pain of its parts,”6 to Hobbes who 
viewed the commonwealth as an artificial man,7 to the continuing usage of such 
terms as “body politic” and “head of state” even today. The organic conception 
of society viewed the individual as subordinate to the political community. The 
individual’s main importance resided in the contribution he or she could make to 
the political community. Therefore, justice, according to Plato, consists in each 
class of members in the community doing its own part and not meddling in the 
activities of others: the producers are not to interfere with matters of defense, 
and soldiers ought not to concern themselves with the affairs of state, which is 
the prerogative of the guardians.8 In the organic understanding of society each 
part of the whole has its own unique contribution to the wellbeing of the whole. 
So long as each part restricts itself to performing its assigned task, the whole 
will prosper. Yet, once, for example, the arms and legs attempt to decide for 
themselves in which direction they ought to move and refuse to accept the head’s 
prerogative to control the body’s movements, disorder steps in.
5. Bobbio. Il primato dei diritti sui doveri. 435.
6. Plato. (1937). The Republic. (P. Shorey, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Book V. 
475.
7. Hobbes. Leviathan. 9
8. See, for example, Plato. The Republic. Book IV. 371–3.
13
Introduction
400088-L-bw-Boot
Individualism, which, as said, is of crucial importance for the birth of hu-
man rights, is thus, from the organic perspective, considered a potential threat 
and is therefore to be suppressed. Individuals are simply to serve the state in 
preassigned ways and make their peace with their fixed station in life. Individu-
alism, by contrast, recognizes the unique value of every human being, as a being 
capable of making its own decisions and setting its own course. This recognition 
of what some would call human dignity lies as the basis of the birth of human 
rights. In order to ensure that each person can pursue her own goals and strive 
to achieve her own understanding of a fulfilled life, the state ought to secure a 
sphere of maximum reciprocal freedom for all. Individuals are understood to 
have a right to such freedom, a right which was initially, in the eighteenth cen-
tury, understood to consist of rights to liberty, property, security and to resist 
oppression.9
The French Revolution was not solely an abolition of the monarchy; it also 
was a clear expression of the shift we have been speaking of. The individual as-
sumed center stage. No longer was the individual but an instrument of the state; 
instead, the state was from then on considered to be legitimate only insofar as 
it heeded the individual. Thus, the French Declaration of 1789 clearly states in 
its second article that the “aim of all political association is the preservation of 
the natural and imprescriptible rights of man.” It follows that any state unable or 
unwilling to preserve the rights of man is to be viewed as illegitimate.
This development was accelerated in the period following the Second World 
War, which was a period of steady expansion of the human rights discourse 
worldwide, to the point that many scholars have come to refer to it as the global 
moral lingua franca.10 Indeed, the dominance of rights discourse in practical 
philosophy at times seems to be absolute, prompting certain scholars to speak 
of “rights infatuation.”11 Whereas prior to the shift from duties to rights, moral 
problems were analyzed solely in terms of duty (and perhaps of virtue), to the 
exclusion of rights, now it has become nearly impossible to speak about norma-
tive matters in a way that does not include rights. Even when we do speak of 
duties, these are considered to be derivative of rights, which has now become the 
most fundamental moral category. Today, it seems, rights are viewed as “most 
9. Cf. Article 2 of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.
10. See, e.g., Tasioulas, J. (2007). The Moral Reality of Human Rights. In T. Pogge (Ed.), Freedom From 
Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? (pp. 75–101). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 75; Flikschuh, K. (2011). On the Cogency of Human Rights. Jurisprudence, 2(1), 17–36. 36: “the 
language of human rights now is the lingua franca of normative global discourse.” 
11. Louden, R. B. (1983). Rights Infatuation and the Impoverishment of Moral Theory. The Journal of Value 
Inquiry, 17, 87–102.
human Duties and the Limits of human Rights Discourse
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indicative of what morality is all about.”12 The problem with such a rights-based 
approach to morality is thus not that it promotes rights – any case made for a 
renewed attention for duty in the pages of this dissertation does not in any way 
wish to detract anything from rights –, but rather that it ignores or disparages 
those spheres of human normative agency that cannot be framed in terms of 
rights, leading to an impoverishment of moral discourse. An example of such a 
neglected moral category, which will figure prominently in the pages to come, is 
that subset of our duties termed “duties of virtue.” Given that rights are consid-
ered to be the most fundamental moral category, duties exist only to the extent 
that they stem from rights. It follows that duties of virtue, which do not have any 
correlative rights, tend to be neglected.13 As a consequence, it becomes difficult 
to convince persons that insisting on one’s right may at times be the wrong thing 
to do. After all, from within a rights-dominated discourse it seems perfectly rea-
sonable to think that so long as one does not violate the rights of others, one can 
do no wrong.14 To illustrate this point, consider the town Joel Feinberg dubbed 
Nowheresville II.15 In this town “everyone always insists upon his own rights 
against others: […] debtors are never forgiven their debts, wrongdoers pardoned, 
gratuitous gifts conferred, or sacrifices voluntarily made, so long as it is within 
one’s rights to refuse to do any of these things.”16 The first problem with the 
predominance of human rights in normative discourse is, therefore, that it leads 
to the neglect of those duties that lack corresponding rights, which in turn can 
lead to the heedless insistence on one’s rights at all times and thus to an under-
standing of freedom as license.
12. Ibid. 89. Similarly, Henry Shue argues that “[b]asic rights are the morality of the depths” (Shue, H. 
(1980). Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 18). Cf.
13. Onora O’Neill especially has made this point most forcefully. See, e.g., O’Neill, O. (1996). Towards 
Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. Chapter 5.
14. In fact, it has been quite common for decades now to speak of  “a right to do wrong.” According to this 
position, I have a right to spend my lottery millions entirely on fancy shoes and bottles of Cristal, instead 
of donating some of my winnings to the destitute. I also have a right to found an openly racist party. As 
a supporter of a particular political party, I have a right to trick people, by providing them false infor-
mation, into voting for that party. Instead of merely maintaining that we ought to tolerate such behavior, 
as interference in such cases by means of, for example, the penal code might be counterproductive and 
perhaps an example of government overreach, many a liberal scholar will argue we in fact have a right to 
perform immoral acts. Moreover, they view the right to do wrong as essential to the very idea of rights. 
See, for example: Waldron, J. (1981). A Right to Do Wrong. Ethics, 92(1), 21–39. I will briefly return to 
this matter (of a right to do wrong) in Chapter 2.
15. Feinberg, J. (1980). The Nature and Value of Rights. In Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty: 
Essays in Social Philosophy (pp. 143–158). Princeton: Princeton University Press. 156ff. The first, and 
more famous, Nowheresville is introduced at the beginning of Feinberg’s article. Nowheresville I is a 
place much like our own, but for one important difference: no one has any rights. 
16. Ibid. 156.
human Duties and the Limits of human Rights Discourse
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An additional problem with the rights-based perspective on morality is the 
tendency to speak of human rights without also considering the duties involved, 
resulting in the promulgation of a plethora of human rights without much atten-
tion for the corresponding duties. The detrimental consequence of this disregard 
for duties is the oft-noted and oft-bemoaned inflation of human rights. The pop-
ularity of human rights discourse has led to “an unruly proliferation of incom-
patible or often just incredible rights claims,”17 which damages the credibility of 
human rights discourse as such.
Given these two serious problems with what I will call the perspective of 
rights – whereby one starts by identifying rights independently of duties and 
from there proceeds to define the corresponding duties – the main thesis of the 
present study is that we ought to adopt instead a perspective of duties, whereby 
one starts from duties and from there proceeds to identify our rights (if, indeed, 
the duty in question involves corresponding rights). This shift of perspective, 
as will be elaborately argued and demonstrated in the following chapters, will, 
firstly, allow us to recognize the full scope of human duties (instead of focusing 
solely on rights-corresponding duties) – thus enriching our moral landscape – as 
well as, secondly, neatly clarify the content of those duties and allocate them to 
specific duty-bearers, which will bring to a halt the great proliferation of dubious 
human rights claims. The goal of this work is, in other words, firstly to salvage 
those duties that are often neglected due to the dominance of the perspective of 
rights – namely duties of virtue – and to argue for their importance, and sec-
ondly to counter the trend of rights proliferation by providing some conceptual 
clarity concerning rights and duties that will enable us to differentiate between 
genuine and spurious claims to the status of “right.”
Concerns with the dominance of human rights discourse, such as those dis-
cussed above, eventually led to some pushback. In the realm of human rights 
discourse itself, this discontent was expressed chiefly in the form of various 
human duties declarations (such as the Universal Declaration of Human Re-
sponsibilities), which saw the light in the past two decades. The drafters of these 
human duties declarations argue for the necessity of a renewed focus on our du-
ties, for which they offer several reasons. They argue, for example, that especially 
Western liberal democracies overemphasize individual rights and personal free-
dom, at the cost of our duties and of an understanding of freedom as involving 
17. Tasioulas. The Moral Reality of Human Rights. 75.
human Duties and the Limits of human Rights Discourse
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necessarily a sense of responsibility. This imbalance between rights and duties, 
between freedom and responsibility, results, they maintain, in an unbridled in-
dividualism which could lead to conflict and discord. Furthermore, several of 
these declarations argue that rights need to be supported by morality if they are 
to be secured. Accordingly, the drafters seem to argue for the development of a 
particular moral disposition, which one might call civic virtue, or perhaps even 
cosmopolitan virtue.
These human duties declarations have not exactly received a warm welcome 
from human rights scholars. In general, the critics argue that such declarations 
are either superfluous, as human rights documents already make ample mention 
of rights-based duties, or, insofar as the human duties declarations contain du-
ties that go beyond rights-based duties, they are dangerous. This debate between 
the drafters of the various human duties declarations and their critics will be 
discussed in Chapter 1. This chapter will, furthermore, provide an overview 
of the individual duties (that is, not the duties of states or corporations, but of 
individuals) present in the major human rights documents. This discussion will 
culminate in the selection of two individual duties that are particularly conten-
tious, namely duties to the community (which can be found in Article 29 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), but also, for example, in the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights) and duties of aid to the global 
poor (which can be understood to correlate with the human right to an adequate 
standard of living stated in, e.g., Article 25 UDHR and Article 11 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). These two duties will 
function as case studies in chapters 3, 4 and 5, as will be clarified in a moment.
Though this study thus starts with a discussion of the human duties decla-
rations and the criticism they have received, it must be stressed that the goal of 
the present study is not to mount a defense of these declarations. The discussion 
of political and juridical documents – that is, the human duties and human rights 
documents – is not the main concern of this study. Rather, the proclamations of 
human duties declarations as well as the ensuing debate concerning their desir-
ability will serve as a springboard for reflections on the importance of a renewed 
focus on duties, the relation between rights and duties, the categorization of 
duties (perfect and imperfect duties, duties of justice and duties of virtue) and 
the relation between justice and virtue. 
Accordingly, Chapter 2 will start by clarifying the central terms: rights, 
duties, justice and virtue. Furthermore, this chapter will elucidate the relation 
between rights and duties as well as argue that perfect duties of justice (that is, 
duties with corresponding rights) are not, as is so often erroneously held, more 
human Duties and the Limits of human Rights Discourse
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binding or of greater importance than imperfect duties of virtue (that is, duties 
without corresponding rights). Finally, the case will be made for a duties-based 
perspective on morality instead of the by far more common rights-based per-
spective. In doing so, I will have to defend myself against critics who fear that 
a renewed focus on duties will necessarily be detrimental to our rights. I will, 
therefore, need to explain that a renewed attention for duties does not at all 
amount to, say, surrendering our rights and freedom to state power. On the con-
trary, rather than weakening or endangering human rights, a renewed emphasis 
on our duties will prove to strengthen human rights, particularly by preventing 
the proliferation of unclaimable rights. Starting from duties rather than rights, 
furthermore, will enable us to recognize the importance of duties of virtue, to 
which the perspective of rights must remain blind as the duties it recognizes are 
limited to rights-based duties, that is, duties of justice. Such duties of virtue, as 
will be made clear in Chapters 4 and 5, are of crucial importance as comple-
ments to the sphere of justice.
It bears mentioning that the exposition of the fundamental concepts provid-
ed in Chapter 2 is distinctly Kantian in nature. The nature of rights and duties, 
the distinctions between the various types of duties as well as the duties-based 
perspective on morality all find their origin in the work of Immanuel Kant, 
whereby I chiefly (but not solely) rely on his “Spätwerk” The Metaphysics of 
Morals. Kant’s work is chosen for several reasons, of which I will mention two 
here. Firstly, it is important to point out that though Kant’s writings (specifically, 
a certain reading of his concept of human dignity) are often considered to be one 
of the fonts of inspiration for the human rights movement, the book in which he 
speaks most of rights was actually viewed by Kant himself as a “general doctrine 
of duties.”18 Therefore, though we may imagine Kant to have supported the idea 
of human rights, he would also be very critical of the contemporary human 
rights discourse, as its neglect of duties fails to adequately identify rights and its 
rights-based perspective on morality prohibits it from appreciating the impor-
tance of duties of virtue. Secondly, the distinction Kant draws between types 
of duties – that is, between duties with corresponding rights (duties of justice) 
and duties without corresponding rights (duties of virtue) – as well as his under-
standing of a right as the ability to place others under obligations, allows us to 
provide some clarity in the jungle of rights claims by enabling us to distinguish 
genuine from spurious human rights. Chapter 2, in short, provides a theory of 
18. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:239. Emphasis added; cf. Ak 6:380.
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duties and rights, which will allow us to resolve practical problems from the 
fields of human rights law and politics in the remaining three chapters, particu-
larly Chapters 4 and 5, which will discuss the two contentious duties singled out 
in Chapter 1. The discussion of these two case studies is meant to illustrate the 
advantages of the perspective of duties.
 To begin, Chapter 3 will examine what we can learn from human rights 
documents and human duties declarations regarding the nature of the duties 
correlative to the human right to an adequate standard of living and the duties to 
the community. Regarding the former, we will find that such documents do not 
at all sufficiently clarify the nature of individual duties concerning global sub-
sistence needs. Chapter 4 will, therefore, provide such clarity by asking, firstly, 
who has what duties in fulfilling subsistence needs, secondly what the status of 
such duties is (are they duties of justice or duties of virtue?), and thirdly, whether 
subsistence needs do indeed give rise to a human right to subsistence. It is in this 
manner that Chapter 4 demonstrates how starting from duties can allow us to 
discriminate more precisely between genuine and (as yet) spurious rights.
Regarding the duties to the community, by contrast, the study of the rel-
evant human rights documents – particularly the travaux préparatoires of the 
Universal Declaration – will prove far more fruitful. Still, many deem such du-
ties owed by the individual to the community to constitute a threat to rights. 
In fact, it is these duties that are most often denounced by critics of the human 
duties declarations (as well as of certain human rights documents, such as the 
African Charter, which also mentions duties to the community, in its Articles 
27, 28 and 29). Therefore, Chapter 5 will illustrate that far from constituting a 
threat to our human rights, duties to the community are paramount to the pres-
ervation of a democratic political community, which, in turn, is instrumental in 
safeguarding our rights.
Finally, Chapter 5 will also discuss the claim of several human duties dec-
larations that rights without morality cannot long endure; what is needed, the 
drafters of such declarations claim, is “voluntary self-obligation.”19 Even legal 
rights that can be coercively enforced will be more reliably secured if all respect 
such rights willingly, rather than merely for prudential reasons. The present 
study is in agreement with such statements and will, in Chapter 5, provide ar-
guments illustrating why calls for a virtuous disposition need not serve a hidden 
19. Küng, H. (1998). Human Responsibilities Reinforce Human Rights: The Global Ethic Project. In B. van 
der Heijden & B. Tahzib-Lie (Eds.), Reflection of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Fiftieth 
Anniversary Anthology (165–168). The Hague: Kluwer Law International. 168.
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paternalistic agenda, provided they are limited to appeals for civic rather than 
personal virtue.
Chapter 5 thus provides us with an illustration of the importance of (duties 
of) virtue as complement to the sphere of justice. As such, it also demonstrates 
the desirability of the perspective of duties, for it can recognize such ethical du-
ties to the community, whereas the perspective of rights can at best view them 
as optional excellences.
In his text Private Philanthropy and Positive Rights, Alan Gewirth presents us 
with a typical expression of the rights-based perspective on morality, whereby 
rights are taken to be the fundamental moral category: “the concept of rights,” 
he writes, “and especially of human rights, is central and indeed indispensable to 
the whole field of morality.”20 Instead, the present study wishes to argue for the 
importance of the adoption of a duties-based perspective on morality. Human 
rights are without a doubt of indispensable importance, yet the exclusive focus on 
rights has led to too narrow a view of morality. Starting from rights diminishes 
or often even entirely neglects the value of those duties that lack corresponding 
rights, in effect relegating the whole spectrum of duties of virtue to the sphere of 
the supererogatory. However, the sphere of justice – that is, the sphere of institu-
tions and laws that are to secure our rights and enforce the corresponding duties 
– can greatly benefit from a population that regularly performs duties of virtue, 
which can thus function as a complement to the sphere of justice. Similarly, just 
laws and institutions can greatly benefit from widespread civic virtue, as such 
virtue can provide them with stability. It thus becomes apparent that an appeal 
for the importance of duties seems to involve a correlative claim concerning the 
importance of virtue as well as a claim concerning the interdependence between 
justice and virtue. 
If the adoption of the perspective of duties has these apparent advantages, 
why then does any argument for a renewed emphasis on our duties generate such 
fierce criticism? There are sundry reasons, of which I will mention some here. 
Historically, as Bobbio has shown, the emphasis on duties went hand in hand 
with the neglect of rights and with the subordination of the individual to the 
state and the community. Given this problematic history, and the great moral 
progress realized by the shift to rights illustrated above, it is understandable that 
the call for a renewed focus on duties should occasion suspicion. Furthermore, 
20. Gewirth, A. (1987). Private Philanthropy and Positive Rights. Social Philosophy & Policy, 4(2), 55–78. 58.
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as Onora O’Neill has pointed out, appeals to human duties have less “immediate 
charm” than human rights; a list of entitlements is more appealing than a list 
of obligations.21 Finally, especially the concept of “duties to the community” has 
caused fears that (some of) the human duties declarations aim to reintroduce a 
certain “holistic” notion of community in which the individual is reduced to an 
instrument of the whole (i.e. the political community), to a mere cog in the ma-
chine, as it were. These suspicions are fueled by the fact that such politicians as 
Lee Kuan Yew signed one of the major human duties declarations (namely, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities). This former prime minister of 
Singapore was also a driving force behind the so-called Asian values movement 
in the 1990s, whereby the term “Asian values” was used in opposition to West-
ern notions of individual freedom and human rights. Instead, the proponents of 
Asian values propagated the precedence of the harmonious development of the 
society as a whole over the freedom of the individual.
There are thus various legitimate reasons why many people experience 
some unease at the thought of the promulgation of human duties declarations 
or the suggestion that a duties-based perspective on morality is to be preferred 
over a rights-based morality. Therefore, I will need to be aware of the mentioned 
concerns and demonstrate that my argument does not detract anything from the 
importance and the force of rights. It will be necessary to distance my position 
from positions that are hostile to or even overly critical of rights. One of the 
main tasks set before me is thus to make the call for duties and the argument for 
a duties-based perspective on morality seem more appealing, and to convince 
the reader that far from endangering rights and threatening justice, a renewed 
emphasis on our duties will in fact strengthen and clarify human rights discourse 
as well as retrieve the importance of (duties of) virtue, which is of great moral 
significance in its own right, but also serves as an indispensable complement to 
the sphere of justice. A renewed emphasis on our duties will thus, ultimately, 
benefit our rights as well.
21. O’Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue. 134–5.
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ChApTEr 1
ThE DEbATE CONCErNING huMAN DuTIES
Quid leges sine moribus vanae proficiunt?1 
During the past two decades we have witnessed an ongoing discussion concern-
ing individual human duties. Proponents of such human duties have explained 
their position in several declarations, in which they argue that current human 
rights law is characterized by an overemphasis on rights and personal liberty, 
resulting in an unbridled individualism, which a renewed focus on individual 
duty is meant to remedy. In order to gain an overall idea of these human duties 
declarations and the manner in which they differ both from each other and from 
current human rights documents,2 this chapter will start by providing an over-
view of the most important human duties declarations of the past twenty years. 
Subsequently, §1.2 and §1.3 will provide an exposition of the critique leveled 
at these declarations by human rights scholars. The discussion of this debate 
between proponents and opponents of human duties declarations will serve as 
an introduction to the overarching question of this dissertation, which concerns 
the desirability of a renewed emphasis on duties in our normative (including our 
legal) discourse.
Critics have two general objections against the human duties declarations: 
firstly, they argue that such human duties discourse is dangerous, because it 
aims, they fear, at limiting the scope of human rights; secondly, a separate decla-
ration of human duties is considered to be superfluous, as current human rights 
law supposedly already grants ample attention to the individual duties implied 
by human rights. The first point of critique will be considered in §1.2, whereas 
the accuracy of the latter claim will be assessed in §1.3 by examining both nega-
tive and positive human duties in several human rights documents. The conclu-
sion of the latter section will be that human rights documents and human rights 
law have clarified our negative human duties quite well, but that our individual 
positive duties remain grossly neglected. The important but murky duties of aid 
to the global poor as well as the contentious duties to the community especially 
1. Horace. (2008). The Odes of Horace. (J. H. Kaimowitz, Trans.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. Ode III.24. p.131: “What good are empty laws without morality?”
2. I use the general term “human rights documents” when referring to binding human rights conventions 
and non-binding human rights declarations together. Human rights documents do not include human 
duties declarations.
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remain unclear and will therefore need to be further examined (in Chapters 4 
and 5 respectively). Finally, §1.4 will recapitulate the most important conclu-
sions of the chapter, as well as pave the way for Chapter 2.
 
§ 1.1 – human Duties Declarations: The problem
In this section I will trace the development of human duties declarations, start-
ing in 1993 with the Declaration Toward a Global Ethic of the Parliament of the 
Worlds’ Religions until the draft resolution Fundamental Rights and Respon-
sibilities, drawn up by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE) in 2011. Instead of simply enumerating the various duties proposed in 
these documents, I will pay attention to the goal of such declarations: what they 
hope to achieve. 
In September 1993 the Parliament of the World’s Religions drafted a Declara-
tion Toward a Global Ethic. This organization strives to realize an interfaith 
dialog by engaging religious leaders from all over the world, in order to bring an 
end to discord among the various religions, and reach a consensus on certain 
fundamental precepts shared by all faiths. Their 1993 Declaration – mostly writ-
ten by the Catholic theologian Hans Küng – was drawn up with the express goal 
of developing a global ethic, based on the shared precepts of the world’s main 
religions, ultimately culminating in the “Golden Rule”: what you do not wish 
done to yourself, do not do to others. Such a global ethic is urgently needed, so 
the drafters held, for the attainment of a better global order. Legal rights are 
an important part of achieving that better order, but will not suffice, for “rights 
without morality cannot long endure.”3 Accordingly, the drafters sketched a new 
global ethic based on four main principles, or “irrevocable directives”: (1) “com-
mitment to a culture of non-violence and respect for life,” (2) “commitment to a 
culture of solidarity and a just economic order,” (3) “commitment to a culture of 
tolerance and a life of truthfulness” and (4) “commitment to a culture of equal 
rights and partnership between men and women.”4
Almost exactly four years later, in honor of the 50th anniversary of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the InterAction Council – an in-
3. Parliament of the World’s Religions. Declaration Toward a Global Ethic. (1993, September 4). Retrieved 
from http://www.parliamentofreligions.org/_includes/fckcontent/file/towardsaglobalethic.pdf. 5.
4. Declaration Toward a Global Ethic. 8–13.
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dependent international organization of former heads of state and government, 
such as Helmut Schmidt, Jimmy Carter, Andries van Agt and Giscard d’Estaing 
– presented their Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities (UDHRe). 
Hans Küng again played a pivotal role in the formulation of the document, and 
with calls for a global ethic and an invocation of the Golden Rule the drafters 
clearly placed themselves in the same tradition as the drafters of the Declaration 
Toward a Global Ethic. The UDHRe, however, goes further; it wishes to com-
plement the discourse of human rights with a renewed focus on human respon-
sibilities. The necessity for such a project stems from the perceived imbalance 
between rights and duties, between freedom and responsibility. The express goal 
of the UDHRe is to complement human rights documents such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in order to remedy this imbalance and 
“move from the freedom of indifference to the freedom of involvement.”5 This is 
deemed necessary, because the overemphasis on individual rights is thought to 
lead to conflict and discord. Contrary to an often-heard critique (which we will 
discuss in §1.2), the responsibilities enumerated in the UDHRe are not to be un-
derstood as legal obligations, but rather as moral obligations. The Declaration is 
meant, just as the UDHR, as a moral appeal and has “voluntary self-obligation” 
as its main aim.6 In the drafters’ view, such voluntary self-obligation is necessary 
for the effective realization of human rights, which according to Hans Küng 
cannot only depend on legal coercion, but instead depends on the normative mo-
tivation of citizens themselves. In order to achieve such normative motivation, 
the Inter-Action Council has drafted their Declaration, containing such respon-
sibilities as the responsibility to respect life (Article 5), the responsibility to con-
tribute to overcoming poverty and inequality (Article 9) and the responsibility 
to use the right to freedom of expression in a responsible manner (Article 14).
In the following year, in 1998, the (Valencia) Declaration of Human Duties 
and Responsibilities (DHDR) was drafted under the auspices of the UNESCO, 
once again on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the UDHR. The renowned 
South-African judge Richard J. Goldstone chaired the high-level group responsi-
ble for the Declaration, consisting of experts from various fields, such as the arts 
(Dario Fo), international law (Richard A. Falk, Baltasar Garzón), politics (Ruud 
Lubbers), and philosophy (Michel Serres, Gianni Vattimo). The Declaration argues 
5. InterAction Council. A Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities. (1997, September 1). Re-
trieved from http://interactioncouncil.org/universal-declaration-human-responsibilities. Introductory 
comment.
6. Küng. Human Responsibilities Reinforce Human Rights. 168.
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that the effective realization of human rights “is inextricably linked to the assump-
tion of the duties and responsibilities implicit in those rights”7 and subsequently 
goes on to enumerate in great detail a wide variety of duties and responsibilities. 
There are three main differences between this Declaration and the UDHRe. 
Firstly, the UDHRe only speaks of moral duties, whereas the DHDR distinguish-
es moral from legal duties.8 The Valencia Declaration thus wishes to function 
both as a moral appeal, and as an account of citizens’ enforceable legal du-
ties concerning human rights. Secondly, the DHDR does not, contrary to the 
UDHRe, only discuss individual duties, but also considers the duties of states 
and, in fact, reaffirms that states exercise the primary duty regarding the protec-
tion and realization of human rights. Thirdly, contrary to the UDHRe, its goal 
in drafting this list of duties and responsibilities is not to remedy an imbalance 
between rights and duties; it recognizes no such imbalance and appears quite 
content with the current relation between rights and duties. Instead, the DHDR 
aims simply to underline the duties and responsibilities that correlate with hu-
man rights in order to achieve more respect for and better protection of human 
rights worldwide. Perhaps due to these three differences, the DHDR has suf-
fered much less criticism than the UDHRe. 
In 2000, the UN Human Rights Commission asked the Sub-Commission on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights to research the relation between 
human rights and human responsibilities. This initial resolution was passed with 
the smallest possible majority (22 in favor – 21 opposed – 10 abstentions).9 The 
research on the interrelation between rights and responsibilities, headed by Spe-
cial Rapporteur Miguel Alfonso Martínez, resulted in the 2003 pre-draft Dec-
laration on Human Social Responsibilities (DHSR). Later that same year, the 
Commission was unable to pass a proposal to have Martínez send the draft dec-
laration to member states and NGOs (25 – 25 – 3).10 In 2004, the same proposal 
was accepted by a difference of merely one vote.11 During it last full meeting in 
2005, before being replaced by the Human Rights Council in 2006, the Com-
7. Valencia Third Millennium Foundation. Declaration of Human Duties and Responsibilities. (1998). 
Retrieved from http://globalization.icaap.org/content/v2.2/declare.html. Preamble.
8. From this point on I will use the terms “moral duty” and “legal duty” in this chapter, though the precise 
explanation of the difference between the two will have to wait until the next chapter (from which point 
onward I will mostly use the more precise terms “duty of virtue” and “duty of justice”). The various 
declarations use different terms – such as “responsibility,” “duty” and “obligation” – to refer to the same 
thing, which only results in confusion. For this reason, I will largely limit myself to using the term “duty” 
alone.
9. United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). Report on the Fifty-Sixth Session. UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2000.167. Resolution 2000/63. 276–7. 
10. UNCHR. Report on the Fifty-Ninth Session. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003.135. 433–4.
11. UNCHR. Report on the Sixtieth Session. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/127. 346.
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mission asked Martínez to draft a new version of the Declaration. This request, 
however, was blocked by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The 
Human Rights Commission thus never accepted the draft Declaration and the 
Human Rights Council has not yet considered it.
In the next section we will explain why so many opposed this draft declara-
tion, but for now a brief description of the document will suffice. In the final re-
port accompanying the draft declaration, Martínez acknowledged to have been 
influenced by the InterAction Council’s UDHRe.12 In fact, there are many simi-
larities between the two declarations to be found. For instance, Martínez stated 
that the responsibilities enumerated in the draft declaration are not legal duties, 
but rather stem from social ethics and human solidarity. At the same time, how-
ever, the express goal of the draft declaration is to be adopted as an international 
standard of human responsibilities by the UN, similar to the UDHR. As we will 
see, this ambiguity with regard to the legal status of the document is one of the 
main sources of concern for its critics. 
Perhaps attempting to assuage his critics, Martínez repeatedly emphasized 
that, as rights and duties depend upon one another for their full realization, a 
renewed emphasis on human duties would only strengthen human rights, not 
weaken them. In this context, he called for the development of a global ethic, 
which was to strengthen international human rights law,13 a clear echo of Hans 
Küng’s argument that legal rights alone cannot ensure a rightful condition and 
that therefore a global ethic is needed to attain voluntary self-obligation.
Finally, the draft declaration is also meant as a corrective to what is viewed 
as the unbridled individualism of the West and is opposed to the “‘culture’ of 
‘Individual rights, YES! Social responsibilities, NO!’”14 It holds that, when in-
dividual rights are allowed to predominate over those of society as a whole, and 
individual duties are neglected, freedom will be endangered and conflict will be 
the result. Accordingly, the majority of the duties recognized by the DHSR are 
duties of the individual towards other individuals and to society as a whole. The 
list contains negative duties of respect for the rights of others, but also duties 
to respect the security of the society in which one lives as well as the morality 
prevalent in it (Article 12), and positive duties to develop one’s talents (Article 
25) and to preserve the positive elements of one’s cultural heritage (Article 23).
12. UNCHR. Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Human Rights and Human Responsibilities. UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/2003/105. (2003, March 17). Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/G03/120/23/PDF/G0312023.pdf?OpenElement 16.
13. UNCHR. Human Rights and Human Responsibilities. 20.
14. Ibid. 12.
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The most recent document in the ongoing discussion concerning human du-
ties is a product of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). 
On 25 November 2011 the draft resolution on Fundamental Rights and Respon-
sibilities (FRR)15 was adopted by the Standing Committee, acting on behalf of the 
PACE. The document posits a distinction between moral and legal duties, whereby 
it argues that legal duties must be subject to the proportionality principle (i.e. they 
may not be too heavy a burden) and that moral duties may not be so burdensome 
that bearing them would endanger the individual’s fundamental rights. The FRR 
thus constitutes an account of human duties that, despite its numerous references 
to the UDHRe and the DHSR, is in fact more similar to the DHDR. Like this 
latter declaration, it recognizes the necessity for human duties, but is extremely 
careful not to let them bring human rights into peril.  
Though the explanatory memorandum accompanying the list of duties pos-
its a distinction between moral and legal duties, the actual list contains only 
“responsibilities,” which are understood as moral duties. Thus, even such duties 
as the duty to respect the human rights of others, to respect life, and to respect 
non-discrimination are to be viewed as mere moral duties. The final clause of the 
document, however, does discuss the possible conversion into legally enforceable 
duties, but is limited to repeating the general comments that legal duties may not 
be too demanding and must not conflict with citizens’ fundamental rights.
Thus, within the scope of a few years, multiple declarations16 emphasizing the 
need for a renewed focus on duties saw the light. We can divide these declara-
tions into roughly two categories. In the first category we find declarations such 
as the DHDR and the FRR. These declarations recognize the interdependence 
of rights and duties and strive to clarify the relation between the two. They are 
careful, however, to distinguish between legal and moral duties, so that our legal 
15. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). Fundamental Rights and Responsibilities. 
Doc. 12777. (2011, October 24). Retrieved from http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML-
2HTML-en.asp?fileid=12965&lang=EN. 
16. This list is by no means complete. One could also mention the International Council of Human Duties 
(1993), initiated by Prof. Rita Levi Montalcini, the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of 
Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1998), and the Earth 
Charter (2000). In the Netherlands, the so-called “Nationale Conventie” in 2005 was a similar initia-
tive. It contained proposals to require citizens to contribute to the common good and suggested that 
17-year-olds do a “social” internship (in community centers, nursing homes, refugee care, etc.): Nation-
ale Conventie. Hart voor de publieke zaak. (2006, September). Retrieved from http://www.parlement.
com/9291000/d/natconv.pdf. In the UK the government drafted a green paper entitled Rights and Re-
sponsibilities: Developing Our Constitutional Framework. (2009, March). Retrieved from https://www.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228938/7577.pdf.
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duties do not become too burdensome, in which case our fundamental rights 
might be brought into jeopardy. Their main goal in allocating human duties is to 
preserve our current human rights culture. 
In the second category, we find declarations such as the UDHRe and the 
DHSR that set a very different goal. The idea common to these declarations is 
that today we are confronted with an overemphasis on individual rights. A re-
newed focus on human duties is to counter this development and bring freedom 
and responsibility more into balance with each other in order to move “from the 
freedom of indifference to the freedom of involvement.” The drafters of these 
documents hold, in sum, that by focusing exclusively on individual rights we 
stimulate an idea of citizenship that is not concerned with the effects of the free 
exercise of one’s rights on the rest of the community. A renewed focus on duties 
is to remedy this ailment.
The difference between these two types of declarations brings us directly 
into some of the main themes of the present dissertation: the importance of a 
renewed focus on duties, the ideal relation between rights and duties, the cate-
gorization of duties (into legal and moral duties, or duties of justice and duties 
of virtue), and the ideal relation between law and morality, or justice and virtue, 
in general. These themes will be discussed throughout the dissertation from 
different perspectives. The next section will present a first attempt at grappling 
with these questions by providing an overview of the reactions of human rights 
scholars to the promulgation of the various human duties declarations. We will 
see that their concerns are chiefly aimed at the ambiguity of the status of the pro-
posed duties (are they legal or moral duties?) as well as at the perceived threat 
that governments will turn to legislating morality (i.e. the worry of paternalism).
§ 1.2 – Critique of human Duties Declarations
Despite their lofty aims of creating a global ethic and more responsible citizens 
so that human rights may be better protected and fully realized, human duties 
declarations of the second category, especially the UDHRe and the DHSR, have 
been greeted with overwhelming critique and skepticism. The two main points of 
criticism can be summed up as follows: “überflüssig und gefährlich.”17 This section 
17. Lohmann, G. (1998). Müssen die Menschenrechte durch eine allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenpflich-
ten ergänzt werden? Perspektiven Ds, Zeitschrift Der Hochschulinitiative Demokratischer Sozialismus, 
15(2), 123–138.
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will deal with the last point, leaving the first point for §1.3. Five points of critique 
will be discussed: the indeterminate nature of the duties listed in the human duties 
declarations, their unclear status (are they legal or moral duties?), the threat of pa-
ternalism, the support from repressive regimes, and the fear that the performance 
of human duties will become a precondition for the enjoyment of human rights.
1. The indeterminate nature of duties. In his article entitled “Hori-
zontal Human Rights Law” John Knox distinguishes two categories 
of duties: converse duties and correlative duties.18 The former are 
vertical duties that run conversely to the duties of the state to re-
spect, protect and fulfill human rights. They are thus duties owed 
by individual citizens to the state or to society at large. Such duties, 
he maintains, “have the potential to undermine human rights be-
cause the government may rely on them to offset the duties it owes 
to the individual under human rights law.”19 Correlative duties, on 
the other hand, are individual duties owed to fellow citizens to re-
spect their rights and are therefore truly horizontal duties. Contrary 
to converse duties, correlative duties can, Knox maintains, in fact 
contribute to the protection of human rights. For example, the right 
to life would be of little consequence if it did not give rise to the 
correlative duty to not take an innocent life, a duty shared by all. 
Knox’s critique of the DHSR starts from his observation that it 
contains mostly converse duties to society. These are vertical duties 
owed by the individual to the state or society, such as the “duty 
to behave in a fraternal manner toward others.”20 The problem 
with such duties is that, given that they are not directly connect-
ed to a particular right, it remains unclear when one has fulfilled 
one’s duty. As a consequence, such duties could be extended in 
ways that conflict with the protection of human rights. For exam-
18. It must be noted here that Knox’s distinction is used only provisionally at this point, in order to provide 
a first approach to the great variety of duties discussed in this chapter. Yet, as will become apparent 
further on in the chapter, his distinction will not suffice to neatly distinguish between legal and moral 
duties. For this reason, it will be necessary to undertake in the next chapter a careful exposition of the 
grounds on the basis of which one can separate the two sets of duties from one another.
19. Knox, J. H. (2008). Horizontal Human Rights Law. American Society of International Law, 102(1), 
1–47. 2.
20. UNCHR. Human Rights and Human Responsibilities. Article 14. Knox fails to mention, however, that 
Article 1 of the Universal Declaration contains almost precisely the same duty (though it does not use the 
word “duty”): “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood” (emphasis added).
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ple, Article 29(4) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights21 – a document often criticized for its inclusion of human 
duties – contains the duty “[t]o preserve and strengthen social and 
national solidarity, particularly when the latter is threatened.” It is 
not clear to what right this duty could correspond, and it should 
therefore be viewed as a converse duty to society as a whole. The 
scope of this duty, furthermore, remains unclear: can the duty to 
preserve national solidarity be extended in such a manner as to jus-
tify the silencing of voices of dissent? When a duty does not cor-
respond to a particular right, it remains difficult to answer such 
questions, Knox maintains. The limits of converse duties are vague 
and thus, when they acquire the force of law, possibly open to ma-
nipulation by those who wish to limit the ambit of human rights. 
2. The unclear status of duties. Proponents of these declarations of 
human duties would argue that their critics who fear that such du-
ties will be abused by repressive governments misunderstand the 
status of the human duties expounded in such declarations. They 
would emphasize the fact that the individual duties enumerated in 
the DHSR and the UDHRe are explicitly intended as moral (not 
as legal) duties. Yet, critics seem to find this argument unconvinc-
ing. They point out that the human duties declarations are none-
theless written in the same language and style as, for instance, the 
UDHR.22 Moreover, both the InterAction Council and the drafters 
of the DHSR have stated that they wish their respective declarations 
to have a similar status as the UDHR.23 While it is true that the 
UDHR is, strictly speaking, not legally binding either, it has result-
ed in binding treaties (most notably the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights). Furthermore, some commentators even 
21. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, hereinafter ACHPR (adopted on June 27 1981 and in 
force since October 21 1986).
22. Knox. Horizontal Human Rights Law. 33. 
23. Fraser, M. (2005). Human Responsibilities and Human Rights in the Age of Terrorism. High Level Ex-
pert Group Meeting on Human Rights and Human Responsibilities in the Age of Terrorism. April 1–2. 
Santa Clara University. http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/global_ethics/laughlin-lectures/
rights-responsibility-fraser.html: “It had been our hope that the Draft Declaration [of the UDHRe] would 
be introduced into the United Nations to be a companion piece to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights so that both ‘rights’ and ‘responsibilities’ would be defined.” Similarly, the DHSR repeatedly ex-
presses the wish to become an international standard regarding the social responsibilities of individuals. 
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regard the UDHR as customary international law.24 Due to these 
facts, it remains unclear what status the duties listed in the DHSR 
and the UDHRe are meant to have. It is this ambiguity with regard 
to the status of these duties that disquiets human rights advocates. 
3. The threat of paternalism. Closely connected with this unclear 
status of human duties, is the question concerning the desirabili-
ty of a “global ethic.” Both the UDHRe and the DHSR argue that 
a better social order cannot be achieved by laws alone, and that 
therefore a global ethic is required. Critics have responded to this 
proposal by arguing that “codifying responsibilities may intrude ar-
bitrarily and selectively into delicate codes of local human morali-
ty.”25 They worry that the introduction of such a global ethic will 
demand of citizens not only that they abide by the law, but also 
that they be good. In other words, they fear that it would enable 
the state to interfere with citizens’ morality, or virtue. If it were 
beyond any doubt that these human duties declarations were intend-
ed as inspirational documents alone, then such appeals for moral 
conduct would be quite harmless and perhaps even welcome. Yet, 
due to the ambiguity regarding the status of these declarations 
(discussed above), the danger of states abusing the call for a glob-
al ethic to enforce a particular mode of conduct they deem “mor-
al” is thought to remain present. In essence, the fear is that such a 
global ethic might lead to paternalism: “if we accepted the ethical 
criterion it proposes, then freedom of speech cases would turn on 
the moral worth of what was being spoken. Freedom of assembly 
cases would turn on the moral worth of the protest, and so on.”26 
4. Support from repressive regimes. An additional factor that wor-
ries critics of the human duties declarations stems from the list of 
supporters of these documents. Among the members of the Inter-
Action Council, for instance, we find the former prime minister 
24. Chinkin, C. (2010). Sources. In D. Moeckli, S. Shah, & S. Sivakumaran (Eds.), International Human 
Rights Law (pp. 103–123). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 120.
25. Saul, B. (2001). In the Shadow of Human Rights: Human Duties, Obligations, and Responsibilities. 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 32, 565–624. 602.
26. Eleftheriadis, P. (2010). On Rights and Responsibilities. Public Law, 31, 33–45. 43. The author is here 
referring to the UK Government’s green paper Rights and Responsibilities calling for a British Bill of 
Rights and Responsibilities.
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of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew (referred to by some as a “benevolent 
dictator”), who is not known as the greatest champion of human 
rights. Matters appear even worse for the DHSR. As said, in 2000 
the initial resolution to study the relation between human rights 
and human responsibilities – which would eventually culminate in 
Martínez’ final report and pre-draft Declaration – was passed by 
the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) with only the 
smallest possible majority (22-21, with ten abstentions). Among the 
countries in favor of the resolution were China, Cuba, Pakistan, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan. Freedom House’s 
annual report on “Freedom in the World” places all these coun-
tries in the “not free” category, whereas the vast majority of the 
countries opposing the resolution belong to the “free” category.27 
The fact that the Special Rapporteur Martínez was himself from a 
country well known for disregarding basic civil liberties and polit-
ical rights (namely Cuba) did not help matters. The support from 
countries with authoritarian tendencies does indeed seem to be a 
deadly blow for the human duties movement. Even if the intentions 
of the DHSR are benevolent, it seems certain countries plan to 
abuse the concept of human duties to the detriment of human rights. 
5. The performance of duties as precondition for enjoying rights. A final 
recurring point of criticism concerns the worry that a declaration of 
human duties would end up making human rights conditional upon 
the adequate exercise of one’s duties.28 Thus, in 2004 (a year after the 
first presentation of the pre-draft Declaration) the European Union 
presented a statement to the UNCHR rejecting the pre-draft Declara-
tion as a threat to human rights. The EU feared that a declaration of 
human responsibilities would introduce conditions for protecting hu-
man rights.29 In other words, the EU wished to prevent the possibility 
27. Freedom House places countries in three different categories – “free,” “partly free” and “not free” – ac-
cording to their compliance (or lack thereof) with basic civil and political human rights. The 2014 report 
can be found at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2014#.VMkKFMYip-
lI. Incidentally, the report does not place all of Pakistan in the not-free category, but only Pakistani 
Kashmir. The rest of Pakistan is placed in the partly free category.
28. E.g. Lazarus, Liora et al. The Relationship Between Rights and Responsibilities (December 1 2009). 
Ministry of Justice Research Paper No. 18/09. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=2022270 or http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2022270. 29-30; Eleftheriadis. On Rights and Responsibilities. 45. 
29. United Nations Economic and Social Council. Statement on behalf of the European Union (July 22, 
2004). PRES04-217 EN. http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_3700_en.htm. 
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of some states refusing a citizen his or her right to a fair trial, because 
he or she has not fulfilled his or her duty to obey the law, for example. 
Critics maintain that the UDHRe and DHSR do not exclude such 
conditionality clearly (enough) and therefore remain open to abuse.
These five points of criticism concern mainly the possible dangers connected 
with an imprecise use of human duties. Therefore, the following chapters (par-
ticularly Chapters 3 and 4) will set out to neatly define the content, scope and 
status of two particularly contentious positive duties, whereas Chapter 5 will 
deal with the question of paternalism. The larger point will be that it is possible 
to argue for human duties in a manner that is precise, discerning and, most im-
portantly, compatible with and even beneficial to human rights. 
First, however, we will discuss the second overarching point of criticism 
of human duties (the other being the danger involved), namely the argument 
that a separate declaration of human duties is superfluous. The drafters of the 
human duties declarations argue that the relevant documents of international 
human rights law promote an unchecked individualism without due regard for 
the duties owed to one’s fellow man and one’s (political) community. Yet, critics 
retort, human rights documents already acknowledge the need for duties that 
correspond to human rights. In order to establish the veracity of this last state-
ment (and to see whether such rights-corresponding duties cover the entire gam-
ut of duties put forward in human duties declarations) the next section will be 
dedicated to an examination of the individual duties already present in current 
human rights documents.
§ 1.3 – human Duties in International human rights Law
This section does not aim to provide an exhaustive overview of all the individual 
duties present in international human rights law. Instead, the goal is to study 
some of the most important international human rights documents in order to 
clarify the role that individual duties play in them. Is there indeed already, as 
critics of the human duties declarations have stated, enough attention for human 
duties in international human rights documents? If so, how do those duties com-
pare to those enumerated in, for instance, the UDHRe and the DHSR?
In order to answer these questions, this section is structured in the fol-
lowing manner: first, in §1.3.1, we will discuss some of the negative individual 
duties (what Knox referred to as “correlative duties”) – i.e. duties of non-inter-
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ference and duties to exercise one’s rights responsibly – present in international 
human rights documents; subsequently, in §1.3.2, we will consider a number of 
positive individual duties30 that these documents contain. The conclusion will be 
that there is indeed more talk of individual duties in human rights documents 
than one would initially expect, but that the duties going beyond mere negative 
duties of forbearance and duties to exercise one’s rights responsibly are not at 
all sufficiently clarified. Positive duties of aid and duties to the community are, 
instead, characterized by an astonishing vagueness, which belies the criticism 
found at the outset of this chapter that a renewed focus on individual duties, ad-
vocated by the drafters of the human duties declarations, would be superfluous.
 
§ 1.3.1 – Negative Individual human Duties in International human rights Law
Though human rights were initially intended mainly as guarantees for the pro-
tection of certain fundamental freedoms and interests against the state, and the 
question of duties referred almost exclusively to state duties to “respect, protect 
and fulfill” human rights, the last years have witnessed an ever growing interest 
for the duties of non-state actors. The traditional vision in which the state alone 
is the bearer of human duties is thereby slowly being replaced by a more pluralist 
conception of human duties. Great steps have already been taken in defining the 
human duties of such non-state actors as transnational corporations,31 interna-
tional financial institutions (such as the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO)32, 
NGOs, rebel groups, and the international community.33 Some have argued that 
the reason for this gradual change lies in the fact that, though states are obvi-
ously still responsible for a great part of human rights violations worldwide, 
“individuals and private groups, including corporations and terrorist bands, are 
now thought to pose an equal or greater threat to public order.”34 The present 
30. The reader will notice that I have dropped Knox’s distinction between “correlative” and “converse” du-
ties. Converse duties, as Knox defines them, refer solely to duties owed by the individual to the state or 
society at large. However, given that, in the rest of the dissertation, I will not only focus on such duties 
to the community, but also on individual duties of aid (which are certainly not vertical or converse du-
ties, but rather horizontal duties that stem from global subsistence needs), I have chosen to use the term 
“positive duties” here instead, which can cover both duties to the community and duties of aid.
31. De Schutter, O. (2006). Transnational Corporations and Human Rights. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
32. Ibid.; Lafont, C. (2010). Accountability and Global Governance: Challenging the State-Centric Concep-
tion of Human Rights. Ethics and Global Politics, 3(3), 193–215.
33. For a good overview of the various human rights duties of non-state actors see: Clapham, A. (2006). 
Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
34. Katz Cogan, J. (2011). The Regulatory Turn in International Law. Harvard International Law Journal, 
52(2), 321–372. 330.
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dissertation focuses on individual human duties, because the central values and 
interests that lie at the foundation of human rights are of such a fundamental 
import that they merit protection not only from states and the non-state actors 
mentioned above, but also from possible violations by private persons. Accord-
ingly, this subsection sets out to expound the various negative individual human 
duties present in international human rights law, whereby the main focus will 
lie on the European Convention on Human Rights35 and the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights.36 Other human rights documents will be 
mentioned in a more cursory fashion. 
Negative duties of respect for the human rights of others can again be di-
vided into two classes: (1) duties of forbearance (duties to refrain from doing 
something) and (2) duties to exercise one’s rights responsibly. As an example of 
an individual duty of forbearance we could examine the various duties correlat-
ing with the right to be free from slavery, servitude and compulsory labor (Ar-
ticle 4 ECHR, Article 8 ICCPR). Whereas the prohibition of compulsory labor 
is mainly aimed at states, the prohibition of slavery and servitude – given that 
slavery and servitude chiefly take place within the private sphere – indicates that 
this right was also meant to have a horizontal effect or Drittwirkung (third-party 
applicability), as it is termed in German legal discourse. Both documents simply 
state that no one is to be held in slavery or servitude, whereby it is irrelevant by 
whom one is enslaved. Therefore we may conclude that not only the vertical re-
lations between the state and citizens, but also the horizontal relations between 
citizens among themselves are regulated by this human right.37 The individual 
human duty in this case thus consists in a duty of forbearance, i.e. a negative 
duty not to enslave or force into servitude anyone else.
International criminal law provides us with additional examples of such 
individual duties of forbearance. Thus the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide unequivocally states that “[p]ersons com-
mitting genocide . . . shall be punished, whether they are . . . public officials or 
private individuals.”38 Similarly the International Convention on the Suppres-
sion and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid emphasizes that “apartheid and 
35. The European Convention on Human Rights, hereinafter ECHR (drafted in 1950 and in force since 
1953).
36. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, hereinafter ICCPR (adopted in 1966 and in 
force since 1976).  
37. Van Leuven, N. (2009). Contracten en mensenrechten: Een mensenrechtelijke lezing van het contrac-
trecht. Antwerpen: Intersentia. 73.
38. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted by the UN General 
Assembly on 9 December 1948 and in force since 12 January 1951). Article 4. 
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similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination . . . are 
crimes violating the principles of international law,” and that “[i]international 
criminal responsibility shall apply . . . to individuals,” and not merely to repre-
sentatives of state.39
The individual duties to exercise one’s rights responsibly are more complex 
than the individual duties of forbearance, discussed above. As they are connect-
ed to the limitations that are placed on the exercise of certain human rights, they 
raise the question when such limitations are legitimate. The right to freedom of 
expression is a famous example of a right that may be subject to certain restric-
tions. Article 20 ICCPR, for example, states that any form of propaganda for war 
should be prohibited by law, as well as any advocacy for national, racial or reli-
gious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. 
Furthermore, Article 19(3) ICCPR explicitly states that the right to freedom of 
expression “carries with it special duties and responsibilities” and may therefore 
be subject to restrictions by the authorities in the case of a pressing social need, 
i.e. the rights or reputations of others, national security, public order, public 
health, and public morals. Article 10(2) ECHR is worded very similarly,40 with 
the exception that it allows for several more limitations in the interest of, for 
example, territorial integrity. The limitations that may be placed on the right 
to freedom of expression roughly coincide with those that may be applied to a 
number of other rights, such as the right to respect for private and family life 
(Article 8(2) ECHR), the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
(Article 9(2) ECHR, Article 18(3) ICCPR), the right to freedom of assembly and 
association (Article 11(2) ECHR, Articles 21 and 22(2) ICCPR), and the right to 
liberty of movement (Article 2(3) of the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR, Article 
12(3) ICCPR).41 Therefore the guidelines that will be expounded below in the 
context of the right to freedom of expression are by and large also applicable to 
these rights.
Despite the fact that both the ECHR and the ICCPR mention which public 
needs may legitimately warrant the restriction of the right, it may still prove 
very difficult to establish whether a particular restriction of freedom of expres-
39. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (adopted by 
the UN General Assembly on 30 November 1973 and in force since July 18 1976). Articles I(1) and III. 
For a more elaborate discussion of individual human duties under international criminal law cf. Knox. 
Horizontal Human Rights Law. 27–30.
40. One thus wonders how Knox can possibly justify his claim that the ECHR “does not mention private 
duties at all:” Knox. Horizontal Human Rights Law. 14.
41. Martinez-Torron, J. (2003). The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or 
Belief: The European Convention on Human Rights. Global Jurist Advances, 3(2), 1–40. 2.
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sion is legitimate. For this reason, international law has developed a three-part 
test to determine whether a limitation is necessary: the limitation must be (1) 
prescribed by law, (2) necessary in a democratic society, and (3) proportionate 
or necessary to reach some of the aims itemized in, for example, Article 10(2) 
ECHR or Article 19(3) ICCPR.42 In other words, any restriction of the right to 
freedom of expression must be prescribed by law (and these laws must be public-
ly accessible); it must pursue a legitimate aim (such as the protection of the rights 
of others); and the harm caused by the limitation of the right must not outweigh 
the benefit gained in terms of protecting certain fundamental interests. With 
regard to this last point, the European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly 
made clear that the exceptions to which freedom of expression is subject under 
Article 10(2) “must be narrowly interpreted and the necessity for any restrictions 
must be convincingly established.”43
Next to the limitations that are inherent to the very right itself (as stated in 
the second paragraphs of Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the ECHR), the European 
Convention also contains Article 17, the so-called ‘abuse clause.’ This article 
consists in a general prohibition of the abuse of the rights listed in the Conven-
tion.44 Usually this article is used indirectly, that is, by applying it together with 
another article – Article 10(2), for example –, in order to decide whether or not a 
particular limitation (of freedom of expression, in our example) is legitimate. In 
certain cases, however, the abuse clause is used in a direct manner, “categorical-
ly excluding certain expressions from the protection of Article 10.”45 This last ap-
proach is particularly common when the Court has to deal with instances of hate 
speech that undermine the central values of the Convention itself by expressing 
racist, xenophobic, anti-Semitic, and aggressively nationalistic views, as well as 
views that are discriminatory towards minorities and immigrants.46 Thus in the 
case Pavel Ivanov v. Russia the Court held that Ivanov’s anti-Semitic remarks 
42. Ibid. 3. 
43. European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR). Thorgeirson v. Iceland. 25 June 1992. Applica-
tion No. 13778/88. Para. 63.s
44. “Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to 
engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set 
forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.” Similar 
‘abuse clauses’ can be found in the UDHR (Articles 29(2), 29(3) and 30) and in the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR (common Article 5(1)).
45. Cannie, H., & Voorhoof, D. (2011). The Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression in the European Hu-
man Rights Convention: An Added Value for Democracy and Human Rights Protection? Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights, 29(1), 54–83. 58.
46. Recommendation No. R 97 (20) of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on “hate 
speech” (adopted on 30 October 1997). Retrieved from http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hr-
policy/other_committees/dh-lgbt_docs/CM_Rec(97)20_en.pdf.
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did not enjoy protection under Article 10: “Such a general and vehement attack 
on one ethnic group is in contradiction with the Convention’s underlying values, 
notably tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination.”47 Such direct applica-
tions of Article 17 are, however, not limited to expressions of anti-Semitism, as 
the Court showed in Norwood v. the United Kingdom. This case concerned a 
member of the British National Party who, by means of a poster in his window, 
equated Muslims with terrorists, prompting the Court to a similar judgment as 
in the Ivanov case:
Such a general, vehement attack against a religious group, linking 
the group as a whole with a grave act of terrorism, is incompatible 
with the values proclaimed and guaranteed by the Convention, no-
tably tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination.48
In addition to the duties that are mentioned in Article 10(2) and the general 
prohibition of the abuse of rights in Article 17, the jurisprudence of the Court 
has shown that certain professionals (such as journalists) have special duties 
with regard to the exercise of their right to freedom of expression. The reason 
why the Court believes they have these special duties was given by the Grand 
Chamber in Stoll v. Switzerland: 
Hence, the safeguard afforded by Article 10 to journalists in relation 
to reporting on issues of general interest is subject to the proviso 
that they are acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis 
and provide “reliable and precise” information in accordance with 
the ethics of journalism . . . 49
This brief discussion of human rights documents clearly illustrates that 
their drafters were very aware of the fact that:
the legal implementation of human rights requires not only the cor-
relative duty of the state in enforcing those rights but also the re-
47. ECtHR. Pavel Ivanov v. Russia. 20 February 2007. Application No. 35222/04 (decision).
48. ECtHR. Norwood v. the United Kingdom. 16 November 2004. Application No. 23131/03 (decision).
49. ECtHR (Grand Chamber). Stoll v. Switzerland. 10 December 2007. Application No. 69698/01. Para. 
103. For a clear overview of the special rights and duties of journalists, as well as public servants, judges 
and lawyers under Article 10, I refer the reader to: Gerards, J.H. (2013). Artikel 10 EVRM – vrijheid van 
meningsuiting. In J.H. Gerards et al. (red.), Sdu Commentaar  EVRM. Deel 1 – materiële bepalingen 
(pp. 856–1024). Den Haag: Sdu.  
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sponsibilities of the individual to ensure that those rights are not 
abridged by his own actions.50
With regard to negative individual duties we may therefore conclude that the 
critics of the human duties declarations are correct in maintaining that human 
rights law already recognizes individual duties of non-interference and individ-
ual duties to exercise one’s rights in a responsible fashion51.52 Yet, the presence 
of such negative duties in human duties declarations (such as Article 12 DHSR53 
or Article 5 UDHRe54) was not their main concern. Rather, the various positive 
duties to the community lie at the source of the disquiet felt by critics. The fol-
lowing subsection will therefore provide a brief overview of such duties present 
in these latter documents. It will be argued that both the status of the documents 
in question (i.e. a declaration as opposed to a binding treaty) and the place as-
signed to positive duties to the community within the document seem to indicate 
that the positive individual duties present in human rights law are not meant to 
be legally binding. However, what exactly the status of these duties is, why they 
have such a (moral or legal) status and what they exactly require of individuals 
is by no means made clear. 
 Furthermore, a second set of positive duties will appear equally (or per-
haps even more) obscure. Positive individual duties of aid stemming from global 
subsistence needs are barely mentioned in human rights documents and, though 
they are perfunctorily mentioned by the drafters of the various human duties 
declarations, the drafters fail to even begin clarifying their content and status.
§ 1.3.2 – positive Individual human Duties in International human rights 
Law
The preceding subsection dealt with individual legal duties of a negative nature, 
the goal of which essentially consists in ensuring that the individual neither ac-
50. Beddard, R. (1999). The International Journal of Human Rights Duties of individuals under international 
and regional human rights instruments. The International Journal of Human Rights, 3(4), 30–48. 33.
51. By which I mean, as has been made clear, a duty to exercise one’s rights with due regard for, inter alia, 
the rights of others, morality, the interests of national security, and the protection of public health. 
52. Pace Van Leuven, who argues that international human rights documents merely do not explicitly ex-
clude the horizontal application of human rights: Van Leuven. Contracten en mensenrechten. 75.
53. UNCHR. Human Rights and Human Responsibilities: “duty to exercise his or her recognized rights and 
freedoms, with due consideration and respect for the rights and freedoms of others.”
54. InterAction Council. A Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities: “Every person has a respon-
sibility to respect life. No one has the right to injure, to torture or to kill another human person.”
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tively breach the rights of others, nor exceed the limits of the legitimate exercise 
of his or her own rights. There are, however, also other, positive duties that await 
clarification. These duties include positive duties to the community as well as 
positive duties of aid arising from global subsistence needs. 
The foremost example of the first kind of positive duties – i.e. duties to the 
community – is of course Article 29(1) of the UDHR, which states:
Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and 
full development of his personality is possible.
Despite its position at the end of the Declaration, it was certainly not deemed 
unimportant, or a last minute add-on. On the contrary, the drafting history55 of 
Article 29 shows that substantial time and effort were put into its formulation 
from the very beginning. It was certainly not an article added in haste at the 
last moment, but was rather intended as an important guide to adequately un-
derstanding the Declaration as a whole. The drafters wished to emphasize that 
sheer liberty is not the only goal of the Declaration. Instead, they argued that 
true freedom “could only be attained through perfect harmony between the in-
dividual and the community.”56
The drafting history furthermore shows that the relation between rights 
and duties in general was of fundamental importance for the drafters. There 
was a clear awareness that human rights alone, detached from individual duty, 
cannot endure:
In all human activity, both social and political, rights and duties are 
indissolubly linked with one another. While rights enhance individ-
ual freedom, duties express the dignity of that freedom. Duties of 
a legal nature presuppose others of a moral nature which facilitate 
their understanding and serve as their foundation . . . Morality being 
55. For a complete discussion of the drafting history of Article 29 UDHR, see: Daes, E.-I. (1990). Freedom 
of the Individual under Law: an Analysis of Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Geneva: Centre for Human Rights. A somewhat shorter treatment of the drafting history can be found 
in: International Council on Human Rights Policy. (1999). Taking Duties Seriously: Individual Duties in 
International Human Rights Law. A Commentary. Versoix (Switzerland). 19–26. General guides to the 
Universal Declaration, which also discuss the role of Article 29, include Morsink, J. (1999). The Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press; and Glendon, M.A. (2001). A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. New York: Random House.
56. UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.8 (31 January 1947). 4. Also see: UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.14 (5 February 1947). 3; 
and UN Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.5 (8 December 1947). 7: The Declaration “should not seek to separate 
man from his community.” 
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the noblest product of culture, it is the duty of all to respect it at all 
times.57
Next to the striking resemblance with the preamble of the world’s first interna-
tional human rights document – the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man58 – this passage is interesting for another reason. It clearly con-
nects law with morality, and more specifically legal duties with moral duties. 
The question thus arises of what type the individual duties to the community 
were meant to be in the final version of Article 29(1). Erica-Irene Daes, in her 
elaborate study of Article 29, argues that Article 29(1) is a provision of a moral 
nature, “in the sense that it lays down a general rule for individual behavior in 
the community to which the individual belongs.”59 This generality, this lack of 
specificity, is precisely the problem with such duties to the community as they 
are discussed in various human rights documents (as well as in the human duties 
declarations), as we will see. 
The same lack of specificity can be found in Article 1 of the UDHR. It states 
that because all human beings “are endowed with reason and conscience” they 
“should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” What actions are 
required, however, to fulfill this duty to treat others in a spirit of brotherhood 
remains unclear.
A passage very similar to Article 29(1) can be found in the fifth preambular 
paragraph of the two International Covenants:
[T]he individual, having duties to other individuals and to the com-
munity to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the 
promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant.
Though inspired by Article 29(1) UDHR, the International Covenants go be-
yond the Declaration by mentioning not only duties to the community, but also 
to other individuals. These are furthermore specified as containing both neg-
ative duties of observance of rights and positive duties of promoting human 
rights. This passage presents us another clue concerning the question of the 
57. UN Doc. A/C.3/261 (12 October 1948). 2. Also see: UN Doc. A/C.3/304/Rev.2 (20 November 1948). 
58. The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, hereinafter ADRDM (adopted and in force 
by April 1948).
59. Daes. Freedom of the Individual under Law. 17.
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status of individual duties to the community. The ICCPR is, in fact, legally bind-
ing, yet its preamble is not. Placing the individual duties to the community in the 
preamble instead of in an article implies that the drafters did not intend for such 
duties to be of a legal nature. So far, it thus seems that the individual duties to 
the community mentioned in the International Bill of Human Rights are in fact 
intended as moral duties. 
The ADRDM, however, appears to contain both moral and legal duties to 
the community. Starting with the preamble, it clearly emphasizes the interdepen-
dence of rights and duties:
 
The fulfillment of duty by each individual is a prerequisite to the 
rights of all. Rights and duties are interrelated in every social and 
political activity of man. While rights exalt individual liberty, duties 
express the dignity of that liberty.60 
The ADRDM recognizes quite a few duties (its entire second chapter is ded-
icated to the duties of the individual). Here again we find several of Knox’s 
“converse duties,” which at first glance would appear to be moral rather than 
legal duties, such as duties to society, and the duty to honor one’s parents.61 The 
ADRDM, however, also contains a number of duties to the community – such 
as the duty to vote, the duty to obey the law, the duty to work and to pay taxes62 
– that are habitually viewed as legal duties (with the possible exception of the 
duty to vote). The content of these duties is clearly stated, rendering it possible to 
determine when an individual has and when he or she has not fulfilled his or her 
duty. As these are also duties that individuals have towards the state and towards 
society at large, they present us with our first example of individual duties to the 
community of a legal nature. 63
60. Note how dignity is here connected to the fulfillment of duty. Throughout most of the history of moral 
philosophy this thought has had precedence over the idea that human dignity is primarily connected 
with rights. This is clearly shown by Oliver Sensen in Sensen, O. (2011). Human Dignity in Historical 
Perspective: The Contemporary and Traditional Paradigms. European Journal of Political Theory, 10(1), 
71–91. his article “Human dignity in historical perspective: The contemporary and traditional para-
digms.” European Journal of Political Theory 10.1 (2011): 71–91.
61. ADRDM. Articles XXIX and XXX respectively.
62. Ibid. Articles XXXII, XXXIII, XXXV and XXXVI respectively.
63. Though, of course, the ADRDM is, as a declaration, strictly speaking not a legally binding document, al-
though some argue that the ADRDM is now also a source of legal obligations for members of the Charter 
of the Organization of American States (hereinafter OAS): Pasqualucci, J. (2010). The Americas. In D. 
Moeckli, S. Shah, & S. Sivakumaran (Eds.), International Human Rights Law (pp. 433–453). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 435.
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The American Convention on Human Rights,64 by contrast, barely speaks 
of individual human duties. Chapter V, entitled “Personal Responsibilities,” only 
contains one Article:
Article 32. Relationship between Duties and Rights
1. Every person has responsibilities to his family, his community, and 
mankind
2. The rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the 
security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare, in a 
democratic society.
 
Unlike the second chapter of the ADRDM, the ACHR thus does not pro-
vide any specific individual duties, but limits itself in Article 32(1) to broad, 
general duties to one’s family, community and to mankind. Article 32(2) is a 
standard clawback clause, the function of which is to call on all bearers of rights 
to exercise those rights responsibly, i.e. with due regard for the rights of others 
and for the common good. Finally, the Convention contains a general abuse 
clause, not unlike Article 17 ECHR and Article 5(1) ICCPR, stating that none of 
its provisions “shall be interpreted as permitting any State Party, group, or per-
son to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized 
in this Convention.”65
Like the ADRDM, the African Charter also prescribes private duties to the 
community. It does so with the express goal of incorporating within the African 
Charter distinctly African values. Thus it recognizes in Article 27(1) that “[e]
very individual shall have duties towards his family and society, the State and 
other legally recognized communities and the international community.” Article 
29, subsequently, provides us with an elaborate list of the various types of duties 
to the community alluded to in Article 27(1), which are considered to be, by the 
Charter itself, specifically African duties:
1. [T]o preserve the harmonious development of the family and to 
work for the cohesion and respect of the family; to respect his par-
ents at all times; 
64. The American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ACHR) was adopted by the OAS on 22 No-
vember 1969 and has been in force since 18 July 1978.
65. ACHR. Article 29(a).
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2. To serve his national community by placing his physical and intellec-
tual abilities at its service;
3. Not to compromise the security of the State whose national or res-
ident he is; 
4. To preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity . . . ; 
5. To preserve and strengthen the national independence and the ter-
ritorial integrity of his country and to contribute to its defense in 
accordance with the law; 
6. To work to the best of his abilities and competence, and to pay taxes 
imposed by law in the interest of the society; 
7. To preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values . . . and, 
in general, to contribute to the promotion of the moral well being 
of society; 
8. To contribute to the best of his abilities . . . to the promotion and 
achievement of African unity.
As becomes clear from this list of duties, the ACHPR rejects the notion that 
duties should always be correlative to rights by presenting duties that run from 
the individual to the state, to the national community as well as to other groups, 
and to individuals, without corresponding rights. It is precisely for this reason 
that the ACHPR has been heavily criticized by human rights scholars. Some 
have expressed the fear that the many vertical human duties could be abused by 
authoritarian states. By referring to the duties of the Charter, states could restrict 
human rights whenever they conflict with duties to society or state.66 Essentially, 
this is the same critique that has been leveled at the human duties expounded by 
the drafters of the UDHRe and the DHSR.
These fears might prove to be somewhat unfounded, however, as the Afri-
can Commission has taken no steps to clarify the content of these duties,67 save 
for the application of the general limitation clause of the ACHPR.68 It has held, 
furthermore, that all limitations of the rights expounded in the ACHPR should 
66. Cohen, R. (1993). Endless Teardrops: Prolegomena to the Study of Human Rights in Africa. In R. Cohen 
(Ed.), Human Rights and Governance in Africa (pp. 3–38). Gainesville (FL): Florida University Press. 
15; Knox. Horizontal Human Rights Law. 16: “[A] government could cite these duties as excuses to limit 
or override human rights.” 
67. Heyns, C., & Killander, M. (2010). Africa. In D. Moeckli, S. Shah, & S. Sivakumaran (Eds.), Inter-
national Human Rights Law (pp. 479–497). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 485; cf. Steiner, H. J., 
& Alston, P. (1996). International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 694.
68. African Charter. Article 27(2): “The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due 
regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.”
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be in compliance with international human rights law standards. In this manner, 
it would seem that the African Commission has effectively rendered the positive 
duties to the community listed in the African Charter inoperative. One reason 
for this is that some of the duties mentioned in the Charter are already justiciable 
under the domestic law of the states parties, such as Article 29(2) (the duty of 
national service and defense), Article 29(3) (“Not to compromise the security of 
the State”), and Article 29(6) (“to pay taxes imposed by law in the interest of the 
society”). Another reason may be, with regard to the remaining duties, that the 
African Commission considers the duties not to be duties of a legal nature that 
may be enforced. These duties – such as Article 29(1) (“to preserve the harmo-
nious development of the family”), Article 29(4) (“To preserve and strengthen 
social and national solidarity”), and Article 29(7) (“To preserve and strengthen 
positive African cultural values . . . and, in general, to contribute to the pro-
motion of the moral well being of society”) – thus assume the form of moral 
appeals, rather than of legal prescriptions. This conclusion is confirmed by the 
lack of specificity of these individual duties.69 It thus also remains unclear when 
one has adequately discharged one’s duties. Ambiguous terms, such as “family,” 
“African cultural values,” “African unity,” and “social and national solidarity” 
further obscure the meaning of the prescribed duties. This, in turn, renders 
practical enforcement of these duties problematic and leads us to conclude that, 
rather than strict legal obligations, these duties seem to be of a moral nature that 
may be fulfilled according to one’s own insight and means.
We may conclude that duties to the community in human rights documents 
are generally interpreted as duties of a moral nature. Why this is the case, how-
ever, is not explained. Why certain duties may be enforced through legal means 
whereas others form but a moral appeal is never argued for. The basis for this 
distinction will therefore need to be exhaustively argued. This task will be un-
dertaken in Chapter 2. 
Furthermore, the content of the civic duties (as I will also call the duties to 
the community) listed in human rights documents is greatly underdetermined. 
What does it mean that we all have duties to the community, as Article 29(1) 
UDHR points out? What does serving one’s national community (Article 29(2) 
ACHPR) exactly amount to? What does it mean that a document like the Amer-
ican Declaration lumps together duties to the community of a legal (e.g. duties 
to obey the law and to pay taxes) and of a moral nature (e.g. the duty to honor 
69. Saul. In the Shadow of Human Rights. 593.
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one’s parents)? What community, exactly, is intended? Critics of human duties 
declarations may be correct when they state that there are already plenty of du-
ties present in human rights documents, but given that they do not provide any 
clarity regarding the nature (Are they legal or moral duties, and why?), content 
and scope (What do I owe to whom, and why?) of duties to the community, it 
is by no means true that a renewed focus on individual duties within a human 
rights discourse is superfluous. For this reason, Chapter 5 will set out to deter-
mine the correct understanding of the content of these duties to the community 
as well as their status (legal or moral, that is, duties of justice or duties of virtue).
Matters are even worse when it comes to that other set of positive duties, to 
be discussed in Chapter 4, namely duties of aid. Concerning the duties of indi-
viduals regarding global poverty, we have very little to go on. Article 25 of the 
Universal Declaration and Article 11 ICESCR speak of a right to an adequate 
standard of living. Nowhere in these documents, however, do we find a clue 
concerning individual duties correlative to this right. In the General Comments 
issued by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 
which are meant to function as interpretations of the provisions of the ICESCR, 
we merely find very vague allusions to individual duties. For example, all mem-
bers of society (including individuals) are said to “have responsibilities in the 
realization of the right to adequate food.”70 What these responsibilities are and 
how responsibilities differ from “obligations,” a word apparently reserved for the 
duties of the state, remains unclear. If I wish to know which duties are placed on 
my shoulders as a consequence of Article 25 UDHR, I will not find any answers 
in human rights documents or in the General Comments of the CESCR (as will 
be more elaborately argued in §3.1).
The human duties declarations do not fare much better. Article 9 of the 
UDHRe holds that all “[a]ll people, given the necessary tools, have a responsi-
bility to make serious efforts to overcome poverty, malnutrition, ignorance, and 
inequality.” Yet, what constitutes “serious efforts,” and whether we owe this duty 
to all human beings or only to our compatriots is never clarified. Similarly, Arti-
70. CESCR. General Comment 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11). E/C.12/1999/5 (12 May 1999). 
Para. 20. The ICESCR and the General Comments of the CESCR are generally extremely state-focused. 
Duties of non-state actors – such as corporations, international financial institutions, and NGOs – are not 
dealt with extensively either. A typical description of their duties can be found in the CESCR’s Statement 
on Poverty: “Non-State actors, including international organizations, national human rights institutions, 
civil society organizations and private businesses, also have heavy responsibilities in the struggle against 
poverty.” CESCR. Statement on Poverty and the ICESCR, E/C.12/2001/10 (10 May 2001). Para. 20. 
Again, what these responsibilities are, is left open. 
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cle 20 DHSR states that one has a duty to use one’s wealth “for the benefit of the 
progress of Humanity as a whole.” Yet, how does one contribute to the “prog-
ress of Humanity?” What exactly is even meant by the “progress of Humanity?” 
Are these duties intended as moral duties or as enforceable legal duties? What 
happens if one does not perform these duties? All these questions still remain 
unanswered. Both the content and the status (moral or legal) of individual duties 
of aid with regard to global subsistence needs remain unclear. Human rights 
documents and human duties declarations both have contributed next to nothing 
to their elucidation.
Not wishing to accept the implication that individuals therefore have no du-
ties with regard to global subsistence needs, Chapter 4 will set out to provide an 
account of our duties of aid, as well as the status of these duties (legal or moral) 
and their scope. For now, we can only conclude that regarding individual posi-
tive duties – both duties of aid and duties to the community – human rights dis-
course does not take individual duties seriously enough to care to clarify them.71 
Furthermore, the drafters of the human duties declarations may aspire to put 
individual duties back on the map, but it seems they are not the best cartogra-
phers. Reconsidering our duties is therefore by no means a superfluous pursuit, 
as our positive duties in particular remain largely shrouded in mystery.
§ 1.4 – Conclusion: human Duties Compared 
Neither the critics nor the proponents of the various declarations emphasizing 
human duties would disagree with the statement that individual human duties 
are indispensable for the full realization of human rights. Opinions diverge 
only where the type and scope of such duties are concerned. Despite the fact 
that some would argue that “the language of individual duty in the universal 
human rights system is rare,”72 the preceding sections have pointed out that 
there has in fact been more attention for individual duties in international hu-
man rights documents than initially expected. Nonetheless, it remains true that 
“the desirable role of ‘duties’ in modern human rights theories is unclear,”73 
71. Despite the hope-giving title of a publication by the International Council on Human Rights Policy 
mentioned earlier: Taking Duties Seriously: Individual Duties in International Human Rights Law. 
A Commentary. This publication, however, also contains no specific answers concerning the positive 
individual duties that interest us here.
72. Steiner and Alston. International Human Rights in Context. 181.
73. Devereux, A. (1995). Should “Duties” Play a Larger Role in Human Rights? A critique of Western Libe-
ral and African Human Rights Jurisprudence. UNSW Law Journal, 18(2), 464–482. 464.
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particularly where the positive duties to the community and duties of aid are 
concerned. For this reason, the advent of human duties declarations in the past 
two decades should be considered, even by its opponents, as a blessing (albeit 
in disguise, from the critics’ perspective). It forces human rights scholars and 
legal philosophers alike to confront the question of individual human duties: 
their content, scope and status as well as their relation with rights all require 
further clarification, for as we have concluded at the end of the previous sec-
tion, the positive individual duties mentioned in human rights documents re-
main far too underdetermined.
This chapter has set a first step in such elucidation by discussing both the 
duties listed in the various human duties declarations (chiefly the UDHRe and 
the DHSR) and those listed in international human rights documents. The 
most often recurring question in this comparison was which duties may be 
enforced by law and should therefore be considered legal duties, and which, 
conversely, may not be enforced by law (because the degree and manner of 
fulfillment of such duties is the prerogative of the individual) and are therefore 
to be regarded as moral duties. The present chapter has taken some first steps 
in distinguishing the former from the latter, both in declarations emphasizing 
human duties and in human rights documents. However, much work remains 
to be done here. Indeed, as became clear in §1.2, one of the main problems 
with human duties declarations as the UDHRe and DHSR lies in the confu-
sion of moral and legal duties. On the one hand, they contain, for example, 
the duty to respect life (Article 5 UDHRe) – a clear legal duty, recognized by 
international human rights law – and on the other hand they propose duties to 
“promote good and to avoid evil in all things” (Article 3 UDHRe) or to develop 
one’s talents “through diligent endeavor” (Article 10 UDHRe), which appear 
to be moral duties. 
This confusion of law and morality, however, is not unique to the drafters of 
human duties declarations. The criticism of most opponents of such declarations 
generally consists in simply asserting that these declarations confuse legal with 
moral duties, without ever clarifying wherein such a distinction would consist. 
The difference between law and morality is never argued for, but rather posited 
as a fact. As said, the advent of human duties declarations is a positive devel-
opment, for it forces us to (re)think some of the fundamental distinctions that 
lie at the basis of all (human rights) law. How does law (or justice) differ from 
morality (or virtue)? On the basis of what criteria are we able to distinguish be-
tween duties of justice and duties of virtue? These questions have not at all been 
addressed by the critics of human duties declarations, nor by their proponents. 
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Yet, without clear ideas about how to answer these questions, the discussion be-
tween these two camps amounts to mere assertions of the one camp concerning 
the incorrectness of the other’s position.74
In §1.3 it was demonstrated that, despite the leveling of harsh criticisms against 
the declarations of human duties, the concept of individual human duties is not 
at all foreign to human rights documents. Even in human rights treaties such as 
the ECHR and the ICCPR – documents not exactly known for their emphasis 
on human duties, unlike the ACHPR and the ADRDM, for instance – we were 
able to find quite a number of individual human duties of a legal nature. Several 
articles of the ECHR and the ICCPR – such as those safeguarding the right to 
freedom of expression, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
the right to freedom of assembly and association, and the right to liberty of 
movement – contain so-called “clawback clauses” that place limits on the men-
tioned rights, thus implying an individual human duty to exercise these rights 
responsibly. Though some would consider such clawback clauses dangerous, as 
they appear to limit the scope of human rights, other human rights scholars have 
argued that they are necessary in order to ensure the compatibility of everyone’s 
rights. They, in fact, “enhance the level of consideration owed to other individu-
als and the community.”75
This reasoning, that one has a duty to exercise one’s rights in a responsible 
manner has also found its way into international human rights law. Accordingly, 
the ECtHR argued in Pretty v. United Kingdom that the limitation of the appli-
cant’s right to private life – here interpreted as the right to personal autonomy, 
which the Court defined as “the ability to conduct life in a manner of one’s own 
choosing”76 – was “justified as ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for the protec-
tion of the rights of others.”77 The Court thus recognized that human rights do not 
74. Even the distinction between correlative and converse duties offered by Knox is simply posited (with-
out argument) as self-evident, whereby horizontal, correlative duties are assumed to be legal duties 
and vertical, converse duties are assumed to be of a moral nature. However, the vertical duties to the 
community or the state to pay taxes, vote, obey the law, and render civic or military service clearly show 
that the correlative-converse distinction does not neatly correspond to the division between law and 
morality, respectively. Furthermore, beneficence surely is a horizontal duty, yet it is generally considered 
to be a moral duty, thus again showing that Knox’s distinction is inadequate. Finally, Knox’s distinction 
between correlative and converse duties ignores the duties to oneself, as prescribed by the human duties 
declarations. The distinction between law and morality (and their respective duties) therefore needs to 
be carefully argued for, not assumed. Providing precise arguments for the division of these two realms 
will be the goal of the next chapter.
75. Hodgson, D. (2003). Individual Duty within a Human Rights Discourse. Aldershot: Ashgate. 98.
76. ECtHR. Pretty v. United Kingdom. 29 April 2002. Application No. 2346/02. Para. 62.
77. Ibid. Para. 78.
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ensure a personal autonomy without bounds. Instead, with this judgment it made 
clear that “personal autonomy finds its boundaries in the rights of others.”78 
In §1.3 many more such examples have been given that attest to the pres-
ence of individual duties to respect the rights of others (as well as public health, 
order and morals) by exercising one’s own rights in a responsible fashion. Up 
until this point, existing human rights law and the proponents of the various 
human duties declarations are still in agreement. Yet, despite the presence of 
such duties in human rights law, the drafters of the UDHRe and the DHSR 
retain that human rights and human duties, freedom and responsibility, are still 
not in balance. They insist that the emphasis lies too heavily on human rights 
and individual freedom, and not enough on human duties and the good of the 
community. In order to remedy this imbalance, they propose individual duties 
owed to society at large, as well as duties to oneself. Generally, such duties are 
quite admirable. Indeed, no one would deny the commendable nature of the 
duty “to behave in a fraternal manner toward others” (Article 14 DHSR), the 
duty “to contribute […] to the eradication of social ills that affect or destroy key 
elements in the effective dignity and freedom of others” (Article 21 DHSR), or 
the duty “to develop, to the greatest degree possible, his or her intellectual, spir-
itual, physical and emotional capacities, both for his or her own benefit and for 
that of the community” (Article 25 DHSR). However, critics of human duties 
declarations would argue that, honorable as such duties may be, they find their 
proper place in morality, not in legally binding documents. Though proponents 
of human duties declarations do indeed explicitly define (without providing ar-
guments, however) the proposed human duties as moral, rather than legal, it re-
mains odd that at the same time the InterAction Council wishes the UDHRe to 
attain the same status as the UDHR. Critics fear this could lead such human du-
ties declarations to obtain, like the UDHR, the status of customary international 
law, or to inspire a legally binding document, much like the UDHR inspired the 
International Covenants. It is precisely this ambiguity with regard to the desired 
legal status of such declarations that unnerves many human rights advocates, 
who insist that such duties cannot and should not be legally binding. They argue 
that granting legal status to these declarations would result in practical problems 
of enforcement and, more importantly, they fear that the promotion of human 
duties will lead to the unduly limitation of human rights. Finally, they worry 
78. Koffeman, N.R. (The Right to) Personal Autonomy in the Case Law of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (nota opgesteld ten behoeve van de Staatscommissie Grondwet). Leiden: Leiden University, 
2010. 59.
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that governments might now feel justified in imposing certain duties of a moral 
nature, resulting in paternalism.
In order to clearly ascertain why (and if) some of the duties discussed in 
this chapter are indeed moral duties and therefore should have no place in any 
(even potentially) legally binding document, we will need to gain a fuller under-
standing of the distinction between moral and legal duties, which is what the 
following chapter sets out to provide. The clarification of the distinction between 
these two sets of duties will rely on the prior elucidation of the underlying dis-
tinction between morality (virtue) and law (justice), which will be provided in 
Chapter 2 as well. 
Finally, we found (in §1.3.2) that both individual positive duties of aid and 
duties to the community are severely underdetermined in human rights doc-
uments and human duties declarations. Contrary to the claim of critics that a 
renewed focus on individual duties is superfluous, we will need to elaborately 
study these two positive duties, as we have found that the human rights perspec-
tive does not help us understand the nature, content and scope of the demands 
they place on us. Accordingly, Chapter 4 will examine individual duties of aid 
arising from global subsistence needs, Chapter 5 will consider the complicated 
case of individual duties to the community, and Chapter 3 will examine them 
both from a juridical perspective.
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ChApTEr 2 – DuTIES AND rIGhTS
[W[hoever does not place the distinction between justice and mo-
rality in general where we have now placed it, will be found to make 
no distinction between them at all, but to merge all morality in 
justice.1
In the previous chapter we examined various human duties from both human 
rights documents and human duties declarations. Without having provided the 
necessary conceptual framework, which will be undertaken in this chapter, we 
provisionally noted that certain duties (such as the duty to develop one’s talents 
or to help eradicate the social ills of one’s society) do not belong within the 
sphere of legally binding documents, whereas others (such as the duty to refrain 
from assaulting others) clearly do. The reason why certain duties can be legal 
duties (with corresponding rights) whereas others cannot, however, still needs to 
be clarified. Such clarification will require an exposition of the central concepts 
involved, that is, duties and rights. Regarding the former, we will, furthermore, 
need to explain the two central distinctions that can be made regarding our 
duties: the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties and the distinction 
between duties of justice and duties of virtue. Explicating the latter distinction 
will, moreover, involve elucidating the terms “justice” and “virtue” themselves 
as well as their mutual relation. These terms and distinctions will be clarified 
here, at the outset of the dissertation, as they will frequently prove useful in the 
remainder of this study. In short, this chapter will provide a theory of duties and 
rights, which will in the subsequent chapters allow us to resolve several practical 
problems from the fields of human rights law and politics.
In keeping with the general theme of this dissertation (the importance of a 
renewed focus on duties), we will start this chapter not by an exposition of rights 
(which will be undertaken in §2.2), but rather with an exploration of duties (in 
§2.1). This is not merely a matter of exposition. The larger point I wish to make 
in this chapter is that looking at morality2 from the perspective of rights severely 
diminishes the scope of our moral landscape. By starting from rights we are able 
1. Mill, J. S. (2008). Utilitarianism. In J. Gray (Ed.), On Liberty and Other Essays (pp. 129–201). New 
York: Oxford University Press. 186. 
2. The term “morality” will from now on no longer be used in opposition to the term “law,” but rather as 
the more general term comprising the realms of both justice and virtue.
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to recognize solely one type of duty, namely duties of justice (as only these have 
corresponding rights), resulting in the reduction of all actions going beyond such 
duties to merely optional acts of supererogation. Starting from duties will allow 
us to steer clear of this error and thus redeem imperfect duties and duties of 
virtue from inconsequentiality. Far from endangering our rights, this approach 
will, additionally, render our rights more clear and robust.
Before moving on to the discussion of duties and rights, perhaps a word 
on the theoretical background of the present chapter is in order. As announced 
in the introduction, I will be relying heavily on the work of Immanuel Kant in 
order to clarify the various kinds of duties as well as our rights. The choice for 
Kant was not made at random. Kant’s political and legal philosophy are constant 
sources of inspiration for contemporary thoughts on justice, human rights, in-
ternational intervention, and similar matters.3 Furthermore, a dominant strand 
of contemporary political theory (comprising the works of, e.g., Alan Gewirth, 
Onora O’Neill, Thomas Pogge, and John Rawls,) is Kantian in nature. The ideas 
developed by Kant concerning matters of justice and virtue have had and con-
tinue to have a profound influence on contemporary debates in the fields of po-
litical and legal philosophy. To understand and present these ideas properly will, 
therefore, not only help us to better understand the problems at hand, but will 
also allow us to participate in an ongoing debate in which Kantian philosophy 
occupies a place of prominence.
§ 2.1 – On Duties
Generally, we could define “duty” as an action to which one is bound. It is a spe-
cific action one is obligated (that is, literally bound) to perform. Within this very 
generic understanding of duty, however, several distinctions can be made. Most 
importantly, we can distinguish between perfect and imperfect duties as well as 
between duties of justice and duties of virtue. As will become clear, these two 
sets of duties are intimately connected, yet not strictly synonymous. 
3. See, for example, Kleingeld, P. (2012). Kant and Cosmopolitanism: the Philosophical Idea of World 
Citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Williams, H. (2012). Kant and the End of War: 
a Critique of Just War Theory. London: Palgrave Macmillan; Roff, H. M. (2013). Global Justice, Kant 
and the Responsibility to Protect: A Provisional Duty. New York: Routledge; Follesdal, A., & Maliks, 
R. (Eds.). (2014). Kantian Theory and Human Rights. New York: Routledge; Flikschuh, K., & Ypi, L. 
(Eds.). (2014). Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press; Lesser, A. H. (Ed.). (2015). Kant’s ‘Doctrine of Right’ in the Twenty-first Century. Cardiff: Uni-
versity of Wales Press. Forthcoming.
55
Duties and RightsChapter 2
400088-L-bw-Boot
This section will start by expounding (in §2.1.1) the difference between 
perfect and imperfect duties. Next to clarifying this distinction, I aim to refute 
the common assumption that imperfect duties (often associated with duties 
without corresponding rights) are less binding and less important than perfect 
duties (often understood as duties with corresponding rights), an assumption 
intimately connected with the perspective of rights, which, I intend to demon-
strate in §2.2, is undesirable. Subsequently, §2.1.2 will elucidate the distinction 
between duties of justice and duties of virtue. In the process, it will also prove 
necessary to clarify and assess Kant’s understanding of the terms “justice” and 
“virtue.” Whereas justice is concerned solely with the regulation of our actions 
in order to set up and maintain a system of equal spheres of freedom for all, 
virtue is instead concerned with regulating the principles on which we act as 
well as the inner disposition underlying our outward acts. Finally, after having 
thus emphasized the differences between justice and virtue, §2.1.3 will exam-
ine the relation between these two spheres of morality. I will distance myself 
from Kant’s strict separation of these two spheres and argue instead for their 
interdependence.
§ 2.1.1 – perfect and Imperfect Duties
Etymologically, perfect duties are complete duties and imperfect duties are in-
complete duties.4 But in what sense are these duties (in)complete? In contempo-
rary discussions, duties are typically considered incomplete (and thus imperfect) 
when neither the duty-bearer nor the precise content of the duty nor the recipient 
of the duty has been determined. By contrast, in the case of perfect duties “who 
the agent is, what her exact responsibility is, and to whom she owes this respon-
sibility are clearly defined.”5 From this incompleteness, it follows that imperfect 
duties are not claimable (and therefore, a fortiori, not enforceable), nor do they 
give rise to corresponding rights. Non-performance of imperfect duties, finally, 
does not give rise to demerit, whereas violation of perfect duties does. 
These differences between the two sets of duties have led many contem-
porary scholars to believe that perfect duties are more binding and of greater 
4. The Latin root of perfect and imperfect is reflected in the German translations of these terms: vollkom-
mene and unvollkommene Pflicht.
5. Tan, K. C. (2004). Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 50.
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moral importance than imperfect duties.6 It is this belief that I mean to refute 
in this subsection. I will do so by expounding the distinction between these two 
duties as understood by Kant, on whose work so many scholars (either explicitly 
or implicitly) erroneously base their claim that imperfect duties carry less moral 
weight and allow for a greater permissiveness than perfect duties. I will argue 
that imperfect duties do indeed allow for discretion on the side of the agent, they 
do lack corresponding rights, and their non-performance is indeed permitted. 
Yet, all this does not warrant the conclusion that they are less important or 
merely optional excellences. Before undertaking this task, however, I will start 
by providing a brief historical sketch of the development of the perfect-imperfect 
distinction.
The rough outlines of the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties as 
it is commonly drawn today can be traced back to the work of the 17th century 
Dutch jurist and legal philosopher Hugo Grotius,7 as does the habit of connect-
ing perfect rights (or “faculties”) and duties to justice and imperfect rights (or 
“aptitudes”) and duties to virtue. Thus, according to Grotius, rights that may be 
enforced, and the violation of which constitutes a wrong, are perfect in nature, 
whereas imperfect rights may not be enforced, nor is anyone wronged by their 
violation.8 Having some moral reason to see a duty performed is therefore not 
enough to render the duty perfect. Only if we have a perfect right to its perfor-
mance does its non-fulfillment constitute a violation of justice. Otherwise, the 
duty in question is imperfect and its fulfillment is a matter not of justice, but 
virtue (“Liberality, Gratitude, Compassion, or Charity”).9
The German philosopher and jurist Samuel von Pufendorf adopts Grotius’s 
distinction and develops it further. He views perfect rights as those warranting 
the use of force (i.e. legal action in a civil state or, between states, war) against 
6. See, e.g., Ashford, E. (2006). The Inadequacy of our Traditional Conception of the Duties Imposed by 
Human Rights. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, XIX(2), 217–235. 219–20; Gilabert, P. 
(2010). Kant and the Claims of the Poor. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(2), 382–418. 
394ff; Waldron, J. (1993). Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-1991. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. 14. The first two authors strive to define duties to help the (global) poor as perfect duties of 
justice, as they believe imperfect duties to be less weighty duties. 
7. Schneewind, J.B. (1998). The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy. Cambrid-
ge: Cambridge University Press. 78. Though some would argue that a similar distinction – that between 
duties of justice and duties of material aid – can already be found in Cicero’s De Officiis: Nussbaum, M. 
(2000). Duties of Justice, Duties of Material Aid: Cicero’s Problematic Legacy. The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 8(2), 176–206.
8. Grotius, H. (2005). The Rights of War and Peace. (J. Barbeyrac, Trans, R. Tuck, Ed.). Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund. I.I.iv; cf. II.XII.ix.2.
9. Ibid. II.XXII.xvi.
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those who would violate them.10 By contrast, the performance of imperfect du-
ties, such as “duties of humanity, beneficence, and gratitude,”11 cannot be extort-
ed by force. The reason why, according to Pufendorf, perfect rights and duties 
are and ought to be enforceable, is that the performance of perfect duties and 
the protection of perfect rights are necessary if society is to exist at all. Imperfect 
rights and duties, on the other hand, contribute to society’s wellbeing. There 
are, in other words, certain duties without the performance of which society 
could not be conceived to persist at all. These are perfect duties. Instead, we 
can conceive of a society persisting through time even though all members of 
this society neglect their imperfect duties. Very concretely, on this view, society 
cannot be imagined to continue to exist if no one would perform the perfect duty 
to refrain from killing innocent people, but it could be thought to persist if no 
one would ever perform their imperfect duty of aiding the poor. Thus, given the 
importance of perfect duties for the very existence of society, they ought to be 
enforceable; no such need, however, pertains to imperfect duties. 
Pufendorf, furthermore, maintains that the content of perfect duties is clear-
ly defined, whereas imperfect duties do not prescribe as precisely. In the case of 
the provision of goods, for example, imperfect duties do “not consider whether 
that which is furnished is equal or not to that on account of which something 
is owed.”12 In the case of imperfect duties the agent can therefore not rely on 
clear legal prescriptions, but must instead follow her own “sense of decency and 
conscience.”13 How much one ought to give, is thus left up to the discretion of 
the agent. 
In sum, we have seen thus far how according to Pufendorf perfect duties 
are characterized by enforceability and precision, whereas unenforceability and 
lack of precision are traits associated rather with imperfect duties. The former 
are, moreover, crucial to peaceful coexistence in society as such, whereas the 
latter contribute “only” to the flourishing of that society.14
Finally, one can distinguish between perfect and imperfect duties regarding 
the moral merit (or demerit) resulting from their (non-)performance. When the 
performance of an action is owed to another (as a matter of right) – be it a spe-
cial duty, such as repaying a debt, or a universal duty, such as refraining from 
10. Pufendorf, S. (1994). On the Law of Nature and of Nations in Eight Books. In C.L. Car (Ed.), M.J. Seid-
ler (Trans.), The Political Writings of Samuel Pufendorf (pp. 93–268). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
I.i.19.
11. Ibid. I,vii.15.
12. Ibid. I.vii.8.
13. Ibid. I. vii. 7.
14. Kersting, W. (2004). Kant über Recht. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag. 204.
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assaulting others – performing it will not result in merit, for “the bare Omission 
of forbidden Actions is utterly unable to produce any Merit, or any Matter for 
Boasting or for Praise.”15 By performing these duties I am only giving others 
their due, i.e. that to which they have a right and which is therefore in a sense 
already theirs. When one instead performs an action, to which the beneficiary 
did not have a right, then one acquires merit. If we did not owe the performance 
of a particular action to others, then our action is meritorious. By contrast, when 
one fails to perform duties one owes to others – by, for example, injuring them – 
the result is demerit and one is obliged to provide some form of compensation. 
Given that those duties, the performance of which is owed by right either to all 
(in the case of rights in rem) or to specific others (in the case of rights in per-
sonam) are called perfect duties, whereas those duties that cannot be claimed 
by right and thus are not owed are termed imperfect duties, we can sum up 
Pufendorf’s position regarding merit and demerit as follows: the performance of 
imperfect duties gives rise to merit, the failure to perform perfect duties gives 
rise to demerit, and the performance of perfect duties gives rise neither to merit 
nor to demerit but appears to be morally neutral. We have seen, furthermore, 
that perfect duties have correlative rights, whereas imperfect duties do not.
The various elements used by Pufendorf to distinguish perfect from im-
perfect duties – (un)enforceability, importance for the very existence or for the 
“mere” flourishing of society, duties to refrain from injury as opposed to duties 
of aid and charity, (lack of) clarity of definition, (no) corresponding rights and 
whether performance of the duty in question gives rise to merit and its omis-
sion to demerit – frequently return in accounts of perfect and imperfect duties. 
Scholars may add or omit elements, they may emphasize some traits at the cost 
of others, and the philosophical foundation of their accounts of duties may vary, 
yet these remain the most central elements of the perfect-imperfect distinction.
Thus, for example, two centuries later John Stuart Mill would describe im-
perfect duties, such as duties of charity or beneficence, as duties all are bound to 
perform. How, when and toward whom we are to perform these duties, however, 
is not specified and is therefore left to our discretion. Imperfect duties, further-
more, do not give rise to correlative rights.16 No one can claim a right, therefore, 
to our beneficence. Perfect duties, by contrast, do prescribe in a precise fashion 
and involve correlative rights. Mill, furthermore, assigns perfect duties to the 
15. Pufendorf, S. (1729). The Law of Nature and Nations. (B. Kennett, Trans., J. Barbeyrac, Ed.). London. 
I.ix.5.
16. Mill. Utilitarianism. 184–5.
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sphere of justice and imperfect duties to the sphere of beneficence, which im-
plies that perfect duties are enforceable and imperfect duties are not. Finally, he 
grants primacy to the dictates of justice (which consist of perfect duties) over 
other dictates of morality, as the rules of justice “concern the essentials of human 
well-being more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, than any 
other rules for the guidance of life.”17 
In contemporary accounts of perfect and imperfect duties, authors often 
focus on the indeterminacy of imperfect duties: who must do what for whom 
is not specified, thus allowing the duty-bearer considerable latitude.18 As a con-
sequence, it is often thought that one may choose to perform imperfect duties 
at one’s pleasure: given that the imperfect duty itself does not prescribe when, 
how and for whom one must perform it, the duty-bearer is at liberty to choose 
herself when (and when not), in what manner and for whom she performs the 
imperfect duty in question. Furthermore, she need not act in accordance with 
her imperfect duties whenever the opportunity presents itself; so long as she 
sometimes performs her duties, she has not violated them. It is clear to see how 
such an understanding of the indeterminate nature of imperfect duties can lead 
to the common thought in contemporary discussions of imperfect duties that 
such duties are less important.19 The thought that imperfect duties do not pro-
vide as clear guidelines for our behavior as perfect duties do, has a long history, 
as shown above. But the conclusion that one may for this reason perform them 
as and when one wishes and that imperfect duties are thus shown to be less im-
portant is peculiar to the view prevailing among scholars today.
That imperfect duties prescribe less clearly than perfect duties is, more of-
ten than not, simply postulated in contemporary discourse. Why they prescribe 
in a less determinate fashion is rarely considered in recent discussions. Yet, once 
we know why the content of imperfect duties is not as clearly specified as the 
dictates of perfect duties, we will find that the latitude involved in imperfect 
duties does not warrant the claim that they are somehow less important or less 
binding than perfect duties. To illustrate this point – that imperfect duties are 
17. Ibid. 195. Cf. 200 and 201.
18. See, e.g.,; Ashford. The Inadequacy of our Traditional Conception. 219; Gilabert. Kant and the Claims 
of the Poor. 391ff.; Griffin, J. (2008). On Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 51, 96; 
Stemplowska, Z. (2009). On the Real World Duties Imposed on Us by Human Rights. Journal of Social 
Philosophy, 40(4), 466–487. 481–2. Tan. Justice Without Borders. 50.
19. Daniel Statman describes this common understanding of imperfect duties and criticizes it, arguing it 
leads to “yuppie ethics:” when a large portion of our duties comes to be viewed as wholly optional and 
not as important as our stricter duties, this results in the performance of the former duties only when it 
is convenient: Statman, D. (1996). Who Needs Imperfect Duties? American Philosophical Quarterly, 
33(2), 211–224. 221–2.
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equally important and by no means optional – we turn now to a discussion of 
Kant’s understanding of the perfect-imperfect distinction.
In The Metaphysics of Morals Kant states that the less precise nature of imper-
fect duties arises from the fact that imperfect duties do not prescribe specific 
actions, but rather maxims for actions: 
if the law can prescribe only the maxims of actions, not actions 
themselves, this is a sign that it leaves a playroom (latitudo) for free 
choice in following (complying with) the law, that is, that the law 
cannot specify precisely in what way one is to act and how much one 
is to do by the action for an end that is also a duty.20
Given that Kant understands maxims as subjective principles of action,21 it is 
clear why duties prescribing only maxims for actions instead of specific actions 
must allow for some latitude. The duty of beneficence, for example, does not 
command us to donate a specific amount to a specific charity or to volunteer at 
least a certain number of times per month at the local homeless shelter. Rather, 
imperfect duties (such as the duty of beneficence) call for the adoption of max-
ims to promote certain ends (that is, I ought to make it my subjective principle 
for action to promote a certain end). In what way we ought to promote the end, 
however, and how much we ought to do in promoting it, is left for us to decide.
Note that the fact that imperfect duties allow a degree of latitude has noth-
ing to do with their supposedly inferior moral weight. The latitude results, in-
stead, from the fact that imperfect duties do not command us to act in specific 
ways, but rather to adopt certain principles. The imperfect duty of beneficence, 
for example, does not prescribe specific beneficent acts, but rather requires us 
to adopt the maxim of making other people’s happiness our end.22 The manner 
in which, however, this maxim is to be applied in specific circumstances is a 
question, the resolving of which necessarily requires a “call upon judgment.”23 
20. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:390; cf. Kant, I. (1968). Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre. In Kants 
Werke. Bd. 23: Vorarbeiten und Nachträge (pp. 371–420). Ausgabe der Königlich Preußischen Akade-
mie der Wissenschaften. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 394.
21. Kant, I. (1996). Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals. In M. Gregor (Ed. & Trans.), Practical 
Philosophy (pp. 41–108). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ak 4:420n; cf. Ak 4:400n. Also see 
Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:225.
22. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:452.
23. Ibid. Ak 6:411. Jens Timmermann discusses the need for judgment and casuistry in the case of duties 
of virtue in the context of possible conflicting grounds of obligation: Timmermann, J. (2013). Kantian 
Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant’s Ethical Theory. Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie, 95(1), 
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We may promote the happiness of those in need by aiding them materially (that 
is, by donating money), but how much we ought to give depends on our means, 
on the presence or absence of social security, on our knowledge of the precise 
needs of specific others, and on a myriad of other contingent factors. But we 
may also help them politically, by lobbying for expansion of the social safety net, 
for instance. Onora O’Neill is, therefore, correct when she maintains that “[i]
mperfect duties require agents to adopt ends or policies [instead of prescribing 
or prohibiting specific actions], but underdetermine the choice of occasions and 
ways of pursuing them.”24
The latitude of imperfect duties does also not imply that they are more per-
missive, or any less binding, than perfect duties, as Kant goes on to say immedi-
ately following the passage quoted above: “But a wide duty is not to be taken as 
permission to make exceptions to the maxims of actions but only as permission 
to limit one maxim of duty by another (e.g., love of one’s neighbor in general by 
love of one’s parents).”25 The latitude agents have in performing imperfect duties 
does thus not imply a permission to refuse to adopt the maxim enjoined by a 
particular imperfect duty. At most, it allows agents to limit one maxim of duty 
by another (e.g., an agent may refrain from donating money to charity, because 
she requires it to help pay for her father’s medical care). 
One may, therefore, in contrast to perfect duties, refrain from performing 
an imperfect duty without incurring demerit, but only because (in the example 
given) one is not capable of both donating to charity and helping one’s elderly 
father. If, however, one refrains from performing an imperfect duty on principle 
– e.g., one has made it one’s maxim not to help others whenever it should involve 
any personal cost or setback – one does incur moral culpability:26 “the latitude of 
imperfect duties does not license us just to forego – for no particular reason – an 
opportunity to help someone but only licenses foregoing such an opportunity 
because it is impossible both to help that person and to help another.”27 
The performance of imperfect duties is thus not optional. It is not beyond 
the call of duty. In contemporary accounts, imperfect duties are often nearly 
equated to acts of supererogation by viewing their performance as optional. 
Instead, on a Kantian account, imperfect duties are just as morally binding as 
36–64. 53–4.
24. O’Neill, O. (2013). Acting on Principle: An Essay on Kantian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 19.
25. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:390. The term “wide duty” is here used as a synonym for “im-
perfect duty.”
26. Ibid.
27. Baron, M. (1995). Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 89.
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perfect duties. It is for this reason that Kant states that observing a person per-
forming her duty – perfect or imperfect – ought not to inspire awe in us, for that 
would cause “a lowering of our feeling for duty, as if to act in obedience to it 
were something extraordinary and meritorious.”28 Performing one’s imperfect 
duties is therefore not especially saintly or heroic, but “simply” a matter of duty.29 
It is true that one may choose to fulfill one’s duty of beneficence by donating to 
this charity or that, by volunteering at a refugee center or at the soup kitchen, 
but one may not choose to do nothing: “Morality tells you: do whatever you like 
[to discharge your duty of beneficence, e.g.] – but do it.”30
Moreover, there may be situations in which imperfect duties command 
nearly as strictly as perfect duties, excluding any freedom to choose in what way 
we will discharge our duty. For example, if I am truly committed to the duty of 
beneficence, I cannot stand by idly while a child is drowning in a pool. Doing 
nothing in this case would demonstrate that I am not truly committed to this 
duty, as a consequence of which, Kant clearly states, I incur moral culpability.31 
In this case, the performance of the specific means of discharging my imperfect 
duty of beneficence allows for no latitude. Not saving the child in order to go 
volunteer at the local soup kitchen instead (as an alternative way of fulfilling 
my duty of beneficence) is not a permissible choice and would be an indication 
that one’s commitment to beneficence is not sincere.32 Certain situations thus 
do away with my freedom to choose how to fulfill my duty of beneficence, and 
lay a very specific duty on my shoulders. In this manner, an imperfect duty can 
approach the precision of perfect duties.
28. Kant, I. (1996). Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. In A. Wood & P. Guyer (Eds.), G. Di 
Giovanni (Trans.), Religion and Rational Theology (pp. 39–215). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. Ak 6:49. Also see Kant’s rejection of the in his day common extolling of “heroes of romance” with 
their “elevated” ideals of extravagant moral greatness: Kant, I. (1996). Critique of Practical Reason. In 
M. Gregor (Ed. & Trans.), Practical Philosophy (pp. 137–271). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ak 5:155.
29. Unfortunately, I cannot delve into the lively discussion concerning the question whether or not Kant’s 
moral system can accommodate acts of supererogation. I have only, very briefly, provided an argument 
why supererogation has no place in Kant’s moral system by way of demonstrating that imperfect duties 
are not any less binding than perfect duties. It is pleasant to see this also appears to be the consensus 
in Kant scholarship. See, e.g., Baron. Kantian Ethics; Hope, S. (2014). Kantian Imperfect Duties and 
Modern Debates over Human Rights. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 22(4), 396–415; Timmer-
mann, J. (2005). Good but Not Required? – Assessing the Demands of Kantian Ethics. Journal of 
Moral Philosophy, 2(1), 9–27. For the contrary position – that is, that (some) Kantian imperfect duties 
can be viewed as supererogatory – see Hill, T. E. (1971). Kant on Imperfect Duty and Supererogation. 
Kant-Studien, 62(1-4), 55–76.
30. Timmermann. Good but Not Required? 21.
31. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:390.
32. This point is made very clearly by Alice Pinheiro Walla in her recent article: Pinheiro Walla, A. (2015). 
Kant’s Moral Theory and Demandingness, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. Advance online publica-
tion. doi:10.1007/s10677-015-9600-x.
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Still, other differences (besides the difference concerning the latitude of im-
perfect duties) with perfect duties remain, differences that may be relied upon to 
justify the claim that imperfect duties are less important than perfect duties. To 
begin with, Kant (in the Groundwork) views that which is contrary to strict (or 
perfect) duty as containing a contradiction in conception, whereas that which 
is contrary to wide (or imperfect) duty is understood to involve “merely” a con-
tradiction of will.33 Thus, for example, acting on a maxim contrary to the duty 
to refrain from making false promises cannot even be conceived as a universal 
law. After all, if the maxim to make false promises whenever it suits one were to 
become a universal law, the very condition of promising, namely that the prom-
isee believes the promisor will deliver on his promise, would disappear.34 By 
contrast, Kant argues that what is contrary to the imperfect duty of beneficence, 
for example, can very well be conceived as a universal law without contradic-
tion: if the maxim to never aid those in need were to become a universal law 
“the human race could admittedly very well subsist, no doubt even better than 
when everyone prates about sympathy and benevolence and even exerts himself 
to practice them occasionally, but on the other hand also cheats where he can, 
sells the right of human beings or otherwise infringes upon it.”35
Kant does seem to argue here for the primacy of perfect duties over imper-
fect duties. He maintains that actions contrary to all duties contain a contradic-
tion of will. But in the case of perfect duties, the maxim guiding actions contrary 
to duty cannot even be conceived as a universal law, “far less could one will that 
it should become such.”36 A contradiction of will thus seems to be a less strict 
criterion than a contradiction in conception, allowing us to conclude that perfect 
duties enjoy primacy over imperfect duties.37 It follows from such primacy that 
the exercise of our imperfect duties is constrained by our perfect duties. In other 
words, I may not steal in order to be able to fulfill my duty of aid to the needy.38
33. Kant. Groundwork. Ak 4:424.
34. Ibid. Ak 4:422.
35. Ibid. Ak 4:423.
36. Ibid. Ak 4:424.
37. Timmermann. Good but Not Required? 17. In Vigilantius’s lecture notes, Kant even explicitly says as 
much: “So imperfect duties always succumb to perfect ones” (Kant, I. (1997). Lectures on Ethics. (P. 
Heath, Trans., P. Heath & J. B. Schneewind, Eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ak 27:537).
38. O’Neill, O. (2002). Instituting Principles: Between Duty and Action. In M. Timmons (Ed.), Kant’s 
Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretive Essays (pp. 331–347). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 342–3. 
Kant’s categorical exclusion of the possibility that there may be occasions on which an imperfect duty 
ought to enjoy precedence over a perfect duty could be problematic, however. For surely I may, for exam-
ple, use another’s boat without her permission in order to save a person from drowning? The utilitarian 
Mill has no difficulty allowing for this possibility, even though he agrees that in general perfect duties 
enjoy primacy over imperfect duties (Mill. Utilitarianism. 200), but Kant rejects such a thought entirely. 
Yet, do we agree with Kant that the holder of the deposit in Theory and Practice ought to hand over the 
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Nonetheless, this does not mean that imperfect duties are not important or 
that they can be viewed as merely optional excellences. After all, as Jens Tim-
mermann points out, the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative deals 
with the question whether or not we can will our maxim to become a universal 
law. Both perfect and imperfect duties are thus duties of fundamental impor-
tance prescribed by the Categorical Imperative.39 It may be true that we can 
conceive of a world in which the maxim to never help those in need has become 
a universal law, but we cannot rationally will such a universal law (Kant him-
self acknowledges) “since many cases could occur in which one would need the 
love and sympathy of others and in which, by such a law of nature arisen from 
his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the assistance he wishes for 
himself.”40  
There is another, important difference between perfect and imperfect du-
ties (already briefly mentioned above): non-performance of perfect duties always 
results in demerit, or moral culpability, whereas non-performance of imperfect 
duties only results in demerit if it is the result of a maxim to never comply 
with the imperfect duty in question. Though this may appear to point toward 
a greater importance of perfect duties, it is instead simply a consequence of a 
difference in demandingness between the two types of duties. What is meant 
becomes clear when we compare the duties not to lie, steal, and assault with the 
duties to aid the poor, to care for one’s family members and to contribute to the 
health of one’s political community. The first three duties are perfect in nature: 
what is required is fully specified (one must refrain from lying, stealing and as-
saulting). To whom one owes these duties is equally clear, namely to everyone. 
Performance of all these perfect duties, furthermore, presents no problems: one 
can perform them all for all without encountering problems of human finitude. 
The latter three duties are instead imperfect: whom one must help, for example, 
and how one must go about it is left underdetermined. More importantly for the 
point at hand, one cannot possibly perform all one’s imperfect duties: caring for 
one’s elderly parents may inhibit one from volunteering at the local community 
center; donating to charities a, b and c may render it impossible to donate to 
sum to the unknowing, wealthy and misanthropic heirs, even though the wretched holder of the deposit 
could very well use this sum to fulfill his duty of care towards his family in need (Kant, I. (1996). On 
the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But Is of No Use in Practice. In M. Gregor (Ed. & 
Trans.), Practical Philosophy (pp. 277–309). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ak 8:286–7)? It 
seems there may indeed be cases in which imperfect duties ought to enjoy precedence over the require-
ments of perfect duty.
39. Timmermann. Good but Not Required? 17.
40. Kant. Groundwork. Ak 4:424. Cf. O’Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue. 194.
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charities x, y and z. Lobbying to raise awareness of the injustices in the interna-
tional garment industry will require so much time and effort that one becomes 
unable to similarly lobby to end EU agricultural subsidies. It thus becomes clear 
that it is impossible for one to perform all one’s imperfect duties, as they are 
generally time and resource consuming, whereas nothing similar is the case for 
one’s perfect duties. As O’Neill phrases it, perfect duties are enactable by all and 
for all,41 whereas imperfect duties are enactable by all but not for all.42 Due to the 
limits of human finitude we are all limited in the number of imperfect duties we 
can perform (as well as the extent to which we can perform them).43 The reason 
why the non-performance of imperfect duties does not always lead to moral cul-
pability is therefore that, in contrast to perfect duties, human finitude renders it 
impossible for us to perform them all for all, and therefore not because they are 
somehow less important.
For they are important. The refusal to perform one’s imperfect duties to 
others contains a contradiction of will, as no agent could wish to have the max-
ims underpinning such refusal – e.g., maxims to ignore the needs of others or to 
refuse to help whenever it is costly to oneself – be universalized. Kant himself 
saw this, but his explanation is in a sense still somewhat prudential in nature: 
one cannot wish such maxims to become universal laws as one might oneself 
one day be in need of the assistance of others. The consequences, however, are 
far greater, as O’Neill illustrates: 
[N]o vulnerable agent can coherently accept that indifference and 
neglect should be universalized, for if they were nobody could rely 
on others’ help; joint projects would tend to fail; vulnerable char-
acters would be undermined; capacities and capabilities that need 
assistance and nurturing would not emerge; personal relationships 
would wither; education and cultural life would decline.44 
It may be true, as both Pufendorf and Mill have argued, that imperfect duties are 
not central to the preservation of the very existence of society, but they certainly 
41. We are speaking here, of course, of universal perfect duties. Special perfect duties need not be per-
formed by all for all. Instead, the special perfect duty to pay back a loan is performed by the person who 
received the loan for the person who lent it.
42. O’Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue. 148. This argument will be crucial in defining, in Chapter 4, our 
duties to the global poor as imperfect duties and, therefore, as duties of virtue.
43. This point is often stressed by Simon Hope. See for example Hope, S. (2013). Subsistence Needs, Hu-
man Rights, and Imperfect Duties. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 30(1), 88–100. 92–3.
44. O’Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue. 194.
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are crucial to its flourishing. Moreover, as I will argue throughout the disserta-
tion, our imperfect duties form an important complement to our perfect, juridi-
cal duties, which, even when universally respected, cannot avoid injustices from 
arising. Legal systems and political institutions are never without their defects 
and will thus benefit greatly if subjects perform not only their strict duties, but 
also regularly perform their imperfect duties: “A legal order may gain support 
from forms of social solidarity and traditions of fair play; it may be undermined 
by traditions of greed or cruelty.”45
Finally, some point out that perfect duties have correlative rights whereas 
imperfect duties do not and would base their claim that imperfect duties are less 
important than perfect duties on this difference. They might ask: if the exercise 
of beneficence, for example, is so important why then is it not made a legal duty 
with correlative claim rights? Why do the indigent of the world not have a right 
to our aid but we do all have a right not to be tortured? Surely the answer must 
be that we find the duty to refrain from torturing more important than the duty 
to aid the global poor? To such charges I would respond that, firstly, one cannot 
(at least not on a Kantian account) state that all perfect duties have correlative 
rights. The duties of respect and to refrain from lying are two examples of such 
perfect duties without corresponding rights. Therefore, the presence or absence 
of corresponding rights does not justify the statement that all perfect duties are 
more important than all imperfect duties (as some perfect duties lack corre-
sponding rights as well).
Secondly, and more importantly, the reason why imperfect duties do not 
have correlative rights has nothing to do with any lack of importance. Instead, 
their latitude renders them unclaimable, which as a consequence precludes any 
rights to their performance.46 Consider the duty to aid the poor. Who must do 
what for which indigent person(s) is not clearly prescribed by this duty, but 
rather left to the discretion of the agent. It follows that the person in need has 
no way of claiming assistance. From whom could she claim it? The problem 
with imperfect duties in this respect is thus that their latitude renders it dif-
ficult to pair up duty-bearers and right-holders. If it is not clear from whom 
we can claim the performance of a duty, we can no longer speak of a right to 
the performance of that duty. The absence of a corresponding right thus re-
sults from the latitude of imperfect duties, not from their lesser importance. 
45. Ibid. 147.
46. As claimability, I argue in §2.2, functions as the condition for the existence of a right.
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Thirdly, the fact that certain duties do not have corresponding rights should 
not lead us to conclude that they are, therefore, less important. Yet, this is cer-
tainly a common assumption, especially in contemporary liberal political phi-
losophy. The reason for this assumption is, or so I will argue in the following 
section, that rights are often considered to be the fundamental moral category 
as well as the adequate starting point for asking ourselves what we ought to do. 
In such a manner, it becomes tempting to view the scope of our duties as delim-
ited by our rights (we have a right not to be tortured, so there is a duty not to 
torture; we have a right to have our property respected, so there is a duty not to 
steal, and so forth). All morally worthy actions beyond the scope of rights-based 
duties thus come to be seen as acts of supererogation, or optional excellences. 
As a consequence, imperfect duties, lacking corresponding rights, come to be 
viewed as less important. The assumption underlying this argument is that the 
most fundamental issues concerning morality can only be expressed in terms 
of rights and the perfect duties to which they give rise. The very idea that there 
may be matters of fundamental moral importance that cannot be captured with 
the language of rights is hereby dismissed out of hand. It will be one of the main 
points of this dissertation as a whole to demonstrate the deficiencies of this posi-
tion – typical of the perspective of rights – and to assert instead the importance 
of imperfect duties and duties of virtue.
With the question of duties with and without correlative rights we have reached 
a natural bridge from the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties to 
the distinction between duties of justice (or duties of right, in Kant’s terms) and 
duties of virtue, which will be discussed in the following subsection. But let us 
first sum up our findings thus far. We found that many ways of distinguishing 
perfect from imperfect duties still common today can be traced back to the work 
of Pufendorf (and, to a lesser extent, to Grotius): perfect duties are enforceable 
and have corresponding rights, whereas imperfect duties lack enforceability and 
corresponding rights; the content of perfect duties is clearly defined, whereas in 
the case of imperfect duties it is not clear who must do what for whom; non-per-
formance of one’s perfect duties results in demerit, whereas this is not the case 
for non-performance of imperfect duties; and perfect duties appear to be some-
how of greater importance than imperfect duties. I believe all these characteris-
tics can be found in contemporary accounts of the distinction.
By means of a discussion of Kant’s more thorough examination of perfect 
and imperfect duties, I have taken issue against the thought, common especially 
in current liberal accounts of duties, that imperfect duties are less important 
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and less binding than perfect duties. Accordingly, I have argued that the reason 
imperfect duties allow for latitude is not because they are less important, but 
rather because they prescribe maxims for actions instead of actions. This lati-
tude, furthermore, does not imply that imperfect duties are somehow optional 
or less binding. Performing imperfect duties is not optional, only the manner in 
which one chooses to discharge them is; one can choose to fulfill one’s duty in 
this manner or that, but to refrain from performing one’s duty altogether is not 
an option and will result in moral culpability. 
Furthermore, given that all duties (perfect and imperfect alike) are derived 
in the same fashion, namely from the first formulation of the categorical imper-
ative,47 it seems odd to attach a greater moral weight to perfect duties, solely be-
cause maxims contrary to perfect duties result in a contradiction in conception 
whereas maxims contrary to imperfect duties result merely in a contradiction of 
will. What can be concluded, however, is that there is a primacy of perfect duties 
with respect to imperfect duties, that is, that the performance of our imperfect 
duties is limited by the requirements of our perfect duties.
But surely the fact that non-performance of perfect duties results in de-
merit whereas one incurs no moral guilt if one does not perform an imperfect 
duty, demonstrates that the latter duties are of lesser importance and are less 
binding (one may, after all, choose not to perform an imperfect duty without 
incurring moral guilt)? This, too, we denied by demonstrating that the reason 
why non-performance of imperfect duties does not (always) result in demerit is 
simply that, due to human finitude, they cannot be performed by all for all, in 
contrast to perfect duties.
Finally, imperfect duties’ lack of correlative rights may be believed to prove 
that they are not as important. This argument relies on the assumption that every-
thing of moral importance can be best formulated in terms of rights. As a conse-
quence, duties without correlative rights appear less important. The notion that 
there may be matters of great moral importance that escape the language of rights 
is never taken into consideration: “Within frameworks that give priority to the per-
spective of recipience, so make rights the fundamental ethical category, it is hard 
to show how act-types that cannot be claimed as a matter of right can be either 
good or obligatory.”48 Once we reject the assumption that rights are the fundamen-
tal normative category, we find that there is no immediate correlation between the 
47. Which asks whether a particular maxim can be willed to become a universal law (Kant. Groundwork. 
Ak 4:421).
48. O’Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue. 143.
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absence of corresponding rights and a lesser moral weight of imperfect duties. An 
additional reason why imperfect duties lack corresponding rights is because their 
latitude renders them unclaimable, precluding any rights to their performance.
Upon closer examination, therefore, none of the differences between perfect 
and imperfect duties can justify the claim that the former are somehow of greater 
moral importance or more binding than the latter. In fact, I hope to show that 
imperfect duties are of crucial importance as supplement to the sphere of justice.
§ 2.1.2 – Duties of Justice and Duties of Virtue
One of the most central ideas Kant presents in The Metaphysics of Morals is 
that one ought to distinguish between duties that can be prescribed by external 
(i.e. juridical) laws and duties that cannot.49 One ought to distinguish, in other 
words, between duties of justice50 and duties of virtue. But on what basis does one 
differentiate between these two sets of duties? Allen Buchanan is right when he 
says that there is quite some confusion on this score. Scholars have varying under-
standings of this distinction, and often employ it without rendering it explicit, let 
alone providing an argument for it.51 Once again taking Kant’s work on the subject 
as my guide, I hope to render perspicuous the difference between these two duties, 
which will have a central role to play in the remainder of this dissertation. 
In addition, it should become clear how the distinction between duties of 
justice and duties of virtue relates to the distinction between perfect and imper-
fect duties discussed above. It should become apparent that the former distinc-
tion is not simply a reformulation of the latter distinction, though the two sets of 
duties are intimately connected. I shall retain that all duties of justice are perfect 
duties (and so that imperfect duties cannot be duties of justice), but that not all 
perfect duties are duties of justice.
In order to understand what duties of justice are, we must first understand 
what is meant by “justice.” Similarly, we must first clarify the term “virtue” if we 
are to fully grasp the meaning of the concept “duties of virtue.” Therefore, I will 
start by clarifying the distinction between justice and virtue before moving on to 
present the distinction between duties of justice and duties of virtue. 
49. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:379, 6:239.
50. I shall refer to Kant’s term Recht as “justice” (and, accordingly, to his Rechtspflichten as “duties of jus-
tice”) as it is the term that is more commonly used in debates of political and legal philosophy, whereas 
the term “right” is largely limited to Kant scholarship.
51. Buchanan, A. (1987). Justice and Virtue. Ethics, 97(3), 558–575.
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With Kant, we can understand the sole concern of the sphere of justice to be the 
guaranteeing of equal spheres of freedom for all. In more Kantian terms, justice 
concerns the formal condition of external freedom, that is, “the consistency of 
outer freedom with itself if its maxim were made universal law.”52 In order to se-
cure such an equal measure of outer freedom for all, limitations must be placed 
on the freedom of each. This is what justice does: “Das Recht bestimmt die 
Freiheit des einzelnen relativ zu der Freiheit aller anderen und sichert durch den 
wechelseitigen Zwang die individuellen Freiheitsräume gegeneinander.”53 
The sphere of justice contains its own action-guiding principle, namely the 
universal principle of justice: “Any action is right [i.e. just] if it can coexist with 
everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law.”54 It follows that if my 
action is indeed compatible with the external freedom of each, none may right-
fully deter me from pursuing said action lest they do me wrong (Unrecht), as 
their hindrance of my rightful action is clearly not compatible with freedom in 
accordance with a universal law. 
Yet, in particular cases Kant does justify certain limitations of freedom. He 
argues that when someone acts in a manner incompatible with the rightful free-
dom of another, his action is deemed a hindrance to freedom and thus wrong. It 
follows that coercing someone to refrain from such an unlawful act would itself 
be lawful, as such a limitation of that person’s freedom renders it once more 
compatible with the freedom of everyone else. Or, as Kant puts it: a “hindering 
of a hindrance to freedom” is “consistent with freedom in accordance with uni-
versal laws.”55 Hence, justice carries within it the authorization to coerce those 
who threaten the balance of equal spheres of freedom through their actions. In 
fact, Kant goes so far as to state that “[r]ight [i.e. justice] and authorization to 
use coercion . . . mean one and the same thing.”56 
Thus far we have seen that justice prescribes or proscribes certain actions 
in order to secure an equal distribution of freedom, and that it may use force to 
ensure compliance with its prescriptions. Next, we must clarify what falls beyond 
the scope of justice. Kant goes to great pains to exclude inner “actions” (such as 
the ends one adopts, or the motives from which one acts) from his definition of 
justice. Thus, immediately following his exposition of the universal principle of 
52. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:380.
53. Horn, C. (2014). Nichtideale Normativität: Ein neuer Blick auf Kants politische Philosophie. Berlin: 
Suhrkamp. 14–5.
54. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:230.
55. Ibid. Ak 6:231.
56. Ibid. Ak 6:232.
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justice, he states that “it cannot be required that this principle of all maxims be 
itself in turn my maxim, that is, it cannot be required that I make it the maxim 
of my action.”57 In other words, justice only demands that the subject’s external 
actions comply with its universal principle; it does not additionally demand a 
particular disposition on the part of the subject to accompany that compliance. I 
do not diminish the freedom of another, even if I secretly wish to do so, so long 
as my external actions do not detract from his or her freedom. Justice does thus 
not require me to respect the freedom of another from the motive of duty; this is 
rather a matter of virtue (as we will see shortly). These thoughts lead to Kant’s 
formulation of the universal law of justice: “so act externally that the free use 
of your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a 
universal law.”58 The difference with the categorical imperative should be clear. 
Whereas it commands the subject to make his or her maxims comply with a 
universal law, the universal law of justice merely requires the subject’s actions to 
be in accordance with a universal law.
This brings us to the main difference between justice and virtue. As said, 
justice prescribes and proscribes certain outward actions in order to maintain 
a system of equal spheres of external freedom for all. It prescribes such actions, 
furthermore, with “mathematical exactitude.”59 Since justice prescribes only spe-
cific external actions and it does so, furthermore, with great precision, it is able 
to ensure compliance with its commands by means of force. Virtue, by contrast, 
does not prescribe actions but rather ends, the adoption of which is presented as 
a duty.60 Where Kant explicitly excluded the adoption of ends from the sphere of 
justice,61 he now presents it as the core of virtue. 
Since virtue prescribes not actions but ends, any kind of enforcement is 
ruled out, as I can be forced to perform (or refrain from performing) certain ac-
tions, but the adoption of ends is an inner matter, which is by definition beyond 
the reach of external coercion. It follows that the only constraint possible in the 
case of virtue is free self-constraint (Selbstzwang).62 Whereas one can act right-
fully, that is, in accordance with the prescriptions of justice, from any motive 
whatsoever (outward compliance is, after all, all that matters), acting virtuously 
already implies that one acts from the correct motive. In other words, whereas 
57. Ibid. Ak 6:231.
58. Ibid. Emphasis added.
59. Ibid. Ak 6:233.
60. Ibid. Ak 6:380.
61. Ibid. Ak 6:230. So long as one’s outward actions do not endanger the external freedom of others, it is 
entirely irrelevant – from the point of view of justice – what one had adopted as the end of those actions.
62. Ibid. Ak 6:383; cf. 6:379, 6:381.
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justice cannot require any specific incentives for actions, virtue requires that one 
comply with its commands from the motive of duty. 
Virtue requires that my subjective principles for acting, i.e. my maxims for 
action (not simply my actions), are in accordance with the objective ends (i.e., ends 
that are also a duty) prescribed by virtue. From this it follows that duties of virtue 
are imperfect,63 since virtue commands us to act in light of the end of promoting 
other people’s happiness, for example, yet it leaves undetermined whose happiness 
specifically we ought to promote as well as the acts through which such promotion 
of happiness ought to be undertaken. This leaves the would-be virtuous agent with 
some considerable latitude, rendering duties of virtue imperfect.
Now that we have an understanding of both justice and virtue, we can undertake 
an exposition of the difference between their respective duties. Let us start with 
duties of justice.
1. Duties of justice concern clearly determined outward actions.64 Spe-
cifically, I take this to mean that it is clear who must do what for 
whom. Therefore, duties of justice are narrow,65 or perfect66 duties. 
2. Because of their determinateness, our actions can easily be judged 
either in compliance with or in violation of duties of justice. This 
makes it possible to claim and enforce compliance with duties of 
justice by means of an external legislation.67 
3. From their enforceability, it follows that duties of justice can have 
corresponding rights.68 This means that the performance of a duty 
of justice is owed69 to the holder of the corresponding right and that 
a violation of one’s duty of justice wrongs70 the right-holder, that is, 
violates her right.
63. Ibid. Ak 6:390.
64. See, e.g., Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:388.
65. Ibid. Ak 6:390, 6:410.
66. Ibid. Ak 6:240.
67. Ibid. Ak 6:239, 6:379, 6:394, 6:410.
68. Ibid. Ak 6:383.
69. It is not for nothing that Kant refers to duties of justice as “officium debiti” (ibid. Ak 6:390). 
Furthermore, since they are owed, their performance is in no way meritorious.
70. I find Joel Feinberg’s distinction between “harming,” understood as causing a setback to another’s inter-
ests, and “wronging,” understood as a “violation of one’s rights, or an injustice,” quite helpful (Feinberg, 
J. (1984). The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Volume One: Harm to Others. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 107). A person may be harmed without being wronged, that is, without her rights being 
violated. For example, if I trip and inadvertently bumb into the person in front of me, causing her to fall 
down, I may have harmed her, but I have not violated her rights and thus have not wronged her. When 
I employ the noun “wrong” (or the verb “to wrong”) I similarly intend a violation of rights.
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4. Furthermore, duties of justice not only can but also must be en-
forced, because actions in violation of such duties are incompatible 
with freedom in accordance with a universal law, that is, such viola-
tions endanger the very function of justice, which is to ensure equal 
shares of external freedom for all.
5. Finally, given that justice is concerned solely with our outward ac-
tions, it is characterized by what Wolfgang Kersting has called a 
“Gesinnungsindifferenz.”71 The motive from which one fulfills one’s 
duties of justice is thus entirely irrelevant.72
Duties of virtue differ from duties of justice on each of these points. 
1. Duties of virtue do not prescribe clearly defined actions, but rather 
command us to adopt ends “by incorporating them into our maxims 
and to advance them in practice when the occasion arises.”73 Duties 
of virtue are, therefore, wide, or imperfect duties.74 
2. Therefore, it is not possible to say when one has fulfilled one’s duty 
of virtue, because duties of virtue do not prescribe who must do 
what (and how much) for whom. As a consequence, duties of vir-
tue are not claimable. For if a duty does not prescribe who must 
do what for whom, then how can anyone claim anything from any-
one else? Where could one lodge one’s claim? And what, precisely, 
would one claim? From their unclaimability follows the impossibili-
ty of their enforcement through external coercion. Instead, duties of 
virtue must rely on free self-constraint. 
3. Consequently, duties of virtue have no corresponding rights to co-
erce. This means that the performance of a duty of virtue is not 
owed to another. Non-performance of my duty of virtue, therefore, 
71. Kersting. Kant über Recht. 221.
72. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:231. Of course, the incentive can be of import when the pre-
scriptions of justice are not followed. Kant recognizes this when he distinguishes fault from crime: “An 
unintentional transgression which can still be imputed to the agent is called a mere fault (culpa). An 
intentional transgression (i.e. one accompanied by consciousness of its being a transgression) is called 
a crime (dolus)” (ibid. Ak 6:224; cf. 6:228). Thus, in the case of a transgression of the law it may indeed 
matter a great deal what one’s incentive was (whether one meant to break the law, did so from necessity, 
or did so unintentionally), as is recognized, for instance, in the distinctions between murder, voluntary 
manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. However, in the case of behavior in compliance with the 
law, the incentive for compliance is irrelevant.
73. Timmermann. Kantian Dilemmas? 45.
74. There are some exceptions to this general statement, however, at least for Kant. For example, the duty 
not to lie, the duty not to commit suicide, and the duty of respect are strict, i.e. perfect, duties of virtue.
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does not result in my wronging anyone. For example, person A may 
not claim from person B that B perform an act of beneficence to-
wards A, nor may A complain that her right has been violated if B 
does not help her.
4. Not only can duties of virtue not be enforced, they may not: for 
Kant, the line separating justice from virtue also indicates the 
boundaries of legitimate state power. Having the state enforce 
compliance with duties of virtue, as if they were duties of justice, 
runs contrary to Kant’s very intention of separating the two realms 
from each other and reeks of paternalism: “die Tugend ist nicht 
Sache des Staates.”75 
5. Finally, Kant often defines duties of virtue as requiring a special mo-
tive; not only do duties of virtue require us to act in light of certain 
ends, but they, moreover, demand we do so from the motive of duty. 
In short, duties of virtue require from us a virtuous disposition.76 
The fact that duties of virtue involve the adoption of ends and acting 
from a particular motive is, incidentally, another important reason 
why they cannot and may not be enforced.
Having thus expounded the distinction between duties of justice and duties 
of virtue, we can end our discussion of this distinction by briefly assessing the re-
lation between it and the perfect-imperfect distinction. There are many similari-
ties between perfect duties and duties of justice on the one hand, and imperfect 
duties and duties of virtue on the other. In fact, there are but two differences. 
Firstly, the motive from which one acts does not play a role in distinguishing per-
fect from imperfect duties, whereas it does in separating duties of justice from 
duties of virtue. Secondly, the imposition of duties of justice serves the explicit 
purpose of securing equal spheres of freedom for all. Perfect duties, by contrast, 
serve no such purpose. Instead, a duty’s perfection only tells us something about 
its strictness. The two terms are, therefore, not synonyms. In fact, there are, 
on Kant’s account, several perfect duties that are not duties of justice, precisely 
because they do not serve the function of preserving equal freedom (as in the 
75. Kersting. Kant über Recht. 221n. Cf. Wood, A. (2002). The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. 
In M. Timmons (Ed.), Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretive Essays (pp. 1–21). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 10: “any use whatever of social coercion in any form to enforce ethical duties . . . must 
be regarded as a wrongful violation of individual freedom by corrupt social customs.”
76. See, e.g., Kant. Vorarbeiten und Nachträge. Ak 23:251: “Äußere Pflichten sind die der Leistungen (ihrer 
Wirkung nach). Innere Pflichten sind die der Gesinnungen.”
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case of the perfect duty of virtue not to lie77) or because they require a virtuous 
disposition (as in the case of the perfect duty of virtue of respect78). 
Therefore, though we cannot simply equate the two sets of duties, we can 
say that duties of justice are always perfect duties79 and that imperfect duties are 
never duties of justice. Duties of virtue are mostly imperfect, though there are 
some exceptions.
As may be expected, given this close relation, the same prejudices exist with 
regard to duties of virtue that exist regarding imperfect duties. Here, too, the 
latitude of duties of virtue, their lack of corresponding rights, and the fact that 
non-performance does not amount to wrongdoing, are taken as signs that duties 
of virtue are less binding, that is, merely optional, and not as important as duties 
of justice. Having provided a point-by-point refutation of this view with regard 
to imperfect duties, we may forgo rehashing those arguments with regard to du-
ties of virtue, given the strong similarities between these two sets of duties. The 
remainder of this dissertation will, furthermore, provide ample opportunity for 
demonstrating that duties of virtue are of crucial importance and that the sphere 
of justice, in fact, depends on their regular performance. The next subsection 
will provide the first such argument.
§ 2.1.3 – The relation between Justice and Virtue
Following the previous subsection, in which we have expounded the differences 
between the spheres of justice and virtue as well as between their respective 
duties, the impression could arise that these two realms of morality are fully 
independent from one another. Indeed, at times it seems Kant wishes to hermet-
ically seal off each of these two spheres from the other, as Wolfgang Kersting has 
77. As a matter of justice, lying is prohibited only if the lie results in a violation of the rights of another 
(Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:238n), but ethics is not limited by this condition of harmfulness 
(ibid. Ak 6:429). However, in On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy Kant states that one does 
wrong (Unrecht) by lying, though not to the person one lies to, but rather to humanity generally, as by 
lying “I bring it about … that statements (declarations) in general are not believed, and so too that all 
rights that are based on contracts come to nothing an lose their force” (Kant, I. (1996). On a Supposed 
Right to Lie from Philanthropy. In M. Gregor (Ed. & Trans.), Practical Philosophy (pp. 611–615). Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press. Ak 8:426). Thomas Mertens elaborately examines this point in 
Mertens, T.J.M. (in press). On Kant’s Duty to Speak the Truth. Kantian Review. 
78. Ibid. Ak 6:462–4. The duty of respect is not a duty of justice, for the free adoption of the maxim of 
respect is an inner matter, which escapes the reach of external coercion (cf. Sensen, O. (2013). Duties 
to Others From Respect (TL 6:462–468). In A. Trampota, O. Sensen & J. Timmermann (Eds.), Kant’s 
‘Tugendlehre’: A Comprehensive Commentary (pp. 343–363). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 358).
79. Hill. Kant on Imperfect Duty and Supererogation. 67.
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noted: “Die Grenze zwischen Recht und Ethik ist in beiden Richtungen unüber-
schreitbar.”80 At times, Kant even speculates about a sphere of justice that is fully 
independent from virtue, “not mingled with anything ethical,” requiring “only 
external grounds for determining choice,” and that is “completely external.”81 In 
the present subsection I, therefore, wish to examine the relation between justice 
and virtue, as presented by Kant. Kant’s understanding of this relation (or lack 
of relation, rather) is exemplary for the position I wish to reject – so common for 
much of liberal political thought –, namely that all that is needed to maintain a 
political community is just laws and institutions backed up by force, i.e. justice, 
rendering a virtuous citizenry redundant. Pace Kant, I will argue that justice 
and virtue cannot be so neatly separated as his conceptual distinction suggests. 
Rather, justice depends on virtue. In order to make this claim, I will illustrate 
how widespread virtue ensures the stability of a political community and func-
tions as a complement to justice.
Justice requires no virtuous disposition from us. It cares not what the nature is 
of the motive from which we act. We may act from respect for the law or from 
mere prudential reasons; so long as my actions do not detract from the external 
freedom of others, I have acted justly. Kant thus limits the scope of justice to 
the prescription (and proscription) of external actions, which one may be forced 
to perform. Where virtue relies on the subject legislating for herself and freely 
constraining herself to perform her duties, justice relies on an external lawgiving 
and coercion; it ensures we all perform our duties by means of force. Justice is 
not interested in questions of motives or dispositions – in fact, it ought to be in-
different concerning such matters. It does not require me to respect the freedom 
of others from the motive of duty; that would rather be a matter of virtue. Jus-
tice, in short, does not require goodness, or good character, but merely outward 
compliance.
The intimate connection between justice and coercion means that the in-
centive for action can cease to be insight into and respect for the law – motives 
on which virtue must rely – and be replaced by the merely prudential incentive 
to avoid being coerced. The “emancipation” of justice from the disposition of the 
subject82 means that justice requires no ethical motivation at all and can, instead, 
80. Kersting. Kant über Recht. 221.
81. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:232.
82. Höffe, O. (1990). Kategorische Rechtsprinzipien: Ein Kontrapunkt der Moderne. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp. 81.
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rely solely on external coercion. Whereas ethical coercion consists in constrain-
ing oneself through the idea of duty, the coercion typical of the sphere of justice 
is instead characterized as pathological, by which Kant means that juridical 
coercion appeals to aversions, “for it [juridical lawgiving] is a lawgiving, which 
constrains, not an allurement, which invites.”83
We might add that by substituting free self-constraint with external coercion 
(or rather with the incentive to avoid external coercion), it would appear that the 
process of autonomous decision-making we know from Kant’s moral writings 
has become superfluous in the case of compliance with the prescriptions of jus-
tice. Recall that in the Groundwork and the second Critique true moral worth 
was said to reside only in actions performed from the motive of duty, and not 
in those performed merely in conformity with duty.84 By dropping this require-
ment, justice, in contrast with virtue, allows for a heteronomous determination 
of choice (Willkür). On Kant’s account, therefore, justice, understood as the 
protection of individual spheres of external freedom by means of reciprocal co-
ercion, realizes its own preservation through heteronomous regulation.85
This is where Kant’s account of justice, specifically his rigorous exclusion of 
any trace of virtue from the sphere of justice, becomes problematic. Allen Wood 
describes the problem well: “a civil society based on right requires no moral 
commitment on the part of its members to respect one another’s rightful free-
dom. It requires only a system of external legislation, backed by coercive sanc-
tions sufficient to guarantee that rights will not be infringed.”86 Wood, however, 
does not recognize any problem here and this passage in fact states his agree-
ment with Kant. Many other Kant scholars and most contemporary liberal polit-
ical philosophers agree with Kant’s position as well.87 So what is the problem? 
The sphere of justice is concerned, as said, with the securing of equal shares 
of freedom for all. Political institutions and legal systems are tasked with realizing 
this ideal of justice. According to Kant, the only thing such institutions demand 
is outward compliance, regardless of the motive from which such compliance 
springs. All that is required to obtain such compliance is the threat or actual use 
of force. When external coercion is present, such things as free self-constraint and 
83. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:219.
84. Kant. Groundwork. Ak 4:397ff.; Kant. Critique of Practical Reason. Ak 5:81.
85. Cf. Kersting, W. (1984). Wohlgeordnete Freiheit: Immanuel Kants Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie. Ber-
lin: Walter de Gruyter. 12. Also see Höffe. Kategorische Rechtsprinzipien. 80.
86. Wood. The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. 8.
87. See, for example, the passages from Kersting and Höffe referred to in note 85. Also consider the nearly 
universal acceptance of complete liberal neutrality in contemporary political philosophy.
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acting from the motive of duty thus become redundant.88 Even when Kant speaks 
of the progress of the human race towards a state of peace between nations and 
ultimately the realization of a truly cosmopolitan society, he maintains that this in 
no way calls for an enlargement of the “moral foundation in humanity,” but will 
instead be a product of sheer legality,89 that is, mere conformity of one’s actions 
with the prescriptions of duty. In other words, the progress of mankind towards 
Kant’s political ideal does not require any advance in the morality of men and 
women, but only outward compliance, or legality.
To be clear, it is understandable that Kant wishes to exclude agents’ motives 
and ends from the sphere of justice. Firstly, motives and ends are internal mat-
ters and therefore beyond the reach of external coercion. In other words, even if 
a state would wish to force its citizens to act from particular motives and in light 
of certain ends, it would not be able to do so. Secondly, Kant would view the 
attempt to use external coercion in order to influence citizens’ reasons for acting 
as paternalistic, and rightly so (imagine a police force patrolling the streets look-
ing for signs that citizens are respecting the law but begrudgingly). 
It is, therefore, clear that one cannot force citizens to act from respect for 
the law, and that the very attempt to do so reeks of paternalism and is, as such, 
a violation of liberal neutrality (as we would call it nowadays). However, from 
the exclusion of citizen’s motives for acting from the list of legitimate goals of 
external coercion, it does not follow that justice does not need good motives. 
Quite the contrary: political institutions and legal systems cannot be expected 
to remain stable and persist over time if a majority of the agents acts from pru-
dential motives alone, that is, simply to avoid punishment. The problem is, thus, 
as follows: 
[E]ven though the law cannot and must not require ethical motives and 
voluntary compliance out of respect for the law, the rule of law, a right-
ful condition, cannot be fully realized in a society in which people, on 
average, are not ethically motivated to respect the law for its own sake.90
88. Next to ample textual evidence in The Metaphysics of Morals, one can already find this position in 
Kant’s Review of Hufeland’s “Essay on the Principle of Natural Right” (in M. Gregor (Ed. & Trans.), 
Practical Philosophy (pp. 113–117). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ak 8:128.
89. Kant, I. (1996). The Conflict of the Faculties. In A. Wood & P. Guyer (Eds.), M. Gregor & R. Anchor 
(Trans.), Religion and Rational Theology (pp. 237–327). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ak 
7:91–2.
90. Willaschek, M. (2009). Right and Coercion: Can Kant’s Conception of Right be Derived from his Moral 
Theory? International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 17(1), 49–70. 58.
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The problem with Kant’s strict separation of justice and virtue is thus an empir-
ical one: as a matter of fact, legal systems and political institutions do rely on at 
least a majority of the people acting in accordance with the law from respect for 
the law. Kant does not seem to acknowledge this fact, however. Whereas virtue 
requires autonomy – i.e. requires that the subject perform her duties from re-
spect for the moral law – Kant seems to say that for the sphere of justice a mere 
heteronomous subject will suffice, a subject who acts strictly from self-interest 
and whose sole reason for not violating his duties is simply to evade punishment 
(or perhaps some other prudential reason). But is a state containing solely such 
heteronomous subjects tenable? Can we expect a legal system to last that relies 
exclusively on the external coercion of its subjects for compliance with its laws? 
Does not rather every Rechtsstaat depend on its citizens being motivated to act 
in accordance with its laws even when the incentive characteristic of justice, i.e. 
external coercion,91 is absent? 
The answer I would venture is that if all citizens were to decide not to 
abide by the law whenever punishment is likely to remain absent, the rule of 
law would not be secure. In other words, any legal system and any political 
community would be in a precarious state if the majority of the people does not 
act in accordance with the law from the inner motivation of duty.92 For what if 
the threatened sanctions prove to be insufficient? What if the political and legal 
order itself would temporarily break down? What if one could somehow evade 
punishment? Kant would have to accept that in such cases, in which external 
coercion does not suffice or is not functioning properly, the agent does not con-
sider herself bound to fulfill her duties.93
In practice, justice and virtue cannot be so neatly separated as their concep-
tual distinction suggests. Justice depends on virtue, because it relies on agents 
acting from the correct disposition. It is true enough that, as Kant rightly points 
out, such a disposition cannot be obtained by force. It follows that the sphere 
of justice relies on something, which it may not demand, namely compliance 
motivated by duty. Justice requires good character, or civic virtue, but may not 
demand it. Yet, a government may employ other means besides external coercion 
in order to bring about a good disposition. It may not use coercion to make its 
91. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:220.
92. Note how this point is quite similar to the argument for the necessity of “voluntary self-obligation,” made 
by Hans Küng (who was instrumental in the drafting of the UDHRe). He argues that legal coercion alone 
is not enough for the realization of human rights, which instead also requires the normative motivation 
of agents.
93. Horn. Nichtideale Normativität. 158.
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citizens virtuous, but it may encourage and nurture the flourishing of virtue in 
different ways. These matters will be elaborately discussed in Chapter 5.
Next to the dependence of just laws and institutions on what we may call civic 
virtue, an analysis of our duties to the global poor provides us with another 
example of how the sphere of justice depends on virtue, thus demonstrating the 
great importance of duties of virtue. Imagine an owner of a clothing factory in 
Bangladesh. His factory is in compliance with all his country’s labor and work 
safety laws, the people working for him do so freely (they are not forced by the 
factory owner to work in his factory), Western clothing companies buy wares 
from this factory owner through lawful transactions, and I, finally, obtain a 
sweater from that company by buying it in a store in Amsterdam. Strictly speak-
ing, nobody in this example has wronged anyone else. That is to say, there have 
been no violations of duties of justice. Still, the net result of this global web of 
relations is abominable: countless people working extremely long hours for less 
than a living wage in terrible (and at times fatally dangerous) circumstances.
 This example demonstrates that often it is not enough to merely insist on 
the performance of duties of justice. In situations where institutional schemes or 
sets of laws are flawed (which will nearly always be the case), the performance of 
our duties of justice does not suffice and other duties are required to fill the gaps. 
These duties can assume various forms, but may be summarized as duties to aid 
those in need and duties to push for reform of the prevailing institutions that are 
(partially) responsible for that need. As will be extensively argued in Chapter 4, 
these duties take the form of imperfect duties – after all, whom I must aid, how 
much I ought to give, and to which cause specifically I should donate my time 
and money, is all left to my discretion –, and are therefore duties of virtue. The 
fact that our duties to the global poor are chiefly duties of virtue, however, is not 
at all to say that these duties are less important or merely optional excellences. 
Instead, duties of virtue are shown to be of paramount import as they function 
as a necessary and indispensable complement to the sphere of justice. Further-
more, the manner in which one discharges one’s duty of virtue toward the global 
poor may allow for a certain measure of discretion, but one is obligated to do 
something. Doing nothing at all to aid the global poor is not a morally acceptable 
option (provided, of course, one has the means to supply such aid94).
94. Kant. Lectures on Ethics. Ak 27:537: “well-doing . . . lapses if my own poverty or family needs have to 
be dealt with.”
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In conclusion, Kant’s distinction between duties of justice and duties of virtue 
is accurate, but his strict separation of justice and virtue runs into problems. 
Their conceptual distinction should not lead us to think that they are fully in-
dependent from one another. Rather, justice and virtue constitute interdepen-
dent realms of morality, as the presence of just laws and institutions facilitates 
the performance of virtue, and widespread virtue ensures stability in a political 
community and functions as a complement to justice. The position that duties 
of virtue are somehow less important than duties of justice must, therefore, be 
rejected. The treatment in Chapters 4 and 5 of our duties to the global poor and 
our civic duties respectively will further illustrate the significance of duties of 
virtue. Indirectly, this will function as a criticism of the rights-based perspective 
on morality – which views rights as the fundamental moral category and derives 
all our duties from our rights –, as duties of virtue tend to appear less important 
or to recede from view entirely when one employs such a perspective (as will be 
illustrated in the following section).
§ 2.2 – On rights
At the very beginning of the previous section, we broadly defined duties as ac-
tions to which one is bound; duties thus limit one’s freedom of choice. This 
section deals with rights and will broadly hold that rights concern that part of 
morality concerned with the question when one person is morally justified in 
binding the freedom of another by prescribing how she should act. If one has 
a right, then one has a moral title to bind the freedom of another by claiming 
the performance of a duty from her. Having a right thus involves a Hohfeldian 
power over the duty of another, which one can either claim or waive. Given this 
understanding of rights, I will hold duties of justice to be indicative of rights 
– and universal duties of justice to be indicative of human rights –, as only du-
ties of justice are claimable and can therefore possess corresponding rights (in 
contrast to duties of virtue). In identifying rights, I therefore propose we adopt 
what I shall call the perspective of duties, that is, that we start from duties and 
proceed to identify our rights, instead of the more common perspective of rights, 
whereby one starts by identifying rights independently of duties and from there 
proceeds to define the corresponding duties. The reason I propose we adopt the 
perspective of duties instead of the perspective of rights is that the latter has 
detrimental consequences both for our duties and for our rights. 
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Regarding the undesirable consequences for our rights, §2.2.1 will show 
how a typical approach starting from human rights with little attention for the 
corresponding duties – the interest theory – results in a proliferation of un-
claimable human rights and thus in a weakening of human rights discourse as 
a whole. We can prevent this outcome by adopting instead the perspective of 
duties, which will allow us to identify human rights (as well as rights in general) 
more precisely by developing a clear criterion for (human) rights: only where 
there is a duty of justice, can there also be a (human) right. In developing this 
approach to rights, it would seem I align myself with the will theory of rights, as 
this theory views the ability to exercise some measure of control over the perfor-
mance of the correlative duty as essential to the possession of the right. 
Next, §2.2.2 will demonstrate how those who adopt the rights-perspective 
cannot recognize any duties beyond rights-based duties, that is, duties of justice. 
Any actions beyond those owed as a matter of justice are, consequently, viewed 
as merely optional excellences, or supererogatory acts. The perspective of rights 
thus leads to an impoverishment of our understanding of morality, limiting it to 
matters of justice alone.
§ 2.2.1 – What Are rights?
The present subsection will provide a brief discussion of the will and interest 
theories of rights in order to clarify what a right is. By pointing out two problems 
with the interest theory of rights that are relevant to the more general concerns 
of this dissertation – namely the disadvantages of a rights-perspective on mo-
rality and the importance of a renewed emphasis on our duties –, I will finally 
side with the will theory of rights. Accordingly, I will present the claimability of 
rights as their existence condition. Genuine human rights will, therefore, be held 
to exist only when they are matched by universal duties of justice that fall on all 
others, for only then can each right-holder claim the corresponding duties from 
all duty-bearers. 
Instead of taking human rights as our point of departure – by, for example, 
identifying fundamental human interests and subsequently drawing up a list of 
human rights to have those interests respected, protected and fulfilled – I will 
take duties as my starting point for identifying rights. That is, I will argue that 
only where there is a possible duty of justice can there also be a right. I will thus 
take duties of justice to be, as it were, indicative of rights.
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The thought that rights exist only where there is a duty of justice makes 
sense once one considers what rights do. What is the function of rights in nor-
mative discourse? What does it mean to have a right? Kant understood rights to 
be “(moral) capacities for putting others under obligations (i.e. as a lawful basis, 
titulum, for doing so).”95 In the Vorarbeiten to the Doctrine of Right Kant repeat-
edly stresses this point. My having a right against another person corresponds to 
a debt on his or her part.96 The metaphor of the debt illustrates that rights bind 
those against whom the right is claimed, limiting their freedom. The debt must 
first be paid. To be sure, both duties of justice and duties of virtue entail having 
one’s freedom of choice limited by a law: “The very concept of duty is already 
the concept of a necessitation (constraint) of free choice through the law.”97 Yet, 
they differ with regard to who may limit one’s freedom. The law limiting free 
choice, as Kant puts it, may be of either a moral or of a legal nature. In the case 
of the former, my freedom of choice can only be limited by free self-constraint, 
in which case we speak of duties of virtue. In the case of a juridical law, however, 
my freedom of choice is instead limited by the right of another, in which case we 
speak of duties of justice. Thus, in the case of a duty of justice there corresponds 
a right of another “to coerce someone,”98 whereas duties of virtue do not give 
rise to any such correlative rights on the part of others.
Similarly, H.L.A. Hart (who will here figure as representative of the will 
theory) maintains that rights belong “to that branch of morality which is spe-
cifically concerned to determine when one person’s freedom may be limited by 
another’s.” In nearly a literal echo of Kant, Hart explains that “to have a right en-
tails having a moral justification [i.e. the titulum, or title, of which Kant speaks] 
for limiting the freedom of another person and for determining how he should 
act.”99 More specifically, rights determine what actions another may be forced, 
by means of “coercive legal rules,” to perform or forbear.100 
But when is it that the freedom of another may be legitimately limited? 
Regarding this question there are, broadly speaking, two schools of thought: the 
95. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:237.
96. Kant. Vorarbeiten und Nachträge. Ak 23:344.
97. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:379.
98. Ibid. Ak 6:383.
99. Hart, H. L. A. (1955). Are There Any Natural Rights? The Philosophical Review, 64(2), 175–191. 183. 
Despite the divide between the interest theory and the will theory of rights, to be expounded presently, 
representatives of both theories can agree on this point. The examples of Kant and Hart illustrate that 
the will theory of rights agrees with the general point that rights function as entitlements to place duties 
on others. In the work of Joseph Raz, we can find evidence that the interest theory supports this thought 
as well: a special feature of rights is “the fact that they are sufficient to hold people to be bound by duties” 
(Raz, J. (1986). The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 192).
100. Hart. Are There Any Natural Rights? 177.
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interest theory and the will theory of (human) rights. The former theory holds 
that human rights exist if a particular human interest is sufficiently important 
to justify the imposition of duties on others to respect, protect and fulfill this 
interest. A person p thus has a right r to have a particular interest i respected, 
protected and fulfilled if and only if i “is a sufficient reason for holding some 
other person(s) to be under a duty.”101 Thus, according to the interest theory, the 
freedom of another may be limited in order to protect and further a sufficiently 
weighty human interest. By contrast, the will theory holds that the only legiti-
mate reason for limiting the freedom of others is to maintain a system of equal 
freedom, that is, “an equal distribution of restrictions and so of freedom” among 
persons.102 In this regard, too, Hart proves himself to be a follower of Kant, 
as Kant had defined that branch of morality to which rights belong – namely, 
Recht, or justice – as the “sum of the conditions under which the choice of one 
can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of 
freedom.”103 
Briefly put, interest theory holds that rights protect certain interests, where-
as will theory maintains that rights protect equal spheres of freedom. It is be-
yond the scope of this section to discuss in full the intricacies of the debate 
between these two theories of (human) rights, so I will limit myself to discussing 
two main problems with the interest theory that are relevant to one of the over-
arching themes of this chapter, namely the problems with an exaggerated focus 
on rights in normative discourse and the concomitant neglect of duties. First, 
there is the problem of unclaimable rights. According to the interest theory, 
my having a human right, which is grounded by a sufficiently strong interest, 
means that someone somewhere bears the corresponding duty. Who this is, is 
not necessarily immediately clear, but this does not detract from the existence 
of the right, according to this theory. Raz gives the example of children’s right 
to education: even if I do not know who has what duties regarding the right to 
education, this does not mean the right of every child to an education does not 
exist. It exists, because the interest of every child in receiving an education is 
of fundamental importance and, therefore, a ground for duties.104 Though this 
argument possesses a certain intuitive appeal – who, after all would wish to 
deny a child an education? –, it actually results in a weakening of rights. Most 
101. Raz. The Morality of Freedom. 166.
102. Hart. Are There Any Natural Rights? 191.
103. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:230.
104. Raz. The Morality of Freedom. 184–5.
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scholars would agree that one typical characteristic of rights is their peremptory 
force: the assertion of a right is not just another consideration to take into ac-
count, but a particularly weighty one that, in principle, cuts off further debate 
concerning what is to be done.105 Yet, the interest theory, represented here by 
Raz, is willing to accept rights even though we do not know who bears what 
duties towards whom. As a consequence, Raz’s argument “leaves us with no 
specific individuals against whom our right will possess peremptory force.”106 
As a result, Raz’s theory has the effect of loosening “the bonds of correlativity 
linking rights to duties.”107 The understanding of rights as granting a moral title 
to limit the freedom of another, i.e. to place duties on others, is therefore put at 
risk by the interest theory.
A typical consequence of the recognition of unclaimable rights as genuine 
rights is the shift in meaning of the concept “duty of justice.” In our discussion 
in the previous section we found that only duties of justice correlate with rights. 
Such duties, furthermore, can only be perfect duties, as they require determi-
nateness to be claimable. Recently, however, several scholars (who do not neces-
sarily self-identify as interest theorists) have argued that even if the correlative 
duties have not been clarified and allocated to specific duty-bearers, the duties 
in question may still be duties of justice, albeit unclaimable and imperfect duties 
of justice.108 Yet, the very concept of an imperfect (and therefore unclaimable) 
duty of justice is a contradiction in terms, for if there is a right, then there is also 
a duty of justice, the performance of which is owed to the right-holder and the 
non-fulfillment of which constitutes a wrong to her (the right-holder), that is, a 
violation of her right. But if the duty is indeterminate and one can therefore not 
know who must do what for whom (as is the case with imperfect duties), how 
can we then speak of one person’s right being violated by another? Who would 
be wronging whom? It follows that there is no such thing as an imperfect duty 
of justice, nor can the right supposedly correlating with such imperfect duties be 
held to exist. Yet, this seemingly obvious conclusion becomes more difficult to 
reach when the concept of rights no longer involves the power to claim or waive 
the performance of the correlative duty, as is the case with the interest theory 
105. Though, as has already become apparent in the previous chapter, rights can obviously not be understood 
as trumps, as Dworkin held, enjoying precedence over all other considerations. Public health, public 
morals, and public order, e.g., can at times limit or overrule the force of rights.
106. Simmonds, N.E. (1998). Rights as the Cutting Edge. In M.H. Kramer, N.E. Simmonds & H. Steiner, A 
Debate Over Rights: Philosophical Enquiries (pp. 113–232). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 204.
107. Ibid. 205.
108. See, e.g.: Ashford. The Inadequacy of our Traditional Conception. 234; Stemplowska. Real World Du-
ties. 482.
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which holds that the existence of a duty-grounding interest is enough to be able 
to speak of a right to said interest.
Will theory, by contrast, maintains that we cannot speak of rights if the pur-
ported right-holder does not have some measure of control over the performance 
of the correlative duty. Therefore, if, as in the example of children’s education 
sketched by Raz, the duty-bearers are unknown, there is no right, as it becomes 
impossible to exercise control over the correlative duty if one does not know 
who the duty-bearers are. Put in more general terms, unless one has the option 
of claiming or waiving the duty correlative to the right, one does not count as a 
right-holder. Having a right thus includes the possession of a Hohfeldian power 
over the duty of another, which one can either claim or waive. Accordingly, Hart 
speaks of the right-holder as a “small scale sovereign” who has exclusive control 
over another person’s duty.109 The concept of unclaimable rights, though accept-
able to interest theorists, is thus a contradiction in terms for will theorists.
As a consequence, rights as understood by the will theory have more bite to 
them than rights as understood by interest theorists, thus preserving the typical 
peremptory force of rights. Conversely, simply determining rights on the basis 
of the importance of certain interests, without any attention to the correlative 
duties, can leave interest theorists with unclaimable and therefore weak “rights.” 
This first problem with the interest theory leads us directly to the second: the 
proliferation of human rights. Due to the fact that, according to the interest 
theory, the identification of an interest is enough to be able to speak of a right 
– even though there is not yet any clarity concerning the content of its correla-
tive duties nor concerning the identity of the duty-bearers – it becomes easier 
to speak of human rights, resulting in human rights inflation. Interest theorists 
themselves admit that they use the term “right” in a wider sense, that is, that 
their understanding of the concept “right” allows them to identify more rights.110 
Often, they seem to view this as an advantage of their approach,111 seemingly not 
quite realizing the significant downside, namely the devaluing of the status of 
all human rights, causing human rights discourse to become “increasingly vac-
uous.”112 Saying something constitutes a human right has thus become merely 
a way of saying that it is something (an interest, value or benefit) that deserves 
109. Hart, H.L.A. (1982). Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 183.
110. See, e.g., Raz. The Morality of Freedom. 249.
111. See, e.g., Tasioulas. The Moral Reality of Human Rights. In Chapter 4 we will further explore the human 
right to an adequate standard of living, which Tasioulas defends in this text, and the problems that arise 
when one identifies rights without paying attention to the correlative duties.
112. Simmonds. Rights as the Cutting Edge. 215.
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our attention and consideration in normative reasoning, something, moreover, 
that must be balanced with a multitude of other relevant interests that merit our 
consideration. 
Indeed, Raz says as much. Though he explicitly states that rights occupy a 
special place in normative discourse due to their peremptory force,113 his approach 
to rights as a whole undermines this force. According to Raz, “‘X has a right’ if and 
only if X can have rights, and, other things being equal, an aspect of X’s well-being 
(his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a 
duty.”114 Similarly, he maintains that rights ground duties, a “ground which, if not 
counteracted by conflicting considerations, justifies holding that other person to 
have the duty.”115 Instead of asserting at least the prima facie peremptory force of 
rights, the interest theory thus reduces rights to one consideration among many 
others. Rights simply indicate important interests that are to be taken into account 
along with a plethora of other competing interests. Rights do thus no longer logi-
cally entail duties. Rather, they are taken into consideration in an intricate process 
of balancing multiple interests, at the end of which the right might come out on 
top, or it might not. In this manner, the peremptory force that sets rights apart in 
normative discourse is steadily eroded by the interest theory. 
In sum, the first problem with the interest theory is caused by a lack of attention 
for the corresponding duties of human rights, which has led to the problem of 
unclaimable rights. Such unclaimable rights, by contrast, are an impossibility 
for will theorists, as possession of a right entails some measure of control over 
the performance of the correlative duty, which the right-holder must be able to 
claim from the duty-bearer. The second problem of the interest theory is the pro-
liferation of human rights. Given that the identification of a sufficiently weighty 
interest suffices to speak of a human right, without considering the correlative 
duties, the interest theory is able to recognize far more human rights than the 
will theory. However, this comes at the great cost of weakening all human rights. 
This weakness stems, on the one hand, from the unclaimability of certain pur-
ported human rights (damaging the credibility of all human rights discourse) 
and, on the other hand, from the loss of the peremptory force of (human) rights 
as a consequence of the reduction of (human) rights to merely one factor among 
many to take into consideration. The will theory avoids these problems by in-
113. Raz. The Morality of Freedom. 192
114. Ibid. 166. Emphasis added.
115. Ibid. 171. Emphasis added.
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sisting on claimability as existence condition of (human) rights, which allows it 
to preserve the peremptory force of (human) rights. Accordingly, I will hold a 
genuine human right to exist when it is matched by universal duties of justice 
that fall on all others. It is in this sense that duties of justice are indicative of 
rights, as announced at the outset of this subsection. For it is only when there 
are universal duties of justice borne by all others that a human right can be 
held to exist, as it is only then that a human right, which must be universal, can 
“be claimed by each from all.”116 (By contrast, a special right exists when it is 
matched by special duties that fall on certain specified others.) The catalogue of 
human rights we are able to recognize may be less extensive as a consequence, 
but the rights recognized are stronger and therefore more credible. 
§ 2.2.2 – The perspective of rights and the perspective of Duties
At the outset of the previous subsection, it was briefly stated that I wish to take 
duties as a starting point, rather than rights. It must be clarified that this state-
ment does not imply the belief that duties are somehow prior to rights, ontolog-
ically speaking as it were, or that we ought to grant duties greater normative 
importance. Taking the perspective of duties (as I shall refer to it, in contrast 
to the perspective of rights) is, instead, solely a methodological move.117 It will, 
firstly, allow us to identify rights more accurately, and, secondly, to gain a richer 
understanding of morality as a whole. Regarding the first point, we have already 
seen that adopting the perspective of rights can lead to the neglect of the correla-
tive duties and, finally, to unclaimable human rights (when the correlative duties 
turn out to be either indeterminate or not allocated to concrete duty-bearers (or 
both) and thus imperfect). When, instead, we start from duties we are able to 
116. O’Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue. 148. The implications of this understanding of human rights will 
be explored in Chapter 4.  
117. The question whether duties are prior to rights or rather rights to duties need not concern us here. Our 
intention is more modest: to show that a renewed emphasis on duties can help us better determine (the 
content of) rights and to gain a richer view of morality as a whole (specifically of the scope of our duties). 
There are those, however, who do argue for the primacy of duties, as Simon Hope does in this passage: 
“The justification for any human right must, in the first instance, be a justification of the duties that right 
places on others, just as the justification for any action-guiding moral principle or demand must be” 
(Hope. Subsistence Needs, Human Rights, and Imperfect Duties. 90; cf. O’Neill. Acting on Principle. 
21) Still, without committing to the claim that duties are the ground of rights, we may say that the op-
posite position, arguing that rights are the ground of duties, is clearly incorrect, for even the proponents 
of this position admit that there are such things as imperfect duties, that is, they accept the existence 
of duties without any corresponding rights. Given that these duties have no corresponding rights, these 
authors must grant the possibility of duties that do not have rights as the ground of their existence.
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formulate a clear criterion for genuine (human) rights: only where there is a pos-
sible duty of justice, can there also be a (human) right. By taking duties of justice 
to be indicative of (human) rights in this manner – that is, by using the presence 
(or absence) of duties of justice to distinguish genuine from merely purported 
(human) rights –, we are essentially making the claimability of rights (that is, 
the ability to claim the performance of their correlative duties) the precondition 
for their existence. After all, what sets duties of justice apart is the fact that 
their performance is owed to another, who may claim this performance from 
specific duty-bearers as her due. As perfect duties, the performance of duties of 
justice may be claimed, whereas the performance of imperfect duties cannot be 
claimed given their indeterminateness (if one does not know who must do what 
for whom, how can anyone claim anything from anyone else?).
It would thus seem that we have aligned ourselves with the will theory of 
human rights, for it maintains that the ability to exercise some measure of con-
trol over the performance of the correlative duty – that is, the ability to either 
claim or waive the right to such performance – is essential to having a right, and 
that where such control does not exist, there is no right. Indeed, one could argue 
that, though a theory of rights, the will theory focuses especially on the correla-
tive duties when identifying rights. For example, Hart maintains that for a right 
to exist, the right-holder “should have at least some measure of the control . . . 
over the correlative obligation.”118 Such an obligation (or duty) can only be a duty 
of justice, as the performance of duties of virtue cannot be claimed by others, 
but relies on free self-constraint. In this sense, the will theory, too, makes the 
existence of (human) rights dependent on whether there are correlative duties 
of justice.119 Still, the present dissertation does not wish to decide the discussion 
between the will theory and the interest theory once and for all. Instead, it mere-
ly wishes to point out the merits of a renewed focus on duties, particularly within 
a human rights discourse. The first advantage of the perspective of duties, is that 
it can help preserve the force of human rights, by more accurately identifying hu-
man rights and thus rendering unclaimable “rights” impossible and preventing 
human rights inflation. Some of the practical consequences of this approach will 
be made apparent in Chapter 4, which will discuss the individual duties arising 
from global subsistence needs.
118. Hart, H.L.A. (1982). Essays on Bentham. 188.
119. Thus, the best-known scholar who employs a “duties-approach” to human rights – Onora O’Neill –, also 
clearly endorses the will theory of (human) rights.
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The second reason for adopting the perspective of duties is, as said, to gain 
a richer understanding of morality. Onora O’Neill has made a convincing ar-
gument that by adopting the perspective of rights instead we inevitably remain 
blind to certain duties.120 Rights-based theories of morality tend to recognize 
solely duties of justice, to the detriment of other duties, as only duties of justice 
correlate with rights. Other duties that do not have corresponding rights – such 
as the imperfect duties whose corresponding rights become known only after 
a process of institutionalization (as is the case with many socio-economic (hu-
man) rights) and the imperfect duties that lack corresponding rights entirely – 
often remain hidden to a rights-based morality. According to such a rights-based 
theory, so long as one has performed one’s duties of justice – that is, so long as 
one has not violated the rights of another – one is at liberty to do whatever one 
wishes. Robert Louden has termed this position the rights infatuationist posi-
tion.121 These rights infatuationists, Louden holds, are “structurally unable to 
account for the role that certain virtues, ends, and duties play in moral experi-
ence because of their single-element approach to moral theory construction.”122 
Lacking other normative concepts, the perspective of rights can do nothing but 
treat everything that does not amount to a violation of rights as permissible and 
morally acceptable. So long as one does not wrong another, one acts rightly. We, 
instead, wish to be able to differentiate between permissible expressions of per-
sonal interests and preferences, imperfect duties, and supererogatory acts. From 
the perspective of rights this becomes far more difficult, however, because of its 
neglect of imperfect duties. Yet, without imperfect duties, “all of these [i.e. per-
missible expressions of personal interests, imperfect duties, and supererogatory 
acts] may seem no more than ways in which we have a right to act, since others’ 
rights are no constraint.”123 The perspective of rights thus results in a severe 
narrowing of the scope of morality.
This problem with the perspective of rights becomes more perspicuous 
when we consider the well-known “right to do wrong.” In arguing for such a 
right, Jeremy Waldron explains that rights do not provide reasons for acting, at 
least not for those who bear them. A right has nothing to say about the moral 
value of this or that action; all it does, is protect decision making in a particu-
lar area, in which the agent is to be safe from interference: “to protect decision 
120. O’Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue. Chapter 5.
121. Louden. Rights Infatuation.
122. Ibid. 99. The single element, of course, being rights.
123. O’Neill, O. (1990). Children’s Rights and Children's Lives. In Constructions of Reason: Explorations of 
Kant’s Practical Philosophy (pp. 187–205). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 192.
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making is not to provide a reason for the making of any particular decision.”124 
It follows that one has a right125 to participate in a demonstration in support of 
a political party with openly racist views; one has a right to donate nothing to 
charity though one has the means to do so; one has a right to deliberately provide 
false information to hapless strangers asking for directions; one has a right not 
to vote (or to participate otherwise in democratic institutions). Having a right in 
these cases does not imply any judgment concerning the moral worth (or lack 
thereof rather) of the actions protected by the right. Provided one does not vio-
late the rights of others, one therefore has a right to do wrong.126
I would argue that Waldron is correct concerning the function of rights: 
rights protect decision-making in a particular sphere of action and have noth-
ing to say about the moral worth of the actions performed. Having clarified in 
this fashion the meaning and function of rights, the problem with a theory of 
morality that focuses solely (or chiefly) on rights becomes plain to see: by not 
recognizing (or simply by ignoring) duties of virtue, a rights-based theory will 
have difficulty explaining why, for example, giving part of one’s income to char-
ity is morally better than giving nothing to charity, or why it is wrong to not 
participate at all in the democratic institutions of one’s country. After all, from a 
rights-based perspective, as long as one does not violate the rights of others, one 
can do no wrong; all further behavior is optional and merely permissible. Thus, 
when one does go beyond one’s duties of justice, this is no longer viewed as a 
duty of beneficence or as civic duty (in the examples mentioned), but instead as 
merely permitted philanthropy or as optional acts of supererogation.127 
One can see why this position is the logical outcome of a moral theory tak-
ing rights as its starting position. As mentioned at the outset of this section, Kant 
124. Waldron. A Right to Do Wrong. 35.
125. Though perhaps one ought to speak of Hohfeldian “privileges,” rather than rights. According to Hoh-
feld, if A has a privilege to Φ, then A is under no duty not to Φ. Furthermore, if A has a privilege to Φ, 
it follows that B has no right (or claim) that A refrain from Φ-ing. In short, Hohfeldian privileges (at 
times also referred to as “liberties”) thus show what the holder of the privilege has no duty not to do 
(Hohfeld, W. N. (1913). Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning. The 
Yale Law Journal, 23(1), 16–59. 32ff.). So, for instance, I am under no duty to provide strangers with 
accurate directions to the Central Station. Conversely, they possess no right (no claim) to receive correct 
information from me.
126. Alternatively, one could say that one has a right to do wrong, provided one does not wrong others (that 
is, violate their rights).
127. For some examples of authors who take rights to be the fundamental moral category and as a conse-
quence hold all acts beyond duties of justice to be supererogatory, see, e.g.: Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory 
of Justice (Revised Ed.). Cambridge (Mass): Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 167; Gewirth. 
Private Philanthropy and Positive Rights (in which Gewirth appears to believe that there is no concep-
tual space between acts of supererogation and rights-based duties); Feinberg. The Nature and Value of 
Rights. 157 (where Feinberg holds that helping others when one has a right not to help them amounts to 
an act of supererogation).
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connected one person’s possession of a right with a debt on the part of another 
(or several others). Accordingly, such rights-corresponding duties, i.e. duties of 
justice, are referred to by Kant as officium debiti (duties of indebtedness).128 If, 
to stay in the metaphor, one pays the precise amount of the debt, one has done all 
one must do; the duty of justice is fulfilled. However, if one pays a larger amount 
than the original debt, one has paid too much; one has gone beyond duty and 
literally performed an act of super-erogation (from the Latin “super” (over) and 
“erogare” (to pay out)). In other words, if one goes beyond what is required as a 
duty of justice, one goes beyond what one was bound (by the right of another) to 
do. For rights-based theories, it follows naturally that actions beyond the scope 
of duties of justice are acts of supererogation. These are the only terms such 
theories can work with, whether this is explicitly acknowledged or not. There 
appears to lie nothing in between duties of justice and acts of supererogation. 
Again, this makes sense once one realizes that for rights-based theories the only 
source of duties is rights. Any actions above and beyond such rights-correspond-
ing duties are therefore supererogatory and thus wholly optional.
In sum, we have found that there are two main downsides to adopting the per-
spective of rights. Firstly, lack of attention for duties could lead to the recognition 
of unclaimable rights as genuine human rights, resulting in claimants clutching 
at straws. Instead, by taking duties as our point of departure, we are able to 
formulate a strict criterion for (human) rights, namely that only where there is a 
possible duty of justice, can there also be a genuine (human) right. By taking the 
perspective of duties, we can thus more accurately identify human rights, render 
unclaimable human rights impossible and prevent human rights inflation. 
Secondly, the perspective of rights tends to only recognize those duties that 
correlate with rights, thus remaining blind to duties of virtue. This, in turn, 
leads to the consideration of all behavior which does not amount to a violation 
of rights as permissible, as no duties are recognized beyond duties of justice. As 
a consequence, all behavior going beyond one’s duties of justice is considered 
supererogatory. This second disadvantage of adopting the perspective of rights 
has been summarized by O’Neill, playing on the title of Dworkin’s famous book, 
as the failure “to take obligations seriously.”129
In conclusion, the adoption of the perspective of duties entails neither any 
judgment concerning the question whether duties are ontologically prior to (i.e. 
128. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:391.
129. O’Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue. 146.
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the basis of) rights130 or the other way around, nor does it imply any derogation 
of the worth of rights. Instead, our only reason for adopting the perspective of 
duties is methodological. It allows us to identify human rights and their correl-
ative duties in a more precise fashion and it grants us a richer view of morality, 
one that is not limited to matters of justice (rights and duties of justice) but that 
extends into the realm of virtue as well.
§ 2.3 – Conclusion: An Overview
This chapter set out to clarify the central concepts and themes of the remainder 
of the dissertation. In §2.1 we clarified the important distinction between per-
fect and imperfect duties as well as the distinction between duties of justice and 
duties of virtue. We, furthermore, took issue with the disparaging treatment of 
imperfect duties and duties of virtue in contemporary debates on duties. Accord-
ingly, we first provided a negative argument illustrating how from the latitude 
and lack of corresponding rights it does not follow that these duties are any less 
important or binding. Next, a positive argument for the importance of duties 
of virtue was presented (in §2.1.3), which set out two ways in which duties of 
virtue in fact serve as a complement to the sphere of justice.
Section 2.2, subsequently, expounded this dissertation’s understanding of 
(human) rights as moral titles to limit the freedom of another by claiming the per-
formance of a duty from him or her. It follows that if one is unable to claim such 
performance, then one does not possess the right in question. In other words, if 
there are no corresponding duties of justice borne by all or specific others, then 
there is no (universal or special) right to speak of. I have termed this approach, 
which moves from duties of justice to rights, the “perspective of duties,” opposing 
it to the by far more common “perspective of rights,” which instead moves from 
rights to duties. The advantages of the perspective of duties, we found, are twofold: 
firstly, by taking duties of justice to be indicative of rights we avoid the problems of 
unclaimable rights and rights inflation. Secondly, by starting from duties we can 
account not only for duties of justice, but also for duties of virtue. The latter escape 
one’s view when one looks at morality from the perspective of rights instead, as it 
can only recognize rights-based duties, i.e. duties of justice. Duties of virtue are, 
consequently, reduced to mere optional excellences.
130. This appears to be Dworkin’s worry when he compares a duties-based approach to a rights-based ap-
proach: Dworkin, R. (1997). Taking Rights Seriously. London: Duckworth. 171.
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As these various concepts have an important role to play in the remainder 
of this dissertation, it seems prudent to provide a handy overview, in which our 
various duties and possible corresponding rights can be organized:131 132133134135
universal Duties of Justice132 Special Duties of Justice133
• Owed by all • Held by specified duty-bearers
• Claimable by all • Claimable by specified right-holders
• Corresponding human rights (rights in rem)  
for all
• Corresponding special rights (rights in  
personam) for a specified few
universal Duties of Virtue134 Special Duties of Virtue135
• Held by all • Held by specifiable others
• Claimable by none • Claimable by none
• No corresponding rights • No corresponding rights
This table indicates that duties of justice require action from either all others (in 
the case of human rights duties) or from a specific set of people (in the case of 
special duties of justice). These duties have correlative rights that are assigned to 
either all others or to particular individuals. Performance of these duties can be 
claimed or waived and is, in principle, enforceable.
We also see that duties of virtue do not give rise to rights. The performance 
of these duties can therefore neither be claimed nor waived and thus cannot be 
131. Here I have drawn considerably on O’Neill’s work on perfect and imperfect duties. See, e.g., 
O’Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue. Chapter 5; O’Neill. Children’s Rights and Children's Lives. 
132. Duties such as the duty to refrain from torturing others, the duty to respect the freedom of others to 
practice their religion, and the duty not to discriminate others are some examples of universal duties of 
justice.
133. Special rights and duties are positive rights and duties resulting from either the specific political con-
text in which agents move (for example, the right to welfare and the duty to contribute to the welfare 
system through taxes) or from contracts, promises and other commitments freely undertaken by agents 
(for example, if I promise to pay back the money you lent me within the week, I have a duty to pay you 
back within that timeframe and you have a right to be paid back in a timely fashion).
134. E.g., the duty of beneficence. We all have a duty to aid those in need to the best of our ability, but 
whom we help and how we help them is left to our discretion. It follows that such a duty is unclaima-
ble. Those in need do thus not have a right to our help, though we are under a duty to do all we can to 
help them.
135. E.g., certain duties of care arising from special relationships. While parents, for example, have a spe-
cial duty of justice to take care of their children, they also have duties of virtue to provide them with 
specific forms of care: for example, to support them in their endeavors, to go to their soccer matches 
on Saturday, and so forth. Children cannot claim a right to such specific forms of treatment from their 
parents, but it is what makes good parents.
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enforced. The reason is that they are neither assigned to all nor to specified but 
rather to indeterminate others. Furthermore, their content is often not sufficient-
ly defined. This can change, however, through the process of institutionaliza-
tion, which can link right-holders to duty-bearers and specify the content of the 
duties in question.
A final observation one can make from this overview is that the rights-per-
spective leaves us with a truly impoverished moral landscape, as it can only 
recognize duties derived from rights, thus remaining blind to half our duties.
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ChApTEr 3 – TWO CONTENTIOuS DuTIES
The fulfillment of duty by each individual is a prerequisite to the 
rights of all […] While rights exalt individual liberty, duties express 
the dignity of that liberty.1
In Chapter 1 we found that the two most contentious and unclear duties to be 
found in both human rights documents and human duties declarations are our 
duties of aid to the global poor and duties to the community. As a first step in 
clarifying these duties, this chapter will ascertain to what extent these duties 
have been explicated within the same, “juridical” discourse (involving both hu-
man rights documents and human duties declarations) in which they have been 
promulgated. Accordingly, §3.1 will consider the treatment of our international 
duties of aid. The conclusion will be that neither the human rights documents 
themselves nor the General Comments of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (CESCR) nor the work of human rights scholars nor the 
various human duties declarations have succeeded in clarifying the duties of 
individuals towards the global poor. It will thus prove necessary to undertake a 
philosophical analysis of these duties in Chapter 4.
Subsequently, in §3.2 I will explore the duties to the community that dis-
quieted so many human rights scholars. This will be done by means of a study 
of Article 29 of the Universal Declaration. This section will be further divided 
into three subsections. First, §3.2.1 will provide an overview of the drafting his-
tory of this article. We will find that the article on duties to the community was 
considered by the drafters to be a crucial and integral part of the Declaration 
from the start. Subsection 3.2.2 will, secondly, examine what role the drafters 
intended Article 29 to have: What was the importance of an article expounding 
duties to the community in a declaration of human rights? It will become appar-
ent that, far from posing a threat to human rights, such duties to the commu-
nity in fact fulfill an important function: they provide us with a more balanced 
view of the relation between rights and duties as well as between the individual 
rights-bearer and the community of which she is a part. Finally, §3.2.3 will first 
answer the question which duties are actually intended when we speak of duties 
to the community. It will then move on to determine the status of these duties 
1.  ADRDM. Preamble.
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(are they duties of justice or duties of virtue?) as well as clarify what community 
it is to which we owe these duties.
§ 3.1 – International Individual Duties of Aid
The importance of examining individual duties relative to subsistence needs 
should require no argument; the numbers speak for themselves. If we exclude 
China, where the boisterous economic growth of roughly the last two decades 
has lifted hundreds of millions above the poverty line (set at $1.25 a day2), 
there were in fact slightly more people suffering from poverty in 2008 (1.11 
billion) than in 1981 (1.10 billion), though as a percentage of the global pop-
ulation there has actually been a decrease (from 40.5% in 1981 to 25.2% 
in 2008, not including China).3 The numbers are even worse if we employ a 
measure of $2 a day: excluding China, the 1.6 billion people below the pover-
ty line in 1981 had increased to 2.08 billion people in 2008 (the percentage 
dropped from 59.3% to 47.0%).4 The numbers and percentages, furthermore, 
differ vastly per region. Whereas the percentage of people getting by on less 
than $1.25 a day in the ‘East Asia and Pacific’ region dropped from 77.2% in 
1981 to 14.3% in 2008, the percentage in sub-Saharan Africa was more or less 
the same in 2008 (47.5%) as it was in 1981 (51.5%), while in this latter region 
the absolute numbers rose from 204.9 million people in 1981 to 386.0 million 
people in 2008.5
Though the urgency of the problem is clear, this has not led, as I will show, 
in any progress in clarifying the duties of individuals arising from global sub-
sistence needs. As will become apparent in what follows, neither human rights 
document nor the General Comments of the CESCR have addressed such duties. 
Human duties declarations do place individual duties towards the global poor 
on our shoulders, yet thus far they excel in vagueness. Therefore, I will conclude 
2. Critics have argued that income data is too narrow a measure to assess poverty. The Human Develop-
ment Reports of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for example, have used Amartya 
Sen’s notion of ‘capabilities’ to assess the quality of life and human welfare worldwide: “Freedoms and 
capabilities are a more expansive notion than basic needs” (UNDP. (2011). Human Development Report 
2011. Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All. Retrieved from http://www.undp.org/content/
dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/2011%20Global%20HDR/English/HDR_2011_EN_Complete.
pdf. 1). Nonetheless, the use of income data will suffice here to provide an idea of the enormous scale of 
the problem of poverty worldwide.
3. Chen, S., & Ravallion, M. (2013). More Relatively-Poor People in a Less Absolutely-Poor World. Review 
of Income and Wealth, 59(1), 1–28. 14.
4. Ibid. 15.
5. Ibid. 14.
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that further research is required, which will be undertaken, from a philosophical 
point of view, in Chapter 4.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights speaks of a human right “to a stan-
dard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services” 
(Article 25(1) UDHR). Similarly, the ICESCR recognizes everyone’s right to “an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions” 
(Article 11(1) ICESCR). These articles aim to show that the destitution of which 
I have spoken in the introduction of this section represents not simply a tragic 
state of affairs, but rather a violation of human rights. Consequently, remedying 
or at least alleviating such dire need is considered not a question of charity or 
beneficence, but rather a matter of justice. Making an adequate standard of liv-
ing a right means that the impoverished individuals of this earth need no longer 
beg for aid, but may claim it. The drafters of these human rights documents 
thus wished to declare that those providing the aid are not performing an act of 
charity or supererogation, but are instead merely giving the right-holders what is 
owed to them. Indeed, this is precisely what having a right means: the power to 
limit the freedom of the duty-bearer to act in accordance with one’s right.
However, despite the clear importance of an adequate standard of living for 
all, questions remain whether it ought to be (and even can be) the subject of a 
human right. There are those who disagree that this human right constitutes a 
right at all; that is, they even disagree that it should be a right within a state, that 
is, a right one has as a citizen. This is a particularly minimalist form of tradi-
tional liberalism (libertarianism) that will not further concern us here. Others, 
and this point of critique will be elaborately presented in the following chapter, 
maintain that it is not a human right. This position holds that, in contrast to civil 
and political rights, socio-economic rights can only be special rights – i.e. rights 
one has as a citizen with respect to one’s government or some other institutional 
order that allocates duties –, but not universal rights one possesses simply as a 
human being that give rise to claims against all. By contrast, my right to be free 
from torture, for example, is truly universal: all have this right against all others.6
Within human rights circles, the most often heard rebuttal of this criti-
cism, points out the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights. What is 
6. Cf., for example, O’Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue. Chapter 5.
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meant by this can be most clearly illustrated by considering the right to life. This 
right has traditionally been understood as a purely negative right entailing solely 
negative duties of forbearance. However, it has become ever more common to 
regard this right no longer merely as a negative right. For example, in the famous 
Case of the ‘Street Children’ v. Guatemala the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights ruled that “the fundamental right to life includes, not only the right of 
every human being not to be deprived of his life arbitrarily, but also the right that 
he will not be prevented from having access to the conditions that guarantee a 
dignified existence.”7 With this statement the Inter-American Court intends to 
show that the right to life does not only involve a negative duty of respect for life 
(i.e. a duty to refrain from killing), but also a positive duty of creating conditions 
in which all are guaranteed the protection of their right to life, by setting up, 
e.g., a police force and an independent judicial branch. Traditional civil rights 
thus also require positive duties, when it comes to their enforcement. Indeed, 
many have argued that the interdependence between the right to life and subsis-
tence rights such as the rights to health, food, water and education is apparent.8 
The Inter-American Court affirms this interdependence and indivisibility of all 
rights and therefore concludes that the right to life belongs “at the same time, to 
the domain of civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural 
rights, thus illustrating the interrelation and indivisibility of all human rights.”9
In the common preamble of the ICCPR and the ICESCR this interrelation 
and indivisibility is further clarified by pointing out the goal of human rights: the 
realization of “the ideal of the free human being.” The preamble stresses that this 
ideal of free human agency “can only be achieved if conditions are created where-
by everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights as well as his civil 
and political rights.” This indivisibility of all human rights has led to the (within 
human rights circles) common conclusion that there is no great disparity between 
first and second generation human rights, but that rather all human rights give 
rise to the same set of three duties, namely duties to respect, protect and fulfill.10
7. Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Villagrán Morales et al. v. Guatemala (the ‘Street Children’ 
Case). Judgment of Nov. 19, 1999 (Merits). Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 63. Para. 144. 
8. See, e.g., Van Boven, T. (2010). Categories of Rights. In D. Moeckli, S. Shah, & S. Sivakumaran (Eds.), 
International Human Rights Law (pp. 173–188). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 179.
9. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Villagrán Morales et al. v. Guatemala. Joint concurring opin-
ion. Para. 4. 
10. Cf. Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Reprinted in (1998) 
Human Rights Quarterly, 20(3), 691–704. Guideline 6: “Like civil and political rights, economic, social 
and cultural rights impose three different types of obligations on States: the obligations to respect, 
protect and fulfill.” This tripartite classification of duties, however, comes from the field of philosophy, 
specifically from the work of Henry Shue: Shue. Basic Rights. 52.
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Specifically with regard to poverty, the CESCR opts for an understanding 
of poverty beyond a simple lack of enough income for food and other essentials. 
Instead, it advocates a view of poverty based loosely on Amartya Sen’s capa-
bilities approach. The Committee’s definition of poverty “recognizes poverty’s 
broader features, such as hunger, poor education, discrimination, vulnerability 
and social exclusion.”11 Poverty, in essence, thus consists in violations of both so-
cio-economic and civil-political rights. The Committee “endorses this multi-di-
mensional understanding of poverty, which reflects the indivisible and interde-
pendent nature of all human rights.”12
To what duties does this understanding of poverty give rise? Let us take the 
right to food, which is one of the rights that make up the right to an adequate 
standard of living, as an example. It should be clear by now that the duties of 
states with regard to this right are not to be limited to non-interference. In-
deed, the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights have put forward the position, following Henry Shue’s tripartite division 
of duties, that states ought to do more than refrain from taking measures which 
result in further violations of the right to food (duty to respect). They must also 
protect their citizens’ right to food by preventing violations by third parties (duty 
to protect). Finally, the CESCR has stated that the duty to fulfill consists of two 
further duties: the duty to facilitate and the duty to provide. The former entails a 
duty of the state to “pro-actively engage in activities intended to strengthen peo-
ple’s access to and utilization of resources and means to ensure their livelihood, 
including food security.”13 The latter duty comes into play when an individual 
or group lacks the means to enjoy the right to food. In this case, the state has a 
duty to provide the necessities for fulfilling the right. This last duty also applies 
in cases of natural disasters or other acute emergencies.
Adequately performing the abovementioned duties will not be possible in 
the same degree for the various states. After all, there are states, which, due to 
a lack of funds and infrastructure, are unable to provide the needy among their 
citizens with (access to) food. There are also states that are gripped in a (civil) 
war. Some states lack the military muscle to protect their citizens’ access to food 
from attacks by third parties, such as rebel groups. In short, the degree to which 
states will be able to perform their duties will vary greatly. But surely we would 
not wish to say that the willing government of a poor, war-torn state is violat-
11. CESCR. Statement on Poverty. Para. 7.
12. Ibid. Para. 8.
13. CESCR. General Comment No. 12. Para. 15. 
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ing its citizens’ human rights when it fails to provide those in need with aid? 
Indeed, the drafters of both the UDHR and the ICESCR would have agreed. 
Thus, whereas the ICCPR declares that each state must take the necessary steps 
“to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant” (Article 2(1) ICCPR), the same ar-
ticle in the ICESCR is more modest; it asserts that each state must “take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation […], to the 
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant” (Article 2(1) 
ICESCR, emphasis added). Similarly, Article 22 of the UDHR reads: “Everyone, 
as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realiza-
tion, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance 
with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and 
cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his per-
sonality” (emphasis added). International human rights law has thus taken into 
account the varying degrees of wealth, infrastructure, and conditions of war or 
peace present in different countries.
Nevertheless, states do have certain minimum core obligations “to ensure 
the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the 
rights”14 of the ICESCR. If a considerable number of individuals in a particular 
state is deprived of enough food, adequate shelter or the most elementary forms 
of education, that state will therefore be found failing in its duties, and thus in 
violation of the Covenant. If such a state claims to be nonetheless doing the most 
it can with the resources available to it, the onus of proof will lie with that state 
to show there are indeed extenuating circumstances of the sort discussed above 
(poverty, war, natural disaster, and so forth).
Moving towards the fundamental aim of this section – i.e. the clarifying 
of the duties of individuals towards the global poor from within the human 
rights discourse – we may inquire what the duties of the developed world are 
towards a state that is unable to fulfill even its minimum core obligations. We 
can find appeals for international cooperation with respect to the realization of 
subsistence rights expressed in rather general terms in the UDHR (Article 22), 
the ICESCR (Articles 2(1) and 11) and the UN Charter (Articles 1 and 56). In 
General Comment No. 12, the CESCR elaborates on the content of these du-
ties of international cooperation with regard to the right to food. Essentially, it 
14. CESCR. General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art. 2(1)).  E/1991/23 (14 
December 1990). Para. 10.
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amounts to the tripartite division of duties discussed above.15 States parties must 
not conduct any activities within their own jurisdiction or abroad which could 
endanger other states’ abilities to ensure the right to food for their citizens. This 
duty of respect further includes the duty to refrain from employing food as an in-
strument of political or economic pressure.16 The CESCR furthermore explains 
the duty to fulfill (provide) as entailing duties to provide disaster relief as well 
as humanitarian assistance in the event of a calamity. This assistance, moreover, 
includes assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons.17 The CESCR 
does not further elucidate the content of the remaining duties (to protect, and to 
fulfill (facilitate)), but it does reiterate that each state should provide assistance 
in accordance with its ability and resources. Controversially, the CESCR argues 
that the drafters of the Covenant intended the phrase “to the maximum of its 
available resources,” mentioned in Article 2(1), to “refer to both the resources 
existing within a State and those available from the international community.”18 
It thus seems that, according to the CESCR, the wealthy countries ought to con-
sider a part of their resources (how much exactly is not spelled out) “as part of 
those which should be available for the realisation of socio-economic rights in 
developing countries.”19
According to some scholars, however, the duties of international coopera-
tion extend beyond the “mere” provision of aid. They point to Article 28 UDHR 
in order to argue, in addition, for duties to contribute to the achievement of a just 
global order:20 “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which 
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.” A 
just social and international order is thus considered to be the precondition for 
the possibility of the realization of all human rights. Given that no (or very few) 
legal systems, and political economic orders today can truly ensure the complete 
realization of human rights, this article contains a potentially radical claim for 
change. As Thomas Pogge has convincingly argued, the manner in which the 
international order is structured has a negative effect on world poverty levels 
15. CESCR. General Comment No. 12. Para. 36.
16. Bojic Bultrini, D. (2009). Guide on Legislating for the Right to Food. Rome: Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization of the United Nations. 26.
17. CESCR. General Comment No. 12. Para. 38.
18. CESCR. General Comment No. 3. Para. 13.
19. Curtis, J., & Darcy, S. (2012). The Right to a Social and International Order for the Realisation of Hu-
man Rights: Article 28 of the Universal Declaration and International Cooperation. In D. Keane & Y. 
McDermott (Eds.), The Challenge of Human Rights: Past, Present and Future (pp. 9–35). Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing. 26.
20. The best known of these scholars would, of course, be Thomas Pogge: Pogge, T. (1992). O’Neill on 
Rights and Duties. Philosophische Studien, 43, 233–247. 246; Pogge, T. (2008). World Poverty and 
Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Polity Press. 70–1. 
104
Human Duties and the Limits of Human Rights Discourse
400088-L-bw-Boot
and human rights fulfillment. Heavy agricultural subsidies in the EU and the 
US, the international borrowing and resource privileges,21 the underrepresen-
tation of developing nations in international financial institutions (e.g., the IMF 
and the WTO), the TRIPS Agreement,22 the imposition of high import tariffs 
by the developed nations – all these measures work together in creating an in-
ternational order very far removed from the order discussed in Article 28. As a 
consequence, state duties of international cooperation are not simply limited to 
duties of direct aid, but rather also contain duties to reform the existing interna-
tional order in a manner that can ensure the enjoyment of rights for all, ideally 
rendering the duties of aid less and less important.
We have thus found that the duties of international cooperation of states to 
respect, protect and fulfill subsistence rights also involve duties to (together with 
other nations) reform the international order (particularly the rules of trade and 
finance), which foreseeably leads to violations of subsistence rights. Perhaps it 
is because our current global order systematically brings about great discrepan-
cies between wealth and power among nations, that the CESCR maintains that 
those who have benefited most from that order (i.e. the wealthy nations) ought 
to consider part of their resources as belonging to those within the international 
community who have the greatest need for such resources. Conceivably, though 
no such argument is provided, the amount a state would be obligated to contrib-
ute would depend on the extent to which it has profited from the current unjust 
global order, as well as that state’s power and influence over the direction of 
trade and finance.
We may conclude that with regard to state duties to prevent and alleviate 
poverty, human rights law has taken great steps forward in defining their content 
and scope. The duties of non-state actors are discussed less and in a vaguer fash-
ion, but human rights law has started to rectify this oversight.23 However, when 
it comes to the duties of individuals, a crushing silence reigns. We have seen that 
both the UDHR and the ICESCR recognize the right to an adequate standard 
of living. Yet, nowhere in these documents, the CESCR’s General Comments, 
21. Pogge, T. (2002). Human Rights and Human Responsibilities. In P. De Greiff & C.P. Cronin (Eds.), 
Global Justice and Transnational Politics (pp. 151–195). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 171–3.
22. The agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is held to severely 
limit access to advanced medicines in poorer countries. Cf. Pogge. World Poverty and Human Rights. 
Chapter 9.
23. CESCR. General Comment No. 12. Paras. 40–1. Paragraph 40 discusses the role of NGO’s, whereas 
paragraph 41 contains a number of recommendations for international financial institutions with regard 
to securing the right to food; cf. CESCR. General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health (Art. 12). E/C.12/2000/4 (11 August 2000). Paras. 63–5. Also see footnotes 31, 32 
and 33 from Chapter 1.
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or the work of human rights scholars, are we provided an adequate treatment of 
the duties of individuals that spring from this right. Individual duties are offered 
perfunctory mention at best. Thus, the CESCR helpfully explains that all mem-
bers of society (including individuals) “have responsibilities in the realization of 
the right to food,”24 but leaves the question of the exact content and status of 
these “responsibilities”25 wide open. Regarding this passage from the CESCR’s 
General Comment No. 12, leading human rights scholars Saul, Kinley and Mow-
bray confirm the existence of ancillary duty-bearers when states are unable to 
fulfill their minimum core obligations. Yet, in the same breath, they state that 
“while it may seem reasonable to suggest that the private sector (and especially 
the private business sector) should have responsibilities to respect the right to 
adequate food, this appears to fall short by failing to follow through with details 
of how and why.”26
In short, if one desires to know which duties one has as an individual, as 
a consequence of Article 25 UDHR (or Article 11 ICESCR), one should not 
expect to find any answers in human rights documents, General Comments of 
the CESCR or the work of scholars of human rights law. Are we to conclude 
that therefore individuals have no real duties regarding the right to an adequate 
standard of living? 
As discussed in Chapter 1, it was discontent with the supposed lack of attention 
for individual duties within human rights documents that led to the birth of sev-
eral human duties declarations. Surely, these declarations will have more to say 
on the matter of our duties to the global poor. Let us first consider the treatment 
of these duties by the UDHRe. It is clear that this declaration wishes to address 
duties to the poor, as becomes apparent from, for instance, Article 9: “All peo-
ple, given the necessary tools, have a responsibility to make serious efforts to 
overcome poverty, malnutrition, ignorance, and inequality.” Yet, what form such 
efforts should take, and whether we owe them to all human beings or only to our 
24. CESCR. General Comment No. 12. Para. 20.
25. When individual duties are mentioned, the CESCR suddenly uses the word “responsibility,” whereas 
it always uses the word “obligation” to refer to the duties of states. Wherein the difference between 
“responsibility” and “obligation” consists, however, is left unsaid, as is the reason for attributing the one 
term to states and the other to individuals.
26. Saul, B., Kinley, D., & Mowbray, J. (2014). The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights: Commentary, Cases, and Materials. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 872. The authors’ 
parenthetical remark in this passage suggests that when it comes to ancillary duty-bearers they are not 
so much interested in the duties of individuals, but rather with those of (transnational) corporations. 
Indeed, following the quoted passage, this suspicion is confirmed, as the authors go on to only discuss 
the duties of corporations.
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compatriots remains unclear. Article 10 continues along the same path: “Every-
one should lend support to the needy, the disadvantaged, the disabled and to the 
victims of discrimination.” Again, the kind and amount of support is not expli-
cated. Similarly, Article 20 DHSR states that one has a duty to use one’s wealth 
“for the benefit of the progress of Humanity as a whole.” The exact meaning of 
“the progress of Humanity,” however, as well as how one is to contribute to it, 
is left nebulous.
Furthermore, in Article 11 UDHRe, the drafters took on the contentious 
issue of a just economic and social order, perhaps intending to provide the duty 
correlative to the right expressed in Article 28 UDHR (“Everyone is entitled to 
a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this Declaration can be fully realized”). What form such an order should take 
and what the duties of individuals are in light of achieving that just order, are 
questions that are, once more, left unanswered.27 
Interestingly, as Pogge points out,28 the Golden Rule, mentioned in Article 
4 UDHRe, is provided only in its negative version: “What you do not wish to be 
done to yourself, do not do to others.” This would seem to imply that, as long as 
I am not actively harming others, I have fulfilled all my duties, which apparently 
include solely negative duties of forbearance. Such a position, however, is in con-
trast with the “spirit of solidarity” espoused in that same article, which would 
appear to call for the positive version of the Golden Rule instead: do unto others 
as you would have them do unto you. Yet, this positive variety is not mentioned, 
though it would have in fact been more appropriate.
Many human duties declarations are, furthermore, confused regarding the 
status of their prescribed duties: are they possibly enforceable duties of justice or 
rather duties of virtue, the fulfillment of which lies at the discretion of the agent? 
The drafters of many human duties declarations claim they have included solely 
27. The DHSR also contains an article prescribing a duty correlative to the right expressed in Article 28 
UDHR: “Every person has the duty to contribute actively to the achievement, both at the international 
level and in his or her own community/society, of an international and social order under which all the 
rights and freedoms recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in other pertinent 
international instruments are made fully effective” (Article 11). Unfortunately, this article does not provide 
us with any information concerning the shape this duty ought to take in practice. For instance, what does 
“contribute actively” entail? A similar criticism can be leveled against Article 18(3) of the Declaration 
on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect 
Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations on 9 December 1998): “Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organ-
izations also have an important role and a responsibility in contributing, as appropriate, to the promotion 
of the right of everyone to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments can be fully realized.” What 
does that “role and responsibility” require of us? How much is “appropriate?”
28. Pogge. Human Rights and Human Responsibilities. 156–7.
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duties of a moral nature, yet they also contain unambiguous legal duties (e.g. 
the duty to respect life and to refrain from killing or injuring another (Article 5 
UDHRe)). It is therefore apparent that the drafters have not thought through the 
distinction between duties of justice and duties of virtue. As a consequence, it is 
not only the content of our individual duties regarding global subsistence needs 
that remains unclear, but also their status.
The most recent human duties declaration (the draft resolution on Fun-
damental Rights and Responsibilities (FRR) issued by the Council of Europe 
in 2011) does attempt to distinguish between legal and moral duties, but does 
not say much more than that the legal duties may not place too heavy a burden 
on the duty-bearer, without any further explanation. The distinction between 
duties of justice and duties of virtue therefore remains wanting in clarity. As a 
consequence, the status of our duties to the global poor continues to be open 
to dispute as well. This declaration, furthermore, provides some more details 
regarding the content of our duties to the poor. However, it understands the 
“responsibility to show solidarity towards other members of the community” 
(Article 12 FRR) as pertaining chiefly to one’s fellow citizens, as becomes clear 
from its commentary. One can fulfill this responsibility, it explains, by paying 
taxes and contributing to a national system of social welfare. Thus, though the 
FRR does provide us with clear individual duties, it cannot provide us with any 
guidance concerning our individual duties towards the global poor.
We must conclude that human rights discourse (considered broadly here, thus 
including human duties declarations as well) has as yet failed to provide a clear 
description of the individual duties that correlate with the human right to an ad-
equate standard of living. Whereas the duties of states have been made increas-
ingly clear, and the duties of non-state actors have also begun to be elucidated, 
the duties individuals have in combating global poverty remain completely in 
the dark. It remains to be seen, in Chapter 4, whether philosophy will fare much 
better in explicating our duties to the global poor and in providing answers to 
questions such as the following: Why do we have duties to the poor in the first 
place? Is the right to an adequate standard of living a universal human right or 
rather a special right? Are our duties concerning global poverty duties of virtue 
or duties of justice, claimable by right-holders? All I hope to have shown here 
is that there is a gaping hole where the specification of the content, scope and 
status of individual duties regarding global poverty ought to be. The next chapter 
will provide an examination of the contemporary debate in political and legal 
philosophy concerning global justice for answers to such questions.
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§ 3.2 – The role and Significance of Duties to the Community within the 
universal Declaration
The second of the two most contentious and ambiguous duties encountered in 
Chapter 1 are the duties to the community. These duties are no doubt more 
contentious among human rights scholars than the duties to the global poor. 
The reason for this is that so-called vertical duties owed by the individual to the 
community are viewed, as became apparent in Chapter 1, as possible illegitimate 
and dangerous limits to our rights. It is therefore the main goal of this section to 
abate these fears and to demonstrate how such duties to the community instead 
perform an indispensable function. This will be done by means of a study of 
Article 29 UDHR, the first paragraph of which places duties to the community 
on us: “Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible.” I have chosen to discuss the Univer-
sal Declaration’s formulation of duties to the community for two reasons. Firstly, 
the document carries considerable weight, as the foundational document of in-
ternational human rights law. Secondly, the drafting history of this article con-
tains discussions among drafters on questions that are central to our purposes 
here, namely the relation between rights and duties as well as between the indi-
vidual bearer of rights and the larger community within which she finds herself.
This section will be structured as follows: first, §3.2.1 will provide a study 
of the drafting history of Article 29 UDHR. Situated near the very end of the 
Universal Declaration, one might be tempted to conclude that Article 29 was 
hastily attached at the very last minute to a document that was essentially al-
ready complete. Even a cursory look at the drafting history, however, will rid us 
of the notion that Article 29 was a mere addendum, appended to the Declaration 
solely pro forma. On the basis of a study of the drafting history, I will reach the 
conclusion that the drafters viewed Article 29 as central to the Declaration as a 
whole.
Subsequently, §3.2.2 will move beyond a mere exposition of the drafting 
history to an interpretation of the meaning and function of Article 29(1) in the 
Universal Declaration as a whole. This subsection wishes to clarify the signifi-
cance of the addition of duties to the community to a human rights declaration 
for our understanding of the nature of such rights as well as for our comprehen-
sion of the relation between the individual rights-bearer and the community at 
large. The point will be made that by insisting on duties to the community, the 
drafters wished to place our rights within a larger moral context and strike a bal-
ance between the rights we enjoy and the duties we owe. By bestowing such im-
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portance on duties to the community, the drafters furthermore intended to avoid 
the image of the lone rights-bearer completely detached from society and instead 
proposed a more balanced view: the rights-bearer is not only a distinct individ-
ual, but also undeniably a part of the community in which she finds herself. The 
drafters thus present us with an appealing intermediate position that avoids the 
trappings of both an extreme individualism and a rigorous collectivism. 
This second subsection will end by considering the educational function of 
the Universal Declaration. A brief look at Article 26(2) will suffice to demon-
strate that the drafters realized that the promulgation of rights and the impo-
sition of duties would not suffice to render human rights secure. Rather, what 
is additionally needed can be best described as a change in people’s disposi-
tion. Article 26(2) proposes that the educational system be used to realize this 
change. Essentially, the drafters hereby make the case that states ought to take 
an active role in utilizing the educational system in order to cultivate a certain 
kind of citizen: one that both insists on her rights and recognizes her duties; 
one that is both part of a particular community and also a distinct individual. In 
other words, the drafters argue for the instilment of civic virtue. 
Lastly, §3.2.3 will clarify what duties are in fact intended by the phrase 
“duties to the community.” Three separate categories of such duties will be dis-
tinguished. Subsequently, the status of each of these three categories of duties 
will be determined. Finally, having already established what actual duties are 
intended by the phrase “duties to the community,” it will become possible to 
determine what precisely is meant by the term “community.” To interpret this 
community as a political community of citizens and therefore the duties to the 
community as civic duties, seems the most convincing reading.
§ 3.2.1 – Drafting history
Already the very first preliminary draft of what was to become the Universal 
Declaration – the so-called Humphrey draft (named after John Peters Humphrey 
who prepared it) – contained an article on duties. Emphasizing the importance 
that was attached to such an article – Humphrey had, after all, prepared his draft 
after having conferred with the executive group of the Commission on Human 
Rights Drafting Committee, chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt –, it was placed at the 
very beginning of the draft. Its Article 1 differed quite substantially from the 
final version: “Every one owes a duty of loyalty to his State and to the (interna-
tional society) United Nations. He must accept his just share of responsibility for 
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the performance of such social duties and his share of such common sacrifices as 
may contribute to the common good.”29 Yet, though the importance of an article 
expounding our duties was generally acknowledged, several delegates felt uneasy 
by defining those duties as duties to the state. Thus the Rapporteur of the Com-
mission, Charles Malik of Lebanon, questioned the desirability of an unqualified 
“duty of loyalty to the State.” Given the recent experiences of war waged by to-
talitarian states, we can understand why Malik argued that we do not owe a duty 
of loyalty to simply any state, but rather only to a just state.30 
Due to sustained criticism of the mentioning of the state in the article listing 
our duties, René Cassin of France avoided any mention of the state in his draft 
declaration. In his revision of the Humphrey text, Cassin placed the article con-
cerning our duties once again near the beginning of the document. Thus, Article 
3 reads: “Man is essentially social and has fundamental duties to his fellow-men. 
The rights of each are therefore limited by the rights of others.”31 His alternative 
formulation of this article can be viewed as a more elaborate version of the cur-
rent Article 29(1) and can therefore help us to better understand this article: “As 
human beings cannot live and develop themselves without the help and support 
of society, each one owes to society fundamental duties which are: obedience to 
law, exercise of a useful activity, willing acceptance of obligations and sacrifices 
demanded for the common good.”32 The cause for our duties is made more ex-
plicit here than it is in the final version: it is because we are dependent on society 
for our life and development that we owe it certain duties. Whereas these duties, 
furthermore, are left unspecified in the final version of the UDHR, Cassin’s draft 
gives us an idea of which duties could have been intended in Article 29(1).
Article 29(2) UDHR embodies the idea that neither rights nor freedom are 
absolute, but rather that both ought to be limited in order to secure “due recog-
nition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just 
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic 
society” (Article 29(2) UDHR). This view was widely shared by the various 
delegates. Thus, William Hodgson of Australia argued that none of the rights in 
the draft declaration are to be considered limitless. Rather, “[e]veryone of these 
rights has a corresponding duty,” namely a “duty to respect the rights of others.”33 
The British delegate Lord Charles Dukeston (trade unionist and Labour politi-
29. UN Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3 (4 June 1947). 
30. UN Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.3 (13 June 1947). 10.
31. UN Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/W.2/Rev.2 (20 June 1947).
32. Ibid.
33. UN Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3/Add.1. (11 June 1947). 5.
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cian) agreed with the Australian delegate, adding: “It is of no use in my opinion 
of seeking to define personal freedom entirely detached from the obligation of 
those individuals either to the State or to voluntary organizations.”34 The senti-
ment was shared not only by Western countries, but also by the Latin-American 
delegates who less than a year later would adopt their own (and the world’s first) 
international human rights declaration. Thus, with regard to the second article 
of Humphrey’s draft35 (a precursor of the final Article 29(2)) Panama proposed: 
“In the exercise of his rights every one is limited by the rights of others and by 
the just requirements of the democratic state.”36 We can see how this proposal 
starts to come close to the eventual formulation in Article 29(2) by specifying 
that one’s rights are limited by the just requirements of not just any kind of state, 
but rather only of a democratic state. 
Article 29(3) additionally mentions that the exercise of our rights and free-
doms may not be “contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.” 
Recall that the very first article on duties, drawn up by Humphrey, contained 
a duty of loyalty not only to the state, but also to the United Nations. Without 
providing any explanation, however, Cassin removed any mention of a duty to 
the international community from his draft, which only reappeared at the time 
of the Third Committee. At this point, the article on duties had already been 
moved to the end of the draft declaration as Article 27 (about which I will have 
something to say in a moment), the second section of which read as follows: “In 
the exercise of his rights, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
necessary to secure due recognition and respect for the rights of others and the 
requirements of morality, public order and general welfare in a democratic so-
ciety.”37 The French delegation suggested to add to this limitation clause, which 
is very close to the final version in Article 29(2), the following phrase: “and to 
serve the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”38 Nearly all those who 
addressed the matter of expanding the circle of our duties to the point that it 
encompasses not only our own national community but also the international 
community as a whole,39 spoke out in favor of the idea. The Belgian representa-
34. Ibid. 6.
35. UN Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3 (4 June 1947): “In the exercise of his rights every one is limited by the rights of 
others and the just requirements of the State and of the United Nations.”
36. UN Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3/Add.1. (11 June 1947). 12.
37. UN Doc. A/C.3/304/Rev.1 (30 October 1948).
38. UN Doc. A/C.3/345 (17 November 1948).
39. The word “community” was chosen precisely because it does not exclusively refer to one particular 
community (as the word “state” does, for instance). Rather, it refers to communities both larger than the 
national community (regional communities or the international community at large) and smaller (e.g. 
the city you belong to, your neighborhood, and so forth).
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tive Fernand Dehousse found the idea expressed in the French addition of such 
importance that he argued it deserved a separate paragraph. This proposal could 
count on the assent of the majority, eventually leading to the adoption of Article 
29(3).40 The point of this article was to emphasize the idea that the individual 
was not only a part of her own national community, but that she also belonged to 
the international community as a whole; she is to view the interests of this larger, 
global community as her interests. Adding this section to an article dealing with 
our duties and the limits of our rights is quite significant: it means that no citizen 
in any country can consider herself and her country’s interests to be detached 
from the interests of others worldwide. It means that in exercising her freedom 
she is to take into account, as far as she can, the possible consequences of her 
actions not only for her fellow citizens, but also for agents worldwide.
Having briefly discussed the drafting history of all three sections of Arti-
cle 29 UDHR, one question concerning the drafting process remains for us to 
answer: How did the article(s) listing our duties come to be moved from the be-
ginning to the end of the Declaration? Did the drafters suddenly have a change 
of heart regarding the importance of our duties? In his study on the Universal 
Declaration Johannes Morsink explains how, strangely enough, the proposal to 
place the duties-article at the end of the document came from the representative 
of China, Peng-Chun Chang who was also vice-president of the UN Commission 
on Human Rights. He argued that an “article which dealt with the limitations on 
the exercise of the rights and freedoms proclaimed in the Declaration should not 
appear before those rights and freedoms themselves had been set forth.”41 As the 
Chinese delegate, Chang was expected to provide a Confucian, communitarian 
input. All the more striking, then, that it was he who argued against a place of 
prominence for the article listing our duties to the community and the limita-
tions on the exercise of our rights and freedoms. Perhaps he did not embrace 
such traditional Chinese views due to his Western education. Perhaps he was 
distraught due to the unrest back in China. Or perhaps he simply was not feeling 
well.42 Whatever the reason for this out-of-character proposal, however, its adop-
tion should not lead us to conclude, Morsink warns,43 that the UDHR stands in 
the exact same tradition as the bills of rights that were drawn up at the end of the 
eighteenth century, with their strong emphasis on individualistic, negative liber-
40. Morsink. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 252.
41. UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.77 (28 June 1948). 2.
42. Morsink explores various explanations for Chang’s odd behavior: Morsink. The Universal Declaration. 
245–6. 
43. Ibid. 245.
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ty. In fact, there was quite some resistance to Chang’s proposal. The British del-
egate Geoffrey Wilson, for example, was opposed to the proposal, as he wanted 
to avoid the impression that “the individual was granted unlimited rights.”44 The 
delegate from the USSR Alexei Pavlov agreed with his British colleague, adding 
that the article listing our duties and the limits of our rights should be viewed as 
a general provision and, as such, ought to precede the “more specific clauses.”45 
Eventually, Chang’s proposal was adopted by the smallest possible majority: 8 in 
favor, 7 opposed and 1 abstention.46 
This extremely narrow majority illustrates that many delegates placed great 
importance on what eventually became Article 29 and would have preferred to 
keep it at the beginning of the Declaration. Its final placement should therefore 
not lead us to infer that the drafters intended it as an afterthought of little impor-
tance. Rather, the article had been an integral part of the Declaration from the 
outset. The narrowly won vote to place the article at the end of the Declaration 
rather seems to form an exception to their habitual treatment of the article up 
until that point. Moreover, much can be said for the position that the drafters 
made a mistake by adopting Chang’s proposal. As the delegate from the USSR 
pointed out, Article 29 clearly forms a general provision and should as such be 
placed at the outset of the document alongside Articles 1 and 2, which similarly 
contain fundamental principles that serve as interpretive tools for the remainder 
of the Declaration. 
§ 3.2.2 – Interpretation
If we are to understand the function of Article 29, we must first understand the 
structure of the Universal Declaration as a whole. It is not just a collection of 
separate rights gathered together in one document. Rather, the different parts 
of the Declaration are intimately linked to one another. Thus, René Cassin, the 
French delegate responsible for the revision of the Humphrey draft, compared 
the structure of the Declaration to the portico of a temple.47 Accordingly, the 
seven clauses from the document’s Preamble form the seven steps leading up to 
the portico. The foundation of the whole structure is formed by four foundation 
44. UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.77 (28 June 1948). 2
45. Ibid. 3.
46. Ibid.
47. For an extensive explanation of this analogy, see: Glendon. A World Made New. Chapter 10. 
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stones. These are the four general principles that can be found in Articles 1 and 
2, namely freedom, equality, dignity and brotherhood. Together, the steps and 
the foundation stones – that is, the Preamble, Proclamation and the first two 
articles – lay down a number of principles and purposes, which are to guide 
the reader in her interpretation of the articles that follow. As briefly discussed 
above, Cassin’s draft had placed both an article stating our duties and an article 
defining the limits on the exercise of our rights and freedoms at the beginning 
of his draft declaration.48 What eventually became Articles 29(1) and 29(2) were 
initially therefore intended as such interpretive guides as well, just as Articles 1 
and 2. 
Cassin’s fourfold division of the rights listed in the Declaration appears some-
what forced to me, so I will not discuss it here.49 A more likely (and more com-
mon) division is that between civil and political rights on the one hand (Articles 3 
through 21) and economic, social and cultural rights on the other hand (Articles 
22 through 27). In any case, the point is that in his metaphor of the portico the 
columns are formed by the several rights listed in Articles 3 through 27. 
More importantly for our purposes, Cassin viewed the remaining three ar-
ticles (Articles 28, 29 and 30) as the pediment of the portico, which completes 
the structure and holds it together. As Mary Ann Glendon points out, these 
articles tie the individual and the community to each other and place “the enu-
merated rights in the context of limits, duties, and the social and political order 
in which they are to be realized.”50 The image illustrates how our rights would 
remain somewhat unbound, as it were, without the direction provided by the 
final articles. As the columns of the portico would remain unstable without the 
pediment in place and would risk tilting or perhaps eventually even falling over, 
so too the adequate protection of rights would be at risk without the necessary 
concomitant duties and limits. The security of rights, in other words, depends 
on the regular performance of duties. The pediment completes the framework in 
which human rights can be realized. What this framework exactly entails, must 
now be explained. To that end, we must provide an interpretation of Articles 28, 
29 and 30, whereby the main focus will lie on Article 29.
We may be brief about Article 30, as it contains a simple general abuse 
clause, similar to Article 17 ECHR, discussed in Chapter 1: “Nothing in this 
48. UN Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/W.2/Rev.2 (20 June 1947). Articles 3 and 4.
49. According to this fourfold division, the first column is formed by Articles 3 through 11, the second by 
Articles 12 through 17, the third by Articles 18 through 21, and the fourth by Articles 22 through 27: 
Glendon. A World Made New. 174.
50. Ibid.
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Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group, or person any 
right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any 
of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.” This article thus forbids any actions 
aimed at the imperilment of the rights and freedoms listed in the Declaration. 
In that sense, it forms a general limit to the legitimate exercise of our freedom.
As briefly mentioned in the previous section, Thomas Pogge maintains that 
Article 28 (“Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”) contains 
a right to an international politico-economic order that is not (as is instead the 
case at present) organized in such a manner that leads to a systematic violation 
of human rights worldwide. Though this is not at all an implausible reading 
of this article, it does not shed any light on Article 29. Therefore, we may, for 
present purposes, consider Article 28 as a “mini-Preamble” instead, as Glendon 
proposes.51 Several aspects of the order mentioned in Article 28 are presented in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 29: 
(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free 
and full development of his personality is possible.
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely 
for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the 
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just require-
ments of morality, public order and the general welfare in a dem-
ocratic society.
Firstly, it must be an order that renders possible the free and full development 
of one’s personality. Secondly, the order must guarantee safety and security for 
those who live in it. Thirdly, this order must promote the general welfare and, 
fourthly, its political system must be democratic in nature. The duties and lim-
itations mentioned in these two paragraphs therefore come into play only to help 
promote and protect these qualities of the political and social order in question. 
Thus, we all have duties to the community, but only to a community that renders 
“the free and full development” of one’s personality possible. Similarly, rights are 
subject to certain limitations, but only “for the purpose of securing due recog-
nition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just 
51. Glendon, M. A. (1998). Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Notre Dame Law Review, 
73, 1153–1176. 1169.
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requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic 
society.” Put differently, one would owe no duties to a community that renders 
the free and full development of one’s personality impossible. Furthermore, any 
limitations on rights and freedoms for any reasons other than those listed in the 
second paragraph are illegitimate. It would seem, therefore, that the distrust 
expressed by critics of individual duties to the community (as discussed in §1.2) 
is unwarranted in the case of the Universal Declaration. For so long as the duties 
and the limitations on the exercise of our rights enjoy such conditions to their 
validity, any abuse by an authoritarian regime seems highly unlikely.
So far we have established only that duties and limits to rights need not be 
the plaything of despots. We have thus, as yet, only made the negative case that 
there is no harm in adopting such duties and limits to rights. Next we must pro-
vide a positive argument for such adoption. We have already explained, in other 
words, why we need not reject duties to the community; now it is time that we 
clarify the importance of accepting them.
In a sense, the inclusion of Article 29 could be read as a response to the 
Marxist critique of human rights. In On the Jewish Question Marx criticizes the 
human rights declarations of the late eighteenth century for what he considers to 
be their basic assumption, namely that man is an inherently selfish creature. The 
idea of human rights, Marx maintains, presupposes a view of man not as a citi-
zen who with his fellow citizens attempts to realize a common good, but rather 
as a “bourgeois,” i.e. a self-interested member of civil society. Accordingly, Marx 
maintains that the “right of man to freedom is not based on the union of man with 
man, but on the separation of man from man. It is the right to this separation, 
the rights of the limited individual who is limited to himself.”52 Human rights are 
intended, thus Marx’s critique runs, merely to guarantee for all a private sphere 
into which each can withdraw from the community [Gemeinwesen], and in which 
each knows his private interests and whims to be secured. The rights of man view 
man not as a social being, but rather society “appears as a framework exterior to 
individuals, a limitation of their original self-sufficiency.”53 
Article 29(1) clearly distances itself from such a view by arguing that only 
in a community can one freely and fully develop one’s personality. In fact, the 
Declaration as a whole emphasizes solidarity and the importance of community: 
the very first sentence of the Preamble speaks of one human family, Article 1 
52. Marx, K. (2000). On the Jewish Question. In D. McLellan (Ed. & Trans.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings 
(pp. 46–70). (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 60.
53. Ibid. 61.
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summons us to “act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood,” and the 
Declaration ends by once more emphasizing the importance of community in 
Article 29(1). We thus find, both out the outset and at the close of the document, 
calls to solidarity. The drafters expressed the importance they attached to the 
community by the insertion of one word in particular, according to Morsink: the 
word “alone” in Article 29(1). He even goes so far as to state that this word may 
perhaps be the most important of the whole Declaration.54
It was the Australian delegate Alan Watt who proposed to add the word 
“alone” to Article 27 (later to become Article 29), so that eventually Article 
27(1) of the Third Committee Draft read as follows: “Everyone has duties to the 
community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is 
possible” (my emphasis). Watt’s proposal sparked a philosophical debate among 
the delegates centered on the question whether it was possible to develop one’s 
personality in complete isolation from others. Those who answered this question 
affirmatively and those who answered it negatively both referred to Daniel De-
foe’s Robinson Crusoe to make their case. Those who opposed the insertion of 
the word “alone” argued that Defoe’s tale showed how one could very well devel-
op one’s personality on a deserted island, whereas those in favor of the addition 
argued that Robinson had been able to develop his personality merely because 
he had had certain artifacts of human civilization at his disposal (e.g. books and 
tools), which he found in the ship’s wreckage.55 The stakes of this debate were 
of course not limited to a textual exegesis of Defoe’s work; rather, what was at 
stake was the matter of how the drafters wished to depict the relation between 
individual and society. By eventually adopting the proposal (23 voted in favor of 
adoption, 5 against and 14 abstained), the drafters essentially voted to present 
a particular image of the rights-bearer. By stating clearly that the individual can 
only develop himself fully in a community, the drafters rejected the image of the 
lone rights-bearer, isolated from society, for whom his fellow men form “not the 
realization but the limitation of his own freedom.”56 They instead viewed the 
rights-bearer as clearly situated within and a part of a particular community, in 
which alone he is able to develop his personality. 
Yet, it is of course not only a matter of the individual depending on the 
community for its preservation and development, but rather the community it-
self also depends on its members for its maintenance and flourishing. Therefore, 
54. Morsink. The Universal Declaration. 248.
55. Daes. Freedom of the Individual under Law. 20.
56. Marx. On the Jewish Question. 60.
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the drafters strove to strike a balance between the rights of the individual and 
the rights of the community or, in other words, between individual rights and in-
dividual duties. Given this interdependence of the community and its members, 
individual freedom had to be balanced with the freedom of others as well as 
with the reasonable demands of the community.57 The rights listed in the Decla-
ration are thus not all understood as trumps.58 The drafters expressed this view 
in the first two paragraphs of Article 29, which together provide guidelines for 
the achievement of the right balance between the “due recognition of individual 
human rights and the acknowledgement of individual duties to the communi-
ty,”59 whereby the community is understood both as an overarching whole and 
as a collection of its individual members.
Earlier we said that the concerns of the critics of human duties declarations 
do not apply to the duties expressed in the Universal Declaration, as we owe such 
duties only to a certain kind of community (one that renders the free and full 
development of one’s personality possible). We noted, furthermore, that not all 
limitations of rights are legitimate; rather, only those limitations are legitimate that 
respect the conditions listed in the second paragraph of Article 29. Other critics, 
however, would argue that the attention dedicated to individual duties and to the 
individual’s place in the community does not go far enough. These critics argue 
that the discourse of universal human rights is an essentially Western discourse 
that promotes an individualistic view of man detached from his community. This 
critique had already been articulated by Marx, as briefly expounded above, but 
more recently it has especially been expressed by scholars and politicians from 
African and Asian nations. Thus, the Kenyan-born Makau W. Mutua, pointing 
out that Africa was not represented at the drafting table of the UDHR, states that 
it is a decidedly Eurocentric document. According to Mutua, this Eurocentrism 
translated itself chiefly into an unbalanced view of the individual. He argues that 
human rights discourse in general, which includes the Universal Declaration, ele-
vates the individual above the society in which she finds herself: 
This runaway notion of individualism, which is a central tenet of lib-
eralism, has retarded the capacity of human rights thinkers to moder-
57. Daes. Freedom of the Individual under Law. 19.
58. Certainly there are absolute rights: the right to not be enslaved by another, for example, or the right not 
to be tortured. In the case of other rights, however (e.g. the rights to freedom of expression, freedom of 
religion, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, as discussed in §1.3.1), rights must be balanced 
with the rights of others and the interests of the community, or the common good.
59. Hodgson. Individual Duty within a Human Rights Discourse. 91.
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ate selfishness with community interests. In other words, the individ-
ual should be placed within the society and constructed in such a way 
that he does not overwhelm his fellow beings or the society itself.60
Such criticism, I argue, does not hold against the Universal Declaration. The 
individual is, firstly, clearly placed in a community, without which it cannot fully 
develop its personality and to which it has certain duties. Furthermore, selfish-
ness is moderated, namely by placing clear limits on the legitimate exercise of 
our rights and freedoms, for the benefit of the rights of others, public order and 
general welfare.
An examination of Article 29 and its drafting history has thus shown that 
the drafters were very much at pains to strike an adequate balance between the 
individual and the community in which she lives as well as between her rights 
and her duties. The individual is deemed neither inferior nor superior to the 
community, but rather an interdependence between the two is posited. Thus 
both the criticism that individual duties to the community form a prelude to 
authoritarianism, and the critique that the individual enjoys absolute freedom at 
the cost of the community, have been demonstrated to be unfounded in the case 
of the Universal Declaration.
Thus far we have shown why the duties mentioned in Article 29 are not to be 
feared and why they help reject the criticism that the UDHR promotes an indi-
vidualistic image of man. Next, I wish to ascertain with what concrete goal the 
drafters included such duties to the community. 
In Chapter 1 we had already briefly mentioned that the UDHR is not, strict-
ly speaking, a legally binding document. Legislative action being thus left out as 
the Declaration’s chief end, the drafters instead emphasized the Declaration’s 
educational purposes.61 Morsink argues that this emphasis on education is clear-
ly expressed in the document’s Proclamation.62 Granted, the Proclamation does 
speak of “progressive measures, national and international, to secure their [i.e. 
60. Mutua. M. W. (2008). Human Rights in Africa: The Limited Promise of Liberalism.  African Studies 
Review, 51(1), 17–39. 32. Cf. Mutua, M. W. (1995). The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Finger-
print: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties. Virginia Journal of International Law, 35, 339–380.
61. Morsink. The Universal Declaration. 323.
62. “Now, Therefore, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that 
every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by 
teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, 
national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among 
the peoples of the Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.”
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of the rights and freedoms expressed in the Declaration] universal and effective 
recognition and observance,” which appears to point towards their legal imple-
mentation. Yet, the Declaration itself was not intended to have legal effect. It 
calls for the adoption of measures, including those of a legal nature, that can 
help secure human rights, which it itself, apparently, cannot do. For this reason, 
the UDHR was intended, from early on in the drafting process, to be comple-
mented by a Covenant, which was to be binding upon the signatories.63 Before 
the passage quoted above, however, the Proclamation states the Declaration’s 
explicitly educational goal, namely “that every individual and every organ of 
society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and 
education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms.”
Morsink appears to view the Declaration’s main educational function to 
be to provide people everywhere with a standard, against which they can judge 
their government’s policies.64 There is, however, another, equally important ed-
ucational function served by the Declaration, to which he grants but cursory 
mention. The Proclamation calls on all members of society to keep the UDHR 
“constantly in mind.” The Declaration must, in other words, be internalized. 
Glendon, quoting two of the most influential delegates (Charles Malik and René 
Cassin), argues that the drafters believed that the best defense of human rights 
resided not in legal coercion, but rather in the adoption of these human rights 
and human duties “in the mind and the will of the people.”65 Cassin added that 
“respect for human rights depends first and foremost on the mentalities of indi-
viduals and social groups.”66 Rendering human rights secure in a stable fashion 
thus requires more than legal coercion alone; it also calls for the cultivation of a 
certain disposition or character, for the internalization of certain values. It calls, 
in brief, for civic virtue.67 
63. Eventually two separate covenants were drawn up, the ICCPR and the ICESCR, which were both adopt-
ed in 1966.
64. Morsink. The Universal Declaration. 324.
65. Malik, C. H.  Introduction. In Nolde, O. F. (1968). Free and Equal: Human Rights in Ecumenical Per-
spective. Geneva: World Council of Churches. 70. Quoted in Glendon. Knowing the Universal Declara-
tion. 1170.
66. Cassin, R. (1972). La Pensée et l’Action. Boulogne-sur-Seine: Editions F. Lalou. 155. Quoted in Glen-
don. Knowing the Universal Declaration. 1170. 
67. Note the similarity with the appeals for “voluntary self-obligation” and a global ethic, as we found them 
in several of the human duties declarations. These aspects were nearly unanimously denounced by human 
rights scholars as paternalistic: not only could the government demand obedience to the law, but it could 
also demand that citizens be virtuous. All the more surprising, then, that we find a very similar call for ci-
vic virtue in the Universal Declaration. It would seem that the drafters of the Universal Declaration would 
have found themselves in agreement with the drafters of the recent human duties declarations concerning 
the point that legal rights without morality cannot long endure and that, therefore, voluntary self-obligati-
on is needed.
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One can imagine why such a disposition is especially important in the case 
of human rights, for often the protection of human rights cannot rely on an 
effective legal remedy. In such cases, it is crucial that ordinary citizens and gov-
ernment officials alike have internalized the value of human rights, which can 
guide their behavior in the right direction, even in the absence of effective legal 
enforcement.68 Otherwise, in the absence of both legal force and correct dispo-
sitions, nothing withholds us from acting as contemporary incarnations of the 
shepherd-become-king Gyges, of whom Glaucon speaks in Plato’s Republic.69
This formative function of the Universal Declaration is underscored, fur-
thermore, by the second paragraph of Article 26, the first paragraph of which 
recognizes everyone’s right70 to education. The second paragraph stipulates that 
the education provided ought to be of a certain kind. It was Mr. Bienenfeld, the 
representative of the World Jewish Congress, who urged members of the Com-
mission to specify the spirit of the mandatory education. He pointed out that 
though Germany and other fascist countries (such as Italy) had rendered the 
right to education universal, 
yet the doctrines on which that education had been founded had led 
to two world wars. If the Declaration failed to define the spirit in 
which future generations were to be educated, it would lose its value 
as a guide for humanity. The Declaration was not merely an appeal 
to the State; it was an appeal also to parents, teachers and educators. 
It was necessary to stress the importance of the article devoted to 
the spirit of education, which was possibly greater than that of all 
the other articles of the Declaration.71
The delegates appeared to be sensitive to Bienenfeld’s plea, as becomes clear in 
Article 26(2): 
Education shall be directed to the full development of the human per-
68. Jeremy Waldron makes a similar point in arguing for the necessity that people be educated to the “cosmo-
politan dimension of their civic responsibibilities:” “if anything, the absence of a coercive institution to 
secure and sustain necessary structures of life and practice at a global level … makes it all the more 
important for us to use ‘citizens of the world’ as an idea regulating our actions” (Waldron, J. (2003). 
Teaching Cosmopolitan Right. In K. McDonough & W. Feinberg (Eds.), Citizenship and Education in 
Liberal-Democratic Societies (pp. 23–55). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 41).
69. Plato. The Republic. Book II. 117ff.
70. In fact, Article 26(1) also contains a duty: “Elementary education shall be compulsory” (emphasis add-
ed).
71. UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.67. (25 June 1948). 13.
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sonality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and 
friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall fur-
ther the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
Education must therefore not only teach children mathematics, languages, sci-
ence, and so forth, but must also create a certain kind of citizen, one that is tol-
erant, understanding and disposed to friendly relations with her fellow citizens 
as well as with other peoples. Education must, in other words, instill both civic 
and cosmopolitan virtue, the latter of which would consist in a set of disposi-
tions and character traits that make us sensitive to the idea that our duties are 
not limited to our fellow citizens but indeed extend to humanity as a whole.72  
Having established the important educational function of the Universal Dec-
laration and how this was envisioned by its drafters, we may infer that the duties to 
the community in Article 29(1) were not (all73) meant as legally enforceable duties; 
rather, Article 29 aims to contribute to the cultivation of a certain kind of citizen, 
namely one who does not only insist on the respect and protection of her rights, 
but one who also realizes that she is dependent on the community in which she 
finds herself for her full development as a person, and to which she therefore owes 
certain duties. We have seen, furthermore, that it is the task of the educational 
system to instill in citizens such a disposition, or civic virtue.
Thus far, we may conclude that, at least with regard to their function, in-
dividual duties to the community are quite worked out. The precise content of 
these duties, however, still eludes us. What exactly are “duties to the communi-
ty?” And what is meant by “community?”
§ 3.2.3 – What Duties?
Neither the final version of the Universal Declaration nor its travaux prépara-
toires offer much insight into the exact content of the duties to the community 
mentioned in Article 29(1). In 1998, precisely fifty years after the adoption of 
the Universal Declaration, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration 
72. Smith, W. (2009). The Transformation of Political Community and Conceptions of Global Citizen-
ship. In P. Hayden (Ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Ethics and International Relations (pp. 
461–477). Surrey: Ashgate. 472.
73. Some duties to the community could, in fact, be legally enforceable duties. The duty to obey the law, to 
vote, and to work are some examples.
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on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to 
Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. Article 18 of this document further considers duties to the commu-
nity. Its first paragraph is nearly a literal quote of Article 29(1) UDHR. Inter-
estingly, the second paragraph elaborates on these duties “towards and within 
the community:” “Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental or-
ganizations have an important role to play and a responsibility in safeguarding 
democracy, promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and contribut-
ing to the promotion and advancement of democratic societies, institutions and 
processes.” This somewhat clarifies the role played by individual duties to the 
community, but we still do not know which duties exactly are meant. 
Perhaps Cassin’s revision of Humphrey’s text can shed some light on this 
matter. In the third article of this text Cassin mentions four “fundamental du-
ties” each of us owes to society, namely “obedience to law, exercise of a useful 
activity, willing acceptance of obligations and sacrifices demanded for the com-
mon good.”74 From these four duties Cassin mentions, I will distill and clarify 
three categories of duties to the community: civic duties of justice (to which both 
the duty of obedience to law and the duty to exercise a useful activity belong), 
sacrifices demanded for the common good and the duty to perform one’s duties 
willingly. Subsequently, the status of each of these duties will be determined. 
All, save for the civic duties of justice, will be deemed duties of virtue. Finally, I 
will suggest that the community referred to in the phrase “duties to the commu-
nity” is primarily the (national) political community. Accordingly, we may refer 
to these duties to the community as “civic duties.”
Civic Duties of Justice
The first two duties listed by Cassin present us with duties to the community 
that are relatively unproblematic.75 We could even determine the status of these 
duties rather easily. These duties are determinate as well as claimable, rendering 
them perfect. They, furthermore, concern only outward actions. We may there-
74. UN Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/W.2/Rev.2 (20 June 1947).
75. This is not to dismiss the immense quantity of literature on political obligation of course, nor the fact 
that several scholars have argued that political obligation cannot be legitimized (see, inter alia: Wolff, 
R. P. (1998). In Defense of Anarchism (2nd ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press; Simmons, A. 
J. (1979). Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Raz. The 
Morality of Freedom.). I am not interested in questions of legitimization here, however, as that would 
require an entire book unto itself. Rather, my point is merely that this duty is unproblematic as far as the 
question of its status as a duty of justice is concerned.
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fore refer to them as civic duties of justice.76 Let us take the duty to obey the 
law, or political obligation, as an example. It is determinate, in the sense that it is 
clear who must do what for whom, namely all citizens must perform the duties 
prescribed by clearly worded and publicly accessible laws. Now, the question to 
whom we owe the duty to obey is one with the question of its claimability: those 
to whom we owe the duty in question are those who may (indirectly) claim its 
performance from us. According to the principle of fair play, it is my fellow citi-
zens who have a claim on me; it is to them that I owe this duty.
This principle of fair play, as first developed by Hart and Rawls,77 is quite 
straightforward. The point of departure is the presence of a social scheme of 
cooperation that is both mutually beneficial and just. The benefits yielded by this 
social scheme can only be procured if all, or (and this is where the problem of 
free riders enters the picture) nearly all, cooperate. When one accepts the bene-
fits provided by such a scheme, and one intends to continue doing so, then one 
has an obligation to do one’s part and cooperate, even when one’s own coopera-
tion is not specifically necessary for the maintenance of the scheme (as it will not 
collapse if you alone do not contribute and simply receive the benefits for free). 
According to this principle, we therefore owe our obligation to obey the law to 
our fellow citizens, that is, to those with whom we form a political community. 
They, in turn, have a right to our obedience, because they have rendered it pos-
sible for us to enjoy the benefits of the political community (in this case the rule 
of law) through their obedience. By enjoying this benefit, we incur an obligation 
to reciprocate by cooperating as well, that is, by obeying the law (provided, of 
course, that the laws are minimally just).78 
The duty to exercise a useful activity could be approached in a similar fash-
ion. It is clear who (namely all of us) must do what (exercise a useful activity/
76. I will explain why I refer to duties to the community as “civic duties” at the end of this subsection.
77. Here I draw from Hart’s and Rawls’s descriptions of the principle of fair play: Hart. Are There Any 
Natural Rights? 185; Rawls, J. (1999). Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play. In S. Freeman (Ed.), 
Collected Papers (pp. 117–129). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 122–3.
78. For reasons of brevity, I am not able to provide a complete defense of our political obligations and the 
principle of fair play. I merely wish to add here that a common criticism against the principle of fair play, 
as provided by, e.g., A. John Simmons, concerns the point of viewing our obligations as owed to the 
community because the benefits are the product of a cooperative venture. Thus, Simmons holds that the 
principle of fair play fails to justify political obligations, because most of us simply “do not regard the be-
nefits of government as the product of a cooperative scheme,” but rather as something that we purchase 
from the government through paying taxes. Therefore, Simmons continues, many feel that “if debts are 
owed at all, they are owed not to those around us, but to our government” (Simmons. Moral Principles 
and Political Obligations. 139). I would argue, however, that this critique is not so much a critique of 
the fair play justification of political obligations, but rather a critique (unintentionally, to be sure) of how 
we perceive ourselves and those with whom we live in a political community. All this criticism therefore 
does is confirm the necessity of cultivating civic virtue, that is, to see ourselves as participating in a 
common endeavor.
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have a job) for whom (according to the principle of fair play, we owe this duty to 
do our fair share and avoid being free riders to our fellow citizens). Of course, 
“failure” to fulfill this duty when one becomes unemployed does not lead to a 
forfeiture of one’s right as a citizen to unemployment benefits, but note that the 
duty in question remains present in the form of the duty to apply for a job when 
receiving such benefits.
The duties to obey the law, pay taxes and work are therefore determinate 
and claimable duties prescribing only outward actions. They are unambiguous 
duties of justice.
Sacrifices for the Common Good
Cassin, furthermore, speaks of the duty to perform “sacrifices demanded for the 
common good.” The word “sacrifices” perhaps evokes images of dying heroically 
on the battlements for one’s country, but the sacrifices need by no means be so 
extreme. One can also imagine that Cassin had more prosaic sacrifices in mind, 
such as duties of civic participation79 – e.g., duties of political participation (com-
prising, e.g., the duty to vote and to attend neighborhood assemblies), the duty to 
be informed about current affairs, and the duty to address patent injustices (by 
writing to one’s representatives, starting or supporting a petition, organizing or 
participating in a protest) – and duties to render civil or military service.80 
The status of this second category of duties to the community is less clear. It 
seems that many of these can be conceived both as duties of justice and as duties 
of virtue. Whether we place these duties in the sphere of justice or in the pur-
view of virtue is therefore a political decision, as both are viable options. Con-
sider the duty to vote. Some countries have made this a legal duty, whereas other 
countries count on people making their way to the voting booth of their own 
accord. Throughout Western democracies (those without a legal duty to vote), 
voting turnout percentages are frighteningly low, in some cases almost as low 
79. Here one sacrifices one’s time and effort for the common good. One imagines that such civic participa-
tion results in a better functioning of the democratic community one is a part of.
80. Examples of such duties to the community can be found in Article XXXIV ADRDM, which states 
that every able-bodied person has a duty to “render whatever civil and military service his country may 
require for its defense and preservation, and, in case of public disaster, to render such services as may be 
in his power.” The ECHR does not contain separate articles prescribing such duties to the community, 
as the ADRDM does. However, in Section 3 of the article prohibiting slavery and forced labor, it states 
that that the term “forced and compulsory labor” does not apply to military service (or the alternative 
civilian service for conscientious objectors), “any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity 
threatening the life or wellbeing of the community” and “any work or service which forms part of normal 
civic obligations” (Article 4(3) ECHR). Even the ECHR, therefore, recognizes not only duties to exercise 
one’s rights in a responsible fashion, as expounded in Chapter 1, but also such duties to the community.
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as 50%.81 One imagines that at a certain point – though it is difficult to deter-
mine where that point lies exactly – the percentage will be so low as to endanger 
the electoral system. For this reason, some have argued in favor of compulsory 
voting: “If a system of open and free elections is in the interests of the citizens, 
then every citizen must have both an obligation to do his or her part to maintain 
the system and a right to expect the others to do theirs.”82 If one benefits from 
an electoral system that is maintained thanks to the participation of others, then 
one owes one’s fellow citizens an obligation to reciprocate, based on the duty of 
fair play, which can be fulfilled by casting one’s vote. It is, therefore, perfectly 
possible to conceive of the duty to vote as a duty of justice, as the duty is both 
determinate and claimable. 
However, one may wonder whether the imposition of a duty to vote in 
fact contributes to the preservation of a system of equal spheres of freedom, 
which is the task of justice. Many argue that it does not, and that such a duty, 
instead, diminishes freedom. They will, accordingly, prefer to view voting as a 
civil right rather than a duty: I may indeed decide to exercise my right, but I may 
also choose not to do so. Perhaps I am a Jehovah’s witness desiring to maintain 
my distance to earthly affairs; perhaps I am a devoted follower of Rousseau 
and accordingly believe representation to be tantamount to the abrogation of 
freedom;83 or maybe I would simply, inspired by Melville’s character Bartleby, 
“prefer not to” vote. Whatever the reason may be for my wish to stay away from 
the polling station, the imposition by the state of a duty of justice to cast my vote 
could be viewed as illegitimate state interference. Some might argue that such 
imposition reveals the state’s perfectionist leanings: in other words, that the state 
wishes to foist its understanding of the good life, understood as the life of the 
active citizen, on its subjects. Others might have more practical concerns with 
a legal duty to vote. Kymlicka, for example, holds that the imposition of a legal 
duty does not guarantee the responsible fulfillment of this duty:84 people might 
be completely ignorant on current affairs, easily swayed by populists, or simply 
81. In Chapter 5 (Section 5.1.2) the problem of low voter turnout rates will be more elaborately discussed.
82. Dagger, R. (1997). Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Virtues. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 149. Cf. Rawls. Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play. 127.
83. Rousseau, J.-J. (1997). Of the Social Contract. In V. Gourevitch (Ed.), V. Gourevitch (Trans.), The So-
cial Contract and Other Later Political Writings (pp. 39–152). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bk. III, Ch. 15 [11]: “the instant a People gives itself Representatives, it ceases to be free; it ceases to be.” 
A more contemporary account of this position is provided by Robert Paul Wolff, who argues that in the 
absence of direct democracy political obligations in general are incompatible with autonomy: Wolff. In 
Defense of Anarchism.
84. Kymlicka, W. (2002). Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 303.
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vote for the party that vows to further their private interests. It is a valid question 
what the value would be of forcing such people to vote. Finally, one could argue 
that democracies without mandatory voting laws appear to be functioning just 
fine, even despite the low voter turnout rates. In sum, the necessity to impose 
what some might view as a rather heavy-handed duty, which interferes needlessly 
with people’s free choice without yielding concrete results, escapes these critics.
Such problems are compounded in the case of the other duties of civic 
participation, which next to the duty to vote contain further duties of political 
participation (such as the duty to attend neighborhood assemblies or the duty to 
become politically active), the duty to be informed about current affairs, and the 
duty to address manifest injustices. First, by making being a good (i.e. active) 
citizen legally binding, the government invites suspicion that it has a perfec-
tionist agenda it wishes to impose, thus violating liberal neutrality. Second, one 
could once again wonder whether such legal duties are necessary in order to 
achieve and maintain a vibrant political community. Third, the question remains 
whether imposing legal duties of civic participation will produce the desired (i.e. 
public-spirited) form of participation. Is it not possible that citizens will, instead, 
participate irresponsibly? A majority could use its newfound civic literacy to 
(further) marginalize a minority. The healthy could decide to cut back on aid 
to the bedridden and use the funds to advance their own goals. Thus, though it 
may be possible to render these duties of civic participation legally enforceable, 
it does not seem an appealing option. Despite the fact that the performance of 
duties of civic participation is desirable,85 rendering such participation legal-
ly obligatory might miss its goal: after all, such a considerable interference of 
the state with the individual freedom of its citizens, which, moreover, could be 
viewed as a perfectionist policy measure, might also stir resentment. All this is a 
rather high price to pay when the possible positive effects could also be attained 
through other means, without imposing legal duties of civic participation. The 
government may rather decide to encourage civic participation by, for example, 
teaching about its importance in school and by providing information on possi-
ble forms of civic participation in one’s neighborhood , city or country. 
Thus far, we have seen that the first category of duties to the community 
consists of evident duties of justice. The performance of the duty to obey the 
law, for example, may not be left up to the discretion of each citizen (whether 
to obey, which laws one will obey and which not); its performance must instead 
85. In Chapter 5 (towards the end of Section 5.1.2), we will distinguish four functions of civic participation.
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be secured. Accordingly, the state may and must enforce such duties through 
legal means. By contrast, we saw that many duties of the second category can be 
viewed both as duties of justice and as duties of virtue. For example, the duty to 
vote and the duty of military service are possible duties of justice. Yet, the pres-
ervation of the political community does not depend on enforcing them by legal 
means: the protection of borders does not depend on a legal duty of military 
service (as countries with a professional army are capable of defending their bor-
ders effectively as well), nor is the enforcement of the duty to vote necessary for 
the maintenance of a democratic state. Accordingly, I will propose to view these 
duties as duties of virtue. The same goes for the duties of civic participation. 
The imposition of such duties as legally enforceable duties of justice would be 
a rather heavy-handed curtailment of citizens’ individual freedom, particularly 
because such imposition is not necessary as it is possible to reach the same result 
(the performance of duties of civic participation) through other means. 
Civic Virtue
Cassin’s penultimate duty – the “willing acceptance of obligations” – will be con-
sidered last here, because it applies to all the duties to the community he lists. 
The word “willing” indicates a particular internal disposition on the part of the 
citizen: not only must one accept certain duties, but one must also accept them 
willingly. Not only must we perform our duties, but we must also perform them 
from the correct motive, that is, from the settled disposition to give precedence 
to the common good over one’s own personal interests. This duty requires, in 
other words, civic virtue.  
With regard to this duty, the problem is that, as Kant would argue, the 
adoption of maxims for action is an internal affair and can only be achieved by 
free self-constraint. Therefore, the willing acceptance of duties can be neither 
externally enforced, nor ascertained. Consequently, neither the state nor one’s 
fellow citizens can demand by right that one perform one’s duties (to the com-
munity or otherwise) from a particular motive, as we understand having a right 
as the ability to legally bind the freedom of choice of another.86 The duty to per-
form one’s duties from a particular motive can therefore only be placed among 
the duties prescribed by virtue, which, after all, are not indifferent concerning 
the motive from which one acts (as duties of justice are), but rather require one 
act from a particular disposition. 
86. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:237.
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Save for the first category of duties to the community, I have therefore ar-
gued that we ought to place duties to the community within the realm of virtue. 
This classification, however, should not be interpreted as a rejection of any role 
for the state in the promotion of the performance of duties to the community 
and in the cultivation of civic virtue (as will be elaborately argued in Chapter 5). 
It would thus appear that the duties to the community of which the Universal 
Declaration speaks consist of three kinds of duties: first, there are duties to the 
community that may and can be enforced – such as the duties to obey the law 
(Cassin’s first duty), pay taxes, and exercise a useful activity (Cassin’s second duty) 
–, to which I have referred as civic duties of justice. Few would disagree that these 
are (and ought to be) part of the sphere of justice. Second, there are “sacrifices 
demanded for the common good.” Cassin does not spell these duties out, but I 
have suggested, basing myself in part on duties to the community mentioned in 
the American Declaration and the European Convention on Human Rights, that 
they may include such duties as military (or civil) service, duties in the face of an 
emergency and duties of civic participation. Third, there is a duty to accept one’s 
duties willingly. This duty points toward the necessity of civic virtue. 
Now that we have a clearer idea of the duties involved when we speak of 
“duties to the community,” we can also render explicit what “community” is 
intended. Duties to obey the law, pay taxes, duties of political participation and 
to perform military or civil service: in what context do these duties operate? It 
seems evident that they operate on the level of the (national) political commu-
nity. The political community is not, however, a synonym for the state. Rather, 
the state functions as the representative of the political community. It is for this 
reason that, from now on, I will also refer to duties to the community as civic 
duties. Furthermore, these civic duties are owed to one’s fellow citizens and only 
indirectly to the representative of the citizens, i.e. the state. Thus, where we 
earlier spoke of duties to the community as vertical duties, largely following the 
lingo of human rights scholars critical of civic duties, it would now appear that 
they are actually horizontal duties, owed to one’s fellow citizens.
Lastly, it should be clear by now (given the discussion of the first two para-
graphs of Article 29 UDHR in the previous subsection) that duties to the com-
munity are not owed to just any political community. Rather, we owe such civic 
duties only to a community that respects the conditions set out in Articles 29(1) 
and 29(2), in other words, a political community that renders possible the free 
and full development of our personality, guarantees the safety and security of its 
denizens, promotes general welfare and is a democracy. 
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§ 3.3 – Conclusion
This chapter set out to shed some light on the two most contentious and unclear 
duties that we encountered in our discussion of human rights documents and 
human duties declarations in Chapter 1, namely duties of international aid and 
duties to the community. It wished to do so from within the (broadly consid-
ered) “juridical” context in which they were also promulgated Accordingly, Sec-
tion 3.1 strove to clarify individual duties of aid to the global poor by consulting 
the human rights documents themselves (which declare all have a human right 
to an adequate standard of living), the General Comments of the CESCR, the 
work of human rights scholars, and the various human duties declarations. The 
result was disappointing: when it comes to elucidating individual duties to the 
global poor, none of these sources were able to help us any further; both the pre-
cise content of these duties and their status remain entirely unclear. It remains to 
be seen, in the next chapter, whether an investigation from a philosophical point 
of view will be more fruitful. 
By contrast, the clarification of our duties to the community, in Section 3.2, 
was rather successful. Our examination of Article 29 of the Universal Declara-
tion provided us with a substantial degree of clarity concerning our duties to the 
community. We found that duties to the community were considered an integral 
part of the Declaration from the very start. Article 29 was meant to illustrate 
how individual rights function in a larger moral context, a context that also 
includes duties, public order and general welfare. Furthermore, the Universal 
Declaration rejects, by means of Article 29, the view of the lone rights-bearer for 
whom the claims of the community are but so many encumbrances, and instead 
affirms the interdependence between the individual and the political community 
in which she finds herself.
By elaborating upon the scant hints provided by Cassin’s draft of the Uni-
versal Declaration, we were, furthermore, able to distinguish three categories of 
duties to the community: civic duties of justice, sacrifices demanded for the com-
mon good and the duty to perform one’s duties willingly. Based on the content 
of these duties we concluded, moreover, that the community in question must be 
the (national) political community. The duties to the community may, therefore, 
also be referred to as “civic duties.” Finally, we concluded that, save for the civic 
duties of justice, civic duties ought to be placed within the realm of virtue.
In close connection with the last of these three types of civic duties – the 
duty to perform one’s civic duties willingly –, we found that the Universal Dec-
laration also has a clear educational function. The drafters recognized that pre-
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scribing legal rights and duties is not enough. For rights to be truly secure, it 
is necessary to educate people and to create a certain kind of citizen. In other 
words, the instilment of civic virtue is paramount. In this, the drafters of the 
UDHR found themselves in close agreement with the drafters of the human du-
ties declarations calling for a global ethic and voluntary self-obligation.
Though Section 3.2 has provided several arguments why duties to the com-
munity need not be feared, provided they meet certain conditions, many critics 
will doubtlessly still be skeptical. Therefore, Chapter 5 will provide an instru-
mental argument for the necessity (and the good) of civic duties (particularly 
those of civic participation) as well as a separate argument for the importance 
of the cultivation of civic virtue (necessary for the willing performance of one’s 
duties, that is, from the motive of duty).
132
Human Duties and the Limits of Human Rights Discourse
400088-L-bw-Boot
133
Human Duties and the Limits of Human Rights Discourse
400088-L-bw-Boot
ChApTEr 4
SubSISTENCE NEEDS AND INDIVIDuAL DuTIES
If we persist, nevertheless, in speaking of these needs as constituting 
rights and not merely claims, we are committed to the conception of 
a right which is an entitlement to some good, but not a valid claim 
against any particular individual.1
In 1972, in an article that became famous, Peter Singer argued that the pro-
cess of globalization involves consequences of a moral nature that we do not 
yet fully comprehend: “From the moral point of view, the development of the 
world into a ‘global village’ has made an important, though still unrecognized, 
difference to our moral situation.”2 Over four decades later, philosophers and 
scholars of human rights law alike are still coming to grips with this state of 
affairs. Traditional conceptions of justice were developed in a world that cer-
tainly knew of international trade and relations, but nonetheless the complete 
interconnectedness of all areas of today’s world is a new relevant factor in the 
equations of justice and virtue, with which traditional moral theories did not 
have to grapple. This development forces us to reconsider our understanding 
of moral responsibility. 
The necessity to review our duties also became apparent in the previ-
ous chapter. There, in §3.1, we found human rights documents, the General 
Comments of the CESCR as well as the various human duties declarations 
all wanting when it came to clarifying our individual duties concerning the 
fulfillment of subsistence needs. The present chapter therefore wishes to sup-
ply answers to such questions as the following: What is the content of our 
duties towards the global poor? Are these individual duties to help the poor 
positive or only negative? Are these best understood as duties of virtue or 
as duties of justice that may be enforced by legal means? Are these strict, 
perfect duties, or wide, imperfect duties? The position I will defend is that 
most of our duties that stem from subsistence needs, prior to the creation of 
institutions that can pair specific right-holders to specific duty-bearers, are 
necessarily duties of virtue. 
1. Feinberg. The Nature and Value of Rights. 153.
2. Singer, P. (1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(3), 229–243. 232. 
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Before arriving at this conclusion, however, several steps will need to be 
taken. Three questions will structure our discussion, each of which will be dis-
cussed in its own section. Firstly (in §4.1), we will ask who has what duties in 
fulfilling subsistence needs: Are our duties limited to refraining from causing 
harm and offering compensation when actual harm is done, or ought we to lend 
a helping hand whenever it is in our power to do so? This section will end with 
an overview of all our individual duties relative to subsistence needs. The second 
section (§4.2) will need to provide an answer to the question concerning the sta-
tus of each of these duties. It will apply the definitions of the distinction between 
perfect and imperfect duties as well as of the difference between duties of justice 
and duties of virtue (provided in Chapter 2) to the duties presented in §4.1. 
Finally, the third section (§4.3) will endeavor to answer the question whether 
subsistence needs give rise to a human right to subsistence. Do all human beings 
always already possess a right to subsistence or is such a right conditional upon 
it being claimable? 
Inevitably, the treatment of these questions will somewhat overlap at times. 
Still, they will function as anchors, as it were, fixed points around which to 
structure our query.
The chapter as a whole will, moreover, demonstrate the need and impor-
tance of a renewed focus on individual duties. Not only is a clarification of our 
individual duties long overdue, but it will also become apparent that a concerted 
focus on our duties will allow us to distinguish more precisely between genuine 
and spurious rights claims. The decision to specifically discuss duties concerning 
global subsistence needs in the present chapter will prove fruitful in demonstrat-
ing this considerable advantage of the perspective of duties over the perspective 
of rights.
Finally, this chapter will conclude with a brief reflection on the significance 
of duties of virtue as a necessary complement to (duties of) justice.
§ 4.1 – Who has What Duties in Fulfilling Subsistence Needs?
In this section I wish to provide an overview of our individual duties regarding 
global subsistence needs. Hereby I will clarify which causes of poverty lead to 
which duties for whom. The status of these duties will then be determined in the 
next section. In order to arrive at such an overview, I will discuss several the-
ories of such duties, most notably Peter Singer’s interactionist approach, which 
is focused solely on remedial responsibility, and Thomas Pogge’s institutional 
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approach, which focuses solely on outcome responsibility.3 
The only incontrovertible duty we have, on which all authors agree, is the 
negative duty to refrain from interfering directly with the ability of others to 
meet their own subsistence needs. If one’s actions directly harm this ability, then 
we incur positive obligations4 to remedy the loss we have caused. This is a case 
in which duties can be assigned by relying on outcome responsibility. This ap-
proach to responsibility typically holds that our duties are limited to refrain from 
causing harm and suffering, though they may involve positive obligations as well 
in the case one has violated one’s original duty of forbearance.
Restricting the scope of our duties to negative duties of forbearance, howev-
er, seems rather limited. For this reason, certain authors have made the case for 
positive duties of aid by relying on remedial responsibility: our individual duties 
regarding subsistence needs are not limited to mere forbearance, but instead 
we have a duty to alleviate suffering whenever it is within our means to do so.5 
Perhaps the best-known example of remedial responsibility can be found in the 
work of Peter Singer. In Famine, Affluence, and Morality he develops his central 
moral principle: “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, 
without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, 
morally, to do it.”6 He subsequently illustrates the validity of this principle by 
applying it to a concrete case. If I happen to walk by a shallow pond, in which 
I spot a drowning child, I ought to go into the pond and rescue the child. It is, 
after all, in my power to prevent something bad (the child drowning) from hap-
pening and the costs  (getting my clothes wet, perhaps catching a cold) by no 
means qualify as “anything of comparable moral importance.” We can therefore 
readily arrive at the conclusion that I ought to rescue the child. If we accept 
this principle in the case of the drowning child, Singer continues, we can also 
apply it to the problem of global poverty. The citizens of wealthy nations could 
save many lives threatened by poverty worldwide by contributing money, and 
doing so would not require the sacrifice of anything equally morally important 
3. I borrow the terms “remedial responsibility” and “outcome responsibility” from David Miller: Miller, 
D. (2007). National Responsibility and Global Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 81. Remedial 
responsibility is hereby understood to be the “responsibility we may have to come to the aid of those who 
need help,” whether we have caused their need or not, whereas outcome responsibility is the “responsi-
bility we bear for our own actions and decisions.”
4. Following authors like Hart and Rawls, I argue it make sense to distinguish here between duties and 
obligations. Both the mentioned authors argue that we mostly speak of “obligations” when they are vol-
untarily incurred, that is, when they are a consequence of our actions (see Rawls. Legal Obligation and 
the Duty of Fair Play. 118; also see Hart. Are There Any Natural Rights? 179n). Conversely, “duties” are 
held prior to and irrespective of the agent’s behavior.
5. Miller. National Responsibility and Global Justice. 231.
6. Singer. Famine, Affluence, and Morality. 231.
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compared to the value of being free from poverty. Yet, how much ought we to 
give? Singer replies that “we ought to give until we reach the level of marginal 
utility – that is, the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffer-
ing to myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gifts.”7 Anticipating the 
criticism that this duty would be too demanding, Singer formulates a more mod-
erate version (though he believes the strong account to be correct): “We should 
prevent bad occurrences unless, to do so, we had to sacrifice something morally 
significant.”8 In this version, it is not necessary for us to give until we reach the 
level of marginal utility, for reducing oneself and one’s dependents to that level 
may be viewed as sacrificing something morally significant. 
The utilitarian basis of this argument is clear: “We ought to be preventing as 
much suffering as we can without sacrificing something else of comparable moral 
importance.”9 Note that it is hereby irrelevant how global poverty is caused or 
who has caused it. These questions are deemed beside the point, as the utilitarian 
position espoused by Singer does not recognize any morally relevant difference 
between harming and refraining from helping. In the end, the utilitarian Singer is 
concerned with the total sum. Solving the problem of global poverty is therefore 
simply a matter of adding and subtracting: that which the wealthy nations have in 
overabundance must be transferred to the poorer nations until the wealthy nations 
have reached a point where giving more would have (morally significant) negative 
consequences for themselves. Thus a position as Singer’s, which relies on reme-
dial responsibility, can, in contrast to outcome responsibility, account for positive 
duties of aid in cases where no one is to blame, as, for example, when a country is 
struck by a tsunami or some other natural disaster.10 Those who have the means 
to help others in need, ought to do so. Conceivably, however, we could still allow 
for gradations of duty, by taking into account specific circumstances and special 
relations between people(s). For example, we could argue that those people of 
country c, which has been struck by a natural disaster, who are able to help, have 
a stronger duty to help their compatriots than other people (from different parts of 
the world) do. Citizens of countries bordering on c, as well as those citizens whose 
country has close historical ties to c, might be next in line, as far as the strength of 
7. Ibid. 241.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid. 238.
10. One could make the argument that natural disasters occur more frequently due to climate change or that 
their impact is magnified by a faulty warning system or by a government that is unable or unwilling to 
provide sufficient emergency aid. Though there are certainly situations where this is the case, occasions 
remain whereby acute need is not the result of anyone’s fault and whereby, therefore, no appeal can be 
made to outcome responsibility. 
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the duty to aid the inhabitants of c is concerned. These gradations of duties do not, 
however, imply that others – who are neither inhabitants of c nor of a neighboring 
country nor of a country that has strong historic ties to c – are exempted of all 
duties to aid the inhabitants of c, provided they are able to do so (it would be odd 
to place a duty on those who themselves are in need of aid).
Positive duties of aid are, however, not limited to cases such as these, where 
no one is to blame. It may also occur that the poverty of agent x is a consequence 
of breaches of agent y’s negative duty of forbearance, which however she refuses 
to remedy. In such a case, the positive duty to aid x might fall to a third party 
(z) instead. Again, such a duty cannot be accounted for if one relies solely on 
outcome responsibility (after all, it is not z who is responsible for x’s indigence). 
Remedial responsibility, by contrast, simply requires agents to help others when-
ever it is in their power to do so, irrespective of the cause of others’ lack, and thus 
can account for z’s duty to help x. As in the discussion above of our duties to the 
inhabitants of the calamity-stricken country c, there may be gradations of duty 
here as well, depending on the relation one has to c and its inhabitants.
Both the negative duty of forbearance and the positive duties of aid, discussed 
above, have relied on what Thomas Pogge has called a traditional, interactionist 
account of human rights, according to which human rights impose duties on in-
dividuals not to harm and duties of aid. The main defect of this position, Pogge 
maintains, is that it is unable to account for the most important duty regarding 
subsistence needs, which is institutional in nature.11 Our fundamental individual 
duty corresponding with human rights is, on Pogge’s account:
a duty not to contribute to the coercive imposition of any institution-
al order that avoidably fails to realize human rights, unless one also 
compensates for one’s contribution by working toward appropriate 
institutional reforms or toward shielding the victims of injustice 
from the harms one helps produce.12
  
This duty arises from Pogge’s institutional approach (which he adopts instead 
of the interactionist position), which maintains that human rights are in the first 
11. It is not my intention to defend Pogge’s rejection of the interactionist approach, but merely to present 
an additional individual duty relative to subsistence needs. I merely mention here, furthermore, that a 
number of authors have argued that the institutional duty Pogge presents is in fact perfectly compatible 
with the traditional, interactionist approach. See, for example: Stemplowska. Real World Duties.
12. Pogge. Human Rights and Human Responsibilities. 166; cf. Pogge. World Poverty and Human Rights. 73.
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place claims on social institutions and in the second place claims on all those 
who are involved in maintaining such institutions.13 Given that the world in 
which we live constitutes a global institutional order, it follows, furthermore, 
that the duty here described falls on all persons everywhere, but especially on 
the more influential and privileged,14 because they presumably have contributed 
to and benefited from this institutional order more than others. The citizens of 
wealthy nations are thus not simply innocent bystanders, but rather they (know-
ingly or unknowingly) cooperate in a system that causes and maintains poverty 
in other parts of the world, to their own advantage.15 Insofar as we have in this 
manner caused the harm of others, we are co-responsible for their suffering. 
Note that our principal duty regarding others’ subsistence needs is a nega-
tive duty not to participate in a global system that causes and perpetuates pov-
erty.16 It is for this reason, Pogge claims, that his institutional account maintains 
the middle ground between two extreme positions.17 On the one side, minimalist 
interactional libertarians would argue that we carry no responsibility for viola-
tions of rights that we did not cause directly, whereas, on the other side, maxi-
malist interactional utilitarians (such as Singer) hold that we are responsible for 
all deprivations everywhere as long as we have not given everything we can give, 
regardless of our causal relation to said deprivations. Pogge maintains the liber-
tarian point that we only have negative duties of justice towards others, without 
concluding that we therefore have no duties at all towards the global poor. Ini-
tially, our duty of justice towards the poor is “merely” to not participate in an 
institutional order that systematically breaches the right to be free from poverty. 
Once we have violated this duty, however, we acquire “negative-duty-generated 
positive obligations”18 to actively work for institutional reform and to provide 
compensation aimed towards poverty alleviation. 
13. Pogge. World Poverty and Human Rights. 50–1.
14. Pogge. Human Rights and Human Responsibilities. 166.
15. In §3.1 I have briefly pointed out several ways in which the global order favors the wealthy nations, at 
the expense of poorer countries.
16. It becomes clear here that, as mentioned in §3.1, Pogge bases his institutional account of human rights on 
a particular reading of Article 28 UDHR, which views this article as key to how we ought to understand 
all rights listed in this document. Accordingly, Pogge explicitly refers to this article when he argues that the 
justice of “any institutional order depends primarily on its success in affording all its participants secure 
access to the objects of their human rights” (Pogge. Human Rights and Human Responsibilities. 165).
17. Pogge. World Poverty and Human Rights. 72.
18. Pogge, T. (2005). Reply to the Critics: Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties. Ethics and In-
ternational Affairs, 19(1), 55–83. 69: “These positive obligations are generated by a negative duty that is 
correlative to human rights. Failure to fulfill such positive obligations therefore violates human rights.” 
Pogge appears to be using the term “obligation” in a similar manner as Rawls and Hart (see note 4).
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The major innovation of Pogge’s theory of human rights is its institutional 
approach. The correlative duties are not limited to avoiding direct harm. Instead, 
we are under a negative duty to refrain from participating in a harmful system. 
This duty involves informing oneself about the manner in which the global or-
der operates and the effects it has on people’s lives. Pogge cleverly claims that 
he only recognizes such negative duties of justice: we need merely refrain from 
harming others, whereby the novelty is that harming must be understood in an 
institutional and not in an interactional manner. His principle of justice has also 
been referred to as the “cause principle:”19 Pogge holds that we are responsible 
for global poverty, because and only insofar as we have caused it. The almost 
libertarian appearance of his position regarding global justice is deceptive, how-
ever. For the negative duty to refrain from participating in an unjust order is such 
that it cannot possibly be fulfilled. Unless one withdraws from society entirely, 
one will be implicated in the preservation of the unjust order and, consequently, 
inevitably incur obligations to remedy the harm caused and to help push for 
reform. Given that the negative duty postulated by Pogge can therefore not pos-
sibly be fulfilled (as I will argue elaborately in the next section), positive duties 
were part of his account all along, except for the fact that they now appear in the 
guise of “voluntarily” incurred obligations.
By merely relying on outcome responsibility, Pogge can thus account not 
only for the negative duties to refrain from both direct and institutional harm, 
but also, given that the negative duty of an institutional nature is impossible to 
fulfill, for positive obligations of aid and reform. What he cannot account for, 
however, given that he relies exclusively on outcome responsibility, are positive 
duties of aid in situations where either no one at all is responsible or at least I 
myself am not to blame.20
The above brief discussion of Singer and Pogge, whose two accounts of our 
duties to the global poor have been extremely influential, has uncovered the 
various duties we have regarding the fulfillment of subsistence needs world-
wide. The goal of this section has not been to judge the status of these duties, 
which will be undertaken next, but rather to provide a complete overview of 
19. Kreide, R. (2007). Neglected Injustice: Poverty as a Violation of Social Autonomy. In T. Pogge (Ed.), 
Freedom From Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? (pp. 155–181). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 172.
20. Indeed, this is a very common critique of Pogge’s work. See, for example: Gilabert, P. (2005). The Duty 
to Eradicate Global Poverty: Positive or Negative? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 7, 537–550. 538; 
Kreide. Neglected Injustice. 174–5. Stemplowska. Real World Duties. 479.
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our individual duties arising from subsistence needs. We may distinguish three 
separate causes of the non-fulfillment of subsistence needs, which trigger either 
remedial or outcome responsibility resulting in either negative or positive duties 
(or both):21
1)    If poverty is caused by a natural disaster, or some other calamity 
for which no one is to be blamed, then all who are able to help 
nonetheless have positive duties of aid. The “weight” of the duty, 
however, may depend on specific circumstances and special rela-
tions between people(s). This duty relies on our remedial respon-
sibilities. 
2)    If the cause of poverty is some directly harmful action (e.g. the 
burning of agricultural lands by an invading army), then (a) the 
agent who committed this direct harm has a positive duty to rem-
edy (and, of course, a negative duty to refrain from further harm-
ing). Here we can rely on outcome responsibility. If that agent re-
fuses or is unable to remedy the situation, we might (b) pass the 
positive duties of aid on to other, capable agents, in which case 
we would rely on remedial responsibility. In this case as well (as 
with duty 1), we allow for the possibility of different gradations 
of duties, depending on the specific circumstances and relations 
between people and countries.
3)   In the case of unfulfilled subsistence needs as a consequence of an 
unjust (global) politico-economic order, we have a negative duty to 
refrain from participating in that order as well as positive duties of 
direct aid and reform if we are unable to fulfill our negative duty. 
These duties are allocated by relying solely on outcome responsi-
bility.
This results in the following schema of all our possible individual duties con-
cerning the fulfillment of subsistence needs: 
21. In drawing up this overview I am indebted to Miller’s work: Miller. National Responsibility and Global 
Justice. 249–59. The main difference between his account and mine, however, resides in the fact that 
Miller’s agents are societies or states, whereas my focus is on individuals and their duties.
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What this overview does not show, however, is the status of these duties. The 
question whether such duties are perfect or imperfect, duties of justice or duties 
of virtue, will therefore be treated next.
§ 4.2 – What Is the Status of Our Duties Concerning the Fulfillment of  
Subsistence Needs?
Over two thousand years ago Cicero briefly summarized the problem of our du-
ties to the needy by observing that “the resources of the individual are limited, 
whereas there is a numberless crowd of those in need of them.”22 Throughout 
the history of practical philosophy such thoughts have led to the conclusion that 
our duties to the needy are greatly underdetermined (and potentially overde-
manding). Kant would argue that the lack of determinacy stems from the fact 
that our duties to the needy do not prescribe particular actions, but rather spe-
22. Cicero. (2001). On Obligations. (P. G. Walsh, Trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. I 52.
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Cause of poverty Who has duties? What duties? Basis for according 
duties
1. 
Natural disaster 
(no one is to blame)
All, but gradations 
of duty and ability to 
help are taken into 
account
Positive duties of aid Remedial 
responsibility
2. 
Direct harm
a. 
The agent that has 
harmed
a. 
Negative duties to 
refrain from harming 
and positive duties to 
remedy
a. 
Outcome 
responsibility
b. 
All, but gradations 
of duty and ability to 
help are taken into 
account
b. 
Positive duties of aid
b. 
Remedial 
responsibility
3. 
(Global) 
institutional harm
All those participating 
in the institutional 
scheme
Negative duty 
to refrain from 
participating in unjust 
schemes. Otherwise, 
positive duties to 
remedy and reform 
are incurred
Outcome 
responsibility
Figure 1
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cific maxims for action. There is therefore a certain measure of latitude (Spiel-
raum) concerning the manner of their fulfillment:23 how one should act, as well 
as how much one is to do for whom, is not precisely determined. These matters 
are therefore largely at the agent’s discretion. It follows, according to this train 
of thought, that duties of aid are imperfect. 
In Chapter 2, I have traced the historical development of our current un-
derstanding of the perfect-imperfect distinction. In brief, we found, firstly, that 
perfect duties are determinate. Who bears the duty, what the content of the duty 
is and for whom the duty-bearer must perform it, all this is clearly determined in 
the case of perfect duties. By contrast, if one of these points remains indetermi-
nate we have to do with an imperfect duty. Thus, when either the duty-bearer has 
not been identified, the content of the duty has not been specified (leaving the 
duty-bearer with a measure of latitude concerning the manner in which she will 
fulfill her duty), or the person for whom the duty must be performed has not been 
singled out, then the duty in question is imperfect. Secondly, as a consequence of 
their determinateness, perfect duties are claimable: the right-holder can identify 
the duty-bearer(s) and claim the performance of a specific duty from her. In the 
case of imperfect duties, instead, it is not clear how to pair up right-holders and 
duty-bearers, nor what the content of the duties is precisely. Thirdly, a common 
point especially in much of contemporary scholarship, imperfect duties are made 
out to be somehow of lesser importance than perfect duties. This belief becomes 
apparent, for instance, from the great pains many defenders of subsistence rights 
go to in order to prove that such rights do not “merely” give rise to imperfect 
duties, but should instead be situated within the realm of justice.24 
 In examining the four duties from the schema provided at the end of the 
previous section, I will mainly attempt to answer the question whether the duty 
under consideration is a duty of justice or a duty of virtue. Though I do not 
believe these terms to be strictly synonymous with perfect and imperfect duties 
respectively, I hold (as argued in Chapter 2) that all duties of justice are perfect 
duties and thus that imperfect duties cannot be duties of justice.25 My under-
standing of duties of justice in relation to rights, furthermore, can be summa-
rized as follows: for there to be a right, there must be a corresponding duty of 
23. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:390.
24. See, for example Ashford. The Inadequacy of our Traditional Conception. 219–20; Gilabert. Kant and 
the Claims of the Poor. 394ff. In Chapter 2 I have already extensively argued against this common view 
that imperfect duties are of lesser importance than perfect duties.
25. That this is a contentious view nowadays is confirmed by the works of Ashford and Stemplowska, both 
of whom argue for the possibility of enforceable imperfect duties, or imperfect duties of justice: Ashford. 
The Inadequacy of our Traditional Conception. 234; Stemplowska. Real World Duties. 482.
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justice, the performance of which is owed to the right-holder and the non-ful-
fillment of which constitutes a wrong, that is, a violation of a right. If, therefore, 
a duty may be weighed against a different duty, or the agent may freely choose 
which aspect of the duty to fulfill without committing a wrong, then the duty in 
question cannot be a duty of justice, but must instead be taken to be a duty of 
virtue. Consequently, the purported right does not exist.26
With these definitions in mind, let us proceed to examine the status of the 
duty to refrain from (global) institutional harm.
Duty to refrain from direct harm
I will start with the least contentious of the duties listed in the schema above, 
namely the duty to refrain from direct27 harm and to remedy the harm caused 
(duty 2.a in Figure 1). The content of this classic Ulpian duty of neminem laedere 
(“do not harm anybody”) is unambiguous: I ought not to harm anyone. Accord-
ingly, violations are easily detected, rendering this duty enforceable. Requiring 
merely forbearance, this duty can, furthermore, be easily performed by all for 
all and is thus universal. We may therefore conclude that this universal, perfect 
duty is indeed a duty of justice. When, however, this negative duty is violated 
(say the agent is a member of a rebel group and, as such, takes part in the 
burning of the farmlands of the rebels’ enemies), the duty-bearer incurs positive 
duties (or strictly speaking, obligations) of remedy. Though the content of such 
duties would need to be specified for each case (depending on the gravity of the 
offence and, if several agents were involved, one’s part in the violation), they 
are nonetheless duties of justice, as they are incurred as a direct consequence 
of the violation of the duty of justice to refrain from direct harm. Furthermore, 
the duty-bearer and the person(s) to whom compensation is owed are clearly 
26. Certain authors, such as Iris Marion Young, have introduced a seemingly new concept beyond the dis-
tinction between duties of justice and duties of virtue. However, she describes “responsibility” in a man-
ner very similar (not to say identical) to the common understanding of duties of virtue: responsibility, as 
opposed to duties (on Young’s account) “is more open as to what action it calls for.” One, furthermore, 
“has the responsibility to do whatever it takes to bring about specific ends or purposes” (my emphasis). 
Lastly, she explains that taking responsibility involves the exercise of discretion: “It is up to the agents 
who have a responsibility to decide what to do to discharge it within the limits of other moral conside-
rations” (Young, I. M. (2013). Responsibility for Justice. New York: Oxford University Press. 143). Yet, 
all the characteristics she mentions – acting in light of ends, exercising discretion, taking into account 
other moral commitments – are typical of duties of virtue. It seems, therefore, that the necessity for the 
introduction of the term “responsibility” arises only as a consequence of the unwarranted conflation of 
the concept of duty as such (or in general) with duties of justice, thus ignoring the existence of duties of 
virtue. I, therefore, fail to see the added value of the concept and leave it aside for the remainder of this 
chapter.
27. Note that we are here speaking only of the duty to refrain from direct harm. The more difficult case of 
institutional harm will be considered next.
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identifiable. The precise content of such positive duties of reparation could be 
specified by a court of law, for example.
This seemingly straightforward duty could, however, be rendered more 
complicated by arguing that the duty to refrain from harming also includes the 
duty to exercise one’s rights in a responsible manner. In a manner analogous to 
the right to freedom of expression, discussed in Chapter 1, the right to (acquire) 
property, for example, is limited by the rights of others. If one exercises this 
right in such a manner that there remains little to nothing left for others, then 
one has exercised one’s right without due respect for the equal rights of others. 
This Lockean duty28 would exclude such practices as land grabbing, i.e. the 
buying up of enormous swaths of land in developing countries by foreign com-
panies or governments. This example shows how harming by exercising one’s 
right without due respect for the rights of others may also be a perfect duty: no 
one is permitted to acquire such quantities of land as would endanger the abili-
ty of others to fulfill their subsistence needs. This duty requires merely forbear-
ance and can thus easily be performed by all for all; it is therefore universal. 
The content of the duty is specific enough, though it may, as in the case of the 
right to freedom of expression, require further fleshing out. As with the right 
to freedom of expression, whether one has exceeded the limits of one’s right to 
property could be determined case by case by a court of law. In general terms, 
however, the duty is clear enough to be considered determinate and claimable: 
everyone has a duty to refrain from acquiring such an amount of property that 
endangers the fulfillment of the subsistence needs of others. Accordingly, the 
duty to refrain from harming by exercising one’s right to property without due 
respect for the rights of others is a genuine duty of justice.
Duty to refrain from (global) institutional harm
This duty lies at the core of Pogge’s account of our duties with regard to the 
subsistence needs of others. It consists in refraining from participating in unjust 
28. John Locke argues that one’s right to property ought to be exercised in such a manner that does not 
render impossible the acquisition of a similar amount of property by anyone else: “Labour being the 
unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, 
at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others(Locke, J. (1988). Two Treatises of 
Government. (P. Laslett, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 288). He recognizes a further, 
more famous limitation on property as well. Everyone may acquire as much property “as any one can 
make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may by his labour fix a Property in. Wha-
tever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others” (ibid. 290). Locke sets this limit as 
he is convinced that “[n]othing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy” (ibid.). (It must be noted, 
however, that for Locke this limit to the accumulation of wealth applies only to the state of nature, prior 
to the invention of money (ibid. 300–2).)
145
Subsistence Needs and Individual DutiesHuman Duties and the Limits of Human Rights Discourse Chapter 4
400088-L-bw-Boot
orders that foreseeably cause a lack of necessary subsistence goods. By violating 
this duty, one additionally acquires duties to remedy the harm caused and to 
push for reform. The negative duty to refrain from institutional harm is the only 
duty of justice Pogge recognizes (the duties to remedy and reform are in fact ob-
ligations incurred only upon violation of one’s duty of justice). The reason why, 
according to Pogge, justice contains solely negative duties,29 is because, given 
certain prejudices about negative and positive duties, he believes the former to 
be more widely accepted because they are viewed as more stringent and less 
demanding. Pogge claims that the duty contained in his conception of justice 
is limited in range, as it involves only persons “subject to an institutional order 
you cooperate in imposing.” In a globalized world, however, this range could 
potentially encompass everyone. The range is thus not as limited as he lets on. 
Furthermore, Pogge maintains that this negative duty (including the two positive 
obligations) is limited in demandingness as well, since it is restricted “to com-
pensation for your share of that part of the human rights deficit that is reason-
ably avoidable through an alternative institutional design.”30 It is this supposedly 
limited demandingness especially that critics have challenged.31
Pogge’s insistence that justice contains only negative duties is meant to ap-
pease critics of subsistence rights who worry that the correlative duties are over-
ly demanding. Indeed, traditionally, negative duties have been held to have cer-
tain advantages over positive duties: they require only forbearance (not positive 
action), they are universally applicable (all can fulfill them towards all), they are 
enforceable, and their fulfillment is less costly and thus more compatible with 
maximal liberty. However, it would seem that this asymmetry between negative 
and positive duties does not apply when the negative duties are of an institutional 
nature, as in the case of Pogge. Refraining from harming in a globalized world is 
not so easy as simply refraining from performing acts most of us would not even 
consider doing anyway (theft, sexual assault, murder). Instead, to refrain from 
harming others requires our unending vigilance: Is this T-shirt made by a child 
in a sweatshop? Are these oranges produced in Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank? Should I take shorter and less warm showers? Should I eat less meat, 
because the production of meat is an incredibly inefficient use of farmland? Are 
29. Pogge. World Poverty and Human Rights. 26.
30. Pogge. Reply to the Critics. 61.
31. E.g. Mieth, C. (2008). World Poverty as a Problem of Justice? A Critical Comparison of Three Ap-
proaches. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 11(1), 15–36. 25. Though not directed solely at Pogge, 
Judith Lichtenberg argues that “ceasing to engage in these ‘New Harms’ is not at all easy” (Lichtenberg, 
J. (2010). Negative Duties, Positive Duties, and the ‘New Harms.’ Ethics, 120(3), 557–578. 558). 
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my savings being invested in weapons manufacturers by my bank? Are my taxes 
being used by my government to wage an unjust war? This is just a fraction of 
the questions we could ask ourselves every day, but this short list of concerns 
will suffice to show that not harming demands our constant attention. To com-
pletely avoid contributing to and benefiting from the global unjust order thus 
appears to be a Herculean task. It involves informing oneself about the possible 
consequences of one’s behavior – in collaboration with the actions of many other 
agents – for people in distant lands whom one has most likely never met. The 
paradigm of harming has thus become very different from the traditional one, 
whereby one’s actions by themselves are sufficient to cause harm without the 
contribution of others, and the harmful effects of one’s actions are immediate 
and near.32 The advantages of negative over positive duties only apply to this 
classic picture of harming. Pogge, however, abandons this picture and proposes 
a new, institutional account without wishing to give up the advantages of the 
classic account (stringency, reasonable demandingness, universality). His theory 
is thus presented as far less demanding that it is in reality. 
Assuming one is able to figure out all the harmful consequences of one’s 
participation in unjust schemes, the question still remains whether or not one can 
reasonably avoid participating in such a scheme. The language of negative duty 
conceals the incredibly complex and demanding nature of this command: to ab-
solutely refrain from consuming any products that have been unfairly produced, 
for example, would already call for a major lifestyle change. But, supposing one’s 
government is involved in upholding unfair trade agreements, one would even be 
required to move to a different country, lest one contribute to one’s government’s 
harmful practices by paying taxes. If one does not succeed in finding a country 
with a completely innocent government, a real possibility I imagine, one would 
have to retreat from society altogether to avoid harming others.
Pogge’s negative duty to refrain from institutional harm is therefore far 
more complex and demanding than the classic duty of forbearance. In fact, one 
could imagine several positive duties of aid less demanding than Pogge’s nega-
tive duty to refrain from institutional harm. It is likely that one is, due to human 
finitude, unable to refrain entirely from doing institutional harm, as it requires a 
32. Lichtenberg. Negative Duties, Positive Duties, and the ‘New Harms.’ 561. Samuel Scheffler makes a 
similar point when he speaks of the traditional phenomenology of agency that is still dominant: “Within 
this phenomenology, acts have primacy over omissions, near effects have primacy over remote effects, 
and individual effects have primacy over group effects” (Scheffler, S. (2001). Individual Responsibility 
in a Global Age. In Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal 
Thought (pp. 32–47). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 39).
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considerable amount of informing oneself as well as substantial life changes. It 
follows that Pogge’s negative duty must be viewed as an imperfect duty, allowing 
the agent considerable latitude in the manner in which and the extent to which 
she discharges it.33 Yet, as mentioned in Chapter 2, such discretion is “not to 
be taken as permission to make exceptions to the maxim of actions but only as 
permission to limit one maxim of duty by another (e.g. love of one’s neighbor 
in general by love of one’s parents).”34 In other words, we do have an imperfect 
duty to act in light of a certain end – i.e. the end of avoiding institutional harm 
altogether –, but the manner in which we fulfill this duty allows for a measure of 
latitude, and may be limited by other duties.
Pogge’s duty to refrain from harming is, furthermore, less precise than it 
seems. Given that it is not always clear what I ought to do to refrain from harm-
ing, the content cannot be said to be determinate. Pogge’s assertion that we 
“choose to remain ignorant”35 of the manner in which the world economy is 
structured, what role our government has in shaping it, and what consequences 
it has for others in the world, is – I think – a bit too quick. It is difficult, for ex-
ample, to hold citizens of wealthy nations responsible for the policies developed 
by the IMF and the World Bank, given that the “IMF is accountable to finance 
ministers and central bank governors, and its officers are not elected but rath-
er appointed by agreement of governments.”36 Debra Satz further points out 
that the policy debates of these organizations more often than not take place 
in secret, rendering it more difficult to obtain information. As long as one is 
33. In these pages I mention the problem of demandingness several times. It must be noted, however, that 
my aim in doing so is not to engage in the discussion of how demanding our moral duties in general 
(understood as comprising both duties of justice and duties of virtue) may be. Rather, my aim is to 
point out the problem of overdemandingness for a particular set of individual duties, namely duties of 
justice, which I take to be perfect duties. The problem of overdemandingness for such perfect duties is 
as follows: I have listed indeterminacy as a characteristic of imperfect duties. If a duty is so demanding 
that one cannot completely fulfill it, then one must choose which aspects of the duty one will perform. 
Pogge’s negative, institutional duty, under discussion here, fits this description: it is too demanding to be 
fulfilled completely. We must therefore make choices: I will refrain, for example, from buying clothing 
that is produced in sweatshops, but I will not move to another country to avoid paying taxes, which my 
government uses to participate in an unjust war. One must do something, but precisely what aspects 
of this duty one chooses to perform is at the agent’s discretion. For this reason, overdemanding duties 
are imperfect and should therefore not be understood to be duties of justice. If we would consider 
overdemanding duties to be duties of justice, then we would have to accept a rather skewed concept of a 
duty of justice. For, habitually, a duty of justice is viewed as a duty, to the performance of which certain 
right-holders may constrain certain duty-bearers. If we accept that overdemanding duties may also be 
duties of justice, then we have to accept the idea of a duty of justice, of which certain aspects may be left 
unfulfilled at the duty-bearers’ discretion – a duty of justice, in other words, that may not be completely 
claimed by the relevant right-holders. In what sense would such a duty still be a duty of justice?
34. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:390.
35. Pogge. Reply to the Critics. 79.
36. Satz, D. (2005). What Do We Owe the Global Poor? Ethics and International Affairs, 19(1), 47–54. 
51–2.
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not entirely clear on the policies of these international financial institutions, the 
content of one’s duties to refrain from participating in an unjust order shaped, in 
part, by these policies, will necessarily remain indeterminate and the duty itself 
therefore imperfect.
It is difficult to imagine, moreover, how Pogge’s negative duty could be 
claimable. It would involve a specific victim, often in a different country, seeking 
out one of the many agents who contributed to the preservation of an unjust 
order that has caused her harm, as responsible for her condition. What justifies 
her claim on him specifically, when she might have placed her claim on so many 
possible others (that have likewise participated in the same order)? This question 
shows that the pairing of victim and violator, and thus claimability, has become 
problematic, another indication that the duty in question is imperfect.
The positive duties to remedy harm caused and to push for reform face a 
similar problem. It seems difficult for a particular person in need of assistance 
to claim aid or reform efforts from a specific duty-bearer. These positive duties, 
furthermore, are underdetermined in two ways. The first sense in which they are 
underdetermined concerns the question how much I ought to do. Pogge answers 
as follows: “The word ‘compensate’ is meant to indicate that how much one 
should be willing to contribute toward reforming unjust institutions and toward 
mitigating the harms they cause depends on how much one is contributing to, 
and benefiting from, their maintenance.”37 But how am I to measure how much 
I have contributed and benefited?38 And even if I could provide such an exact 
figure, how ought I then to translate that into aid and reform efforts? This brings 
us to the second sense in which Pogge’s positive duties are underdetermined: it 
is unclear whom ought I to help first and how much. Where should the focus of 
my reform efforts lie?
Given the global range of the harmful institutions in which one has partici-
pated, the persons for whom one might provide aid or for whose cause one might 
lobby and undertake reform efforts, are numerous: one could lobby to overhaul 
the EU agricultural subsidies, which render it impossible for African farmers to 
compete and make a living, given the extremely low prices of subsidized Euro-
pean agricultural produce. Yet, one could also provide direct aid to victims of an 
37. Pogge. World Poverty and Human Rights. 56.
38. A related problem, though of a more epistemic nature, is raised by O’Neill who argues that “the causal 
links between specific individuals or institutions who injured and were injured . . . are too often not 
clear enough to allocate rights of compensation (O’Neill, O. (2000). Transnational Economic Justice. In 
Bounds of Justice (pp. 115–142). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 132). Also see Satz. What Do 
We Owe the Global Poor? 50.
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unjust war in which one’s country has participated, or dedicate one’s time and 
effort to any one of the many other cases in which subsistence needs go unmet. 
Such reform efforts and aid require the seeking out of information about the 
region in which the problem has occurred, the nature of the problem in ques-
tion, its causes, and effective ways of helping or reforming. It is possible for an 
individual to do this for one cause or perhaps two at a time, but certainly not for 
all the cases in which people suffer from poverty. Duties of aid and reform do 
not dictate which of these many possible cases I ought to focus on, and human 
finitude precludes us from fully dedicating ourselves to all of them. Therefore, 
agents have considerable latitude in deciding which duties of aid and reform they 
discharge.
Both the negative duty to refrain from upholding harmful institutions and 
the positive duties resulting from its violation are thus not sufficiently deter-
minate, nor is it clear how right-holders could claim the performance of these 
duties. As a result, we must conclude that they are imperfect. Indeed, Elizabeth 
Ashford, whose position is in many ways similar to Pogge’s, admits that this 
is the case: in the absence of just institutions that can allocate and specify the 
duties, they remain imperfect.39 Nonetheless, Ashford maintains, they are (im-
perfect!) duties of justice. At this point, however, we ought to ask ourselves what 
we mean when we speak of duties of justice. Unfortunately, more often than not 
this term is employed without the provision of a clear definition. Often it seems 
that the term “justice” is simply used in order to convey that something is very 
important, whereby the possibility that certain duties may be of fundamental 
importance but are not matters of justice, is rejected out of hand. Indeed, the 
greater the number of duties that are given the predicate “duty of justice,” the 
more all other duties seem to be devalued. Certain liberals even place the duty 
to treat “each as an end” within the sphere of basic justice,40 while Kant, from 
whom they presumably borrow this duty, clearly did not view this as a matter 
of justice, as it fails to fulfill the first condition of justice (namely that it regards 
only the external actions of individuals, insofar as they can affect others). 
We will thus need to define duties of justice more precisely.41 The idea that 
duties of justice are perfect and duties of virtue imperfect has been contested of 
39. Ashford. The Inadequacy of our Traditional Conception. 234.
40. See e.g. Nussbaum, M. (2006). Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Cam-
bridge (Mass.): Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 70.
41. I am indebted to Allen Buchanan for the four different distinctions between duties of justice and duties 
of virtue I discuss here: Buchanan. Justice and Virtue. Buchanan, however, employs the terms “charity” 
where I speak of “virtue.” 
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late. Instead, some scholars have made the argument that the imperfect duties 
under discussion here are duties of justice that ought to be made perfect.42 This 
duty to develop institutional structures that can define and allocate imperfect 
duties, rendering them perfect and enforceable, is itself imperfect as well. None-
theless, this too is held to be a duty of justice. Yet, if it is no longer the perfection 
of duties that places them within the sphere of justice, what criterion for du-
ties of justice is used instead? A second traditional approach to the distinction, 
found in the work of Pogge and in the writings of most libertarians, holds that 
only negative duties can be duties of justice. This theory has also been rejected, 
however, since the positive duties to aid and reform are considered to be duties 
of justice as well. Alternatively, a third option would be to make an appeal to the 
claimability of the duties. Yet, again this suggestion is turned down. After all, 
these scholars regard duties to reform and aid, as well as duties to not partici-
pate in harmful institutions, as duties of justice despite the fact that they are not 
claimable at present. Finally, duties of justice have often been held to be those 
duties that have corresponding rights. It is this definition to which these authors 
appeal: the right to an adequate standard of living exists, it is held, because it 
protects a fundamental human interest. This right then gives rise to duties that, 
though they are of an imperfect nature, are nonetheless considered to be duties 
of justice, precisely because they arise from a right. It is the importance of the 
right in question, furthermore, which leads to calls for institutionalization so as 
to render the duties perfect, lest the rights remain unfulfilled:
 
It is therefore not true that an institutional specification of duties 
is a condition of the right’s existence. The right exists, and imposes 
corresponding obligations, even in the absence of any institutional 
allocation of duties. In particular, it imposes . . . the corresponding 
duty to coordinate with others to bring about an institutional allo-
cation of duties that realizes the right, insofar as this is reasonably 
possible.43
Here it must be clarified, however, how the term “right” is utilized in this line of 
argument. Crucially, this understanding of right does not connect having a right 
42. Gilabert. Kant and the Claims of the Poor. 399. Ashford. The Inadequacy of our Traditional Concepti-
on. 234.
43. Ashford, E. (2007). The Duties Imposed by the Human Right to Basic Necessities. In T. Pogge (Ed.), 
Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right (pp. 183–218). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 216–7.
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to X with a moral title to limit the freedom of another by claiming the perfor-
mance of X from all or specific duty-bearers. After all, prior to institutionaliza-
tion the right in question (i.e., the right to basic necessities) is not claimable, as 
it is not clear wherein exactly X consists, nor is it clear who must provide X for 
whom.44 Rather, a right to X seems to give rise to what is referred to as an “im-
perfect duty of justice” to set up institutions that can make possible the claiming 
by force of the duties to aid and reform. 
On the account I have put forward in Chapter 2, if there is a right, then there 
must be a duty of justice,45 the performance of which is owed to the right-holder 
and the non-fulfillment of which wrongs her. Conversely, where a duty of jus-
tice is absent, there can be no right. A right to subsistence, however – given the 
impossibility of the negative duty to wholly refrain from participating in unjust 
institutions – generates duties of aid and reform, which I have argued cannot 
be performed by all for all. I will thus have to choose whom I will aid and for 
which cause I will lobby for institutional reform. It seems to me, however, that 
if I choose to help needy persons A and B, and, due to human finitude, am not 
able to help all the others who are equally deserving of my help, I do not wrong 
those that I have not helped.46 But if we accept this line of argument, it would 
seem that a human right to subsistence confronts us with a problem: it is held to 
be a right, though the non-performance of its correlative duties does not consti-
tute a wrong towards the holder of this right.47 This is problematic, however, for 
normally those duties that one can refrain from performing without wronging 
anyone are considered to be duties of virtue: “failure to fulfill them [i.e. duties of 
virtue] is not in itself culpability (demeritum) = – a, but rather mere deficiency 
in moral worth = 0.”48 Therefore it seems, thus far, that the duties correlative 
with the right to subsistence (as described by the institutional account) are, in 
fact, duties of virtue.
Still, those who view these imperfect duties as duties of justice could argue 
that the right to subsistence is in fact not held against particular individuals, but 
44. Though certain authors have attempted to view imperfect duties as claimable prior to institutionali-
zation: cf. Stemplowska. Real World Duties. 482. Yet, it is not clear how she expects to achieve true 
claimability on her account, which suggests that all indigents could simply have a claim to help from all 
those who have not yet undertaken sufficient steps to fulfill their duty.
45. Whereby duties of justice must be perfect, as imperfect duties of justice have been shown (in Chapter 2) 
to contain a contradiction of terms.
46. Anscombe, G. E. M. (2005). Who is Wronged? Philippa Foot on Double Effect: One Point. In M. Geach 
& L. Gormally (Eds.), Human Life, Actions and Ethics. Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe (pp. 249–251). 
Exeter: Imprint Academic.
47. Notice how different this is from the duty to refrain from torture, for example. Here, if I do not fulfill my 
duty towards everyone, I most certainly do wrong others.
48. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:390.
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rather “against the vast group of agents who participate in these [unjust] social 
institutions.”49 The right-holder thus has a right that the wealthy coordinate as 
a group to fulfill her right. This would do away with the argument based on 
human finitude, for conceivably if the wealthy would coordinate their relief and 
reform efforts they would in fact succeed in fulfilling subsistence rights for all. 
There would be no need for picking and choosing aid recipients (which leads to 
the suspicion that subsistence rights correlate with duties of virtue, as discussed 
above), because as a group they could fulfill the subsistence rights of all. But 
even if we grant that this is possible, the worry would be that rights held against 
an amorphous and anonymous group will de facto not be claimable. After all, 
without institutions the question remains where concretely one’s claim can be 
lodged when one’s right has not yet been fulfilled. The answer that the wealthy 
of the world as a group are responsible does not help us much: “Claimants who 
do not know who bears the counterpart obligations to rights they claim may 
grasp thin air.”50 It seems this warning applies to the case of group duties as 
well. Placing the correlative duty on the shoulders of a collective may conceiv-
ably solve the problem of finitude, but it leaves the question “Who should do 
what for whom?” unanswered. Rights held against groups thus do not provide 
clear guidelines for individual agency.
Should we then conclude that our individual, institutional duties to the 
global poor are “merely” duties of virtue? They are, as we have argued, (1) inde-
terminate: which duty-bearers must perform which duties for which right-hold-
er(s) remains unclear. As a consequence, they are (2) not claimable: if one does 
not know who owes what to whom, how is one to claim anything? Consequently, 
the duties to the poor appear to have (3) no correlative rights, since we under-
stand having a right to mean one has a title to bind the freedom of another by 
claiming the performance of a certain duty from him or her. Given these three 
characteristics it seems we must conclude that our duties concerning global sub-
sistence needs are duties of virtue.51
There remains, however, a crucial difference between our individual duties 
stemming from subsistence needs and traditional duties of virtue: the latter are 
not typically performed as recompense for an injustice for which one is (co)re-
49. Ashford. The Duties Imposed by the Human Right to Basic Necessities. 216.
50. O’Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue. 135. A similar critique of rights held against a group of duty-bear-
ers collectively is put forward by Simon Hope: Hope. Subsistence Needs, Human Rights, and Imperfect 
Duties. 97.
51. Note that I leave out the fourth characteristic of duties of virtue mentioned above, namely that they are 
positive (whereas supposedly duties of justice can be only negative). I omit this point, because I hold that 
justice could also, given the adequate institutions, contain positive duties.
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sponsible.52 Regarding global poverty, however, I believe Pogge can be credited 
with convincingly demonstrating that, in fact, we are implicated in this injustice. 
If we accept this, then it seems unsatisfying to classify these duties as duties of 
virtue. Yet, judging them to be genuine duties of justice also seems inaccurate 
(as argued above). If we are to overcome this stalemate, we should recall that, 
at least according to the account I have provided, duties of justice are limited 
to those duties that correlate with a corresponding right to coerce others (to 
perform the duties in question).53 Given that the duties in question are imperfect 
and therefore not claimable, it cannot be meaningfully held that these duties 
correlate with such a right. A human right to subsistence – whereby “right” 
must be understood as the ability to claim the performance of the correlative 
duty from the duty-bearer – thus becomes problematic. This could be viewed 
as an undesirable conclusion by proponents of this human right, but I would 
argue that we should not use certain words lightly: if we speak of a human right 
to subsistence, but the right-holder is unable to claim the performance of the 
corresponding duty from a specific duty-bearer, then one could wonder about 
the point of speaking of a right. If we speak of duties of justice, but it is utterly 
unclear what one ought to do for whom, then the meaning of “justice” has been 
altered to a point where it comes suspiciously close to virtue. The term “duty of 
justice” should add something that sets it apart from duties of virtue. As argued 
above, however, the structure of the institutional duties stemming from global 
subsistence needs is too similar to duties of virtue to be able to speak of duties of 
justice. If a duty is indeterminate and unclaimable it seems misleading to speak 
of duties of justice. This term creates expectations that, at present, can simply 
not be fulfilled.54
Duties of a Remedial Nature
Thus far we have dealt with situations in which subsistence rights are unful-
filled as a consequence of either direct or institutional harm. We have found 
that the duty to refrain from direct harm is a duty of justice, whereas the duty 
to refrain from institutional harm and the positive duties one incurs upon vio-
lation of this duty (i.e. the duties to provide aid and push for reform) are duties 
52. Mieth, C. (2012). On Human Rights and the Strength of Corresponding Duties. In G. Ernst & J-C. 
Heilinger (Eds.), The Philosophy of Human Rights (pp. 159–184). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 181. 
53. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:383.
54. This is not to say that duties of aid, for example, could not become perfect duties of justice in a particular 
social scheme, such as a welfare state. In such a scheme individuals have clear duties of justice (to comply 
with the welfare system, to pay taxes) and right-holders have a justiciable right to subsistence goods. 
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of virtue. What remains is to discuss the cases in which the lack of subsistence 
goods is either no one’s fault (duty 1), or at least not my fault (duty 2.b), and 
remedial duties kick in. We will begin by discussing the former. Consider the 
plight of a country struck by an environmental disaster (e.g. a volcanic erup-
tion or a tsunami), leaving countless inhabitants without secure access to food 
and shelter. Let us further stipulate that this environmental disaster did not 
occur as a consequence of climate change caused by man. In other words, this 
is not a matter of institutional harming: no one is to blame. At first glance, this 
situation might perhaps appear analogous to Singer’s easy rescue case: we are 
not responsible for the trouble in which the child in the pond finds himself, but 
we are in a position to help and the rescue effort will not cost us any great effort 
or resources. Therefore, Singer concludes we have a duty to save the child. Simi-
larly, the lack of subsistence goods in the afflicted country is not our doing, but if 
(the citizens of) wealthy countries work together they could, conceivably, allevi-
ate the country’s problems without too great a cost to themselves. This, however, 
is where the similarities end. In the easy rescue case it is clear who should do 
what for whom – I, the single passerby, should wade into the pond and save the 
child – rendering the duty in this example both perfect and possibly a duty of 
justice. In fact, several countries actually have such Good Samaritan laws, which 
include a duty to rescue. In the case of a natural disaster, by contrast, there are 
many possible candidates for the role of the Good Samaritan. Moreover, there 
could be various countries struck by natural disasters that are in need of our 
help.55 Furthermore, we argued earlier on (in §4.1) that the duty to aid others in 
need (for which no one is to blame) allows for gradations of duty, by taking into 
account the special circumstances of the duty-bearer (is she able to help a lot or 
only a little, or perhaps not at all?) as well as the special relations between people 
and nations. The duty to assist in cases of a natural calamity is therefore under-
determined and unclaimable, hence imperfect. We must conclude, consequently, 
that the duty in question is a duty of virtue. 
55. Much in Singer’s account hinges on the analogy between the easy rescue case and the problem of global 
poverty. I have here raised one aspect of the problem of global poverty that renders that analogy prob-
lematic. Miller raises two further points against this analogy. Firstly, saving the drowning child is, most 
likely, a onetime event and will, for this reason, not interfere with our life plans in any significant way. 
Poverty, on the other hand, is a chronic problem. Secondly, in the easy rescue case the question who has 
caused the child’s troubles is not raised (the child in the pond is simply an innocent victim), whereas in 
the case of global poverty it is of both moral and practical importance who is found responsible. Oth-
erwise we will not be able to hold those accountable who have contributed to the poverty of others, nor 
will we obtain any insight into the question how we can prevent poverty in the future (Miller. National 
Responsibility and Global Justice. 234–7).  
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This is not to say that we do not have strong moral reasons to aid those in 
need. We indeed have significant duties of virtue to help them. But, if we do not 
help them, or if we help others who are equally in need and deserving of our help, 
then we do not wrong them.56 For only if one has a right to the performance of 
a duty does its non-fulfillment constitute a wrong and thus a violation of justice. 
Furthermore, the imperfect duty to aid others who, through no one’s fault, are 
in need of help can also become a perfect duty. Within a particular institutional 
scheme, the indigent can lodge their claim with a specified agency that assumes 
the duty of aid. All others in the scheme have the duty to cooperate with and 
contribute to this scheme. Thus when a fellow citizen, for example, has an acci-
dent, rendering her disabled and unable to work, the welfare state assumes the 
duty to ensure she is taken care of and has enough means to live her life. Indi-
rectly, all the citizens share in this duty by complying with the welfare system 
and by paying taxes. In such a fashion an imperfect duty can be institutionalized 
and become a duty of justice. Somewhat analogously, countries could resolve 
to set up an international fund for disaster relief, under the supervision of the 
UN for instance, which could be relied on in cases of emergencies.57 In the case, 
however, where such an institutional structure is missing, individuals’ duties to 
aid are imperfect in nature, and thus duties of virtue.
It is likely that not everyone will agree with this assessment. In National 
Responsibility and Global Justice, for example, David Miller holds that such 
remedial duties do fall within the purview of justice, though he does not provide 
an explicit argument for this position. Even more curious, he argues that such 
duties “must be discharged as a matter of justice, assuming that the relevant 
agent or agents are able to do so without infringing other, weightier, duties of 
justice.”58 On a Kantian account, however, the “permission to limit one maxim 
of duty by another”59 forms a clear indication that the duties at hand are imper-
fect and hence not duties of justice. By admitting that there may be weightier 
duties and that precedence ought to be given to such duties in a possible case of 
conflict, Miller himself in fact already describes the remedial duties to aid others 
after a (natural) disaster as duties of virtue. His insistence that they are nonethe-
less duties of justice therefore seems merely stipulative.
56. Though if we were to help no one at all, if we were to do nothing, then we would be in violation of our 
duty of virtue.
57. Perhaps we could imagine something along the lines of the UN’s Green Climate Fund.
58. Miller. National Responsibility and Global Justice. 255.
59. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ak 6:390.
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Finally, consider the duty (duty 2.b) pertaining to the following situation: a large 
part of a particular country’s GDP has the tendency to end up filling the large 
pockets of a small group of extremely wealthy and powerful oligarchs, who ei-
ther reside within the upper echelons of the government or wield considerable 
influence on the administration’s policy through their political clients. As a re-
sult, large portions of the people of this country find themselves in need of pov-
erty relief. Obviously, primary responsibility for their indigence lies with the 
band of oligarchs. They, however, have no intention of leaving their fraudulent 
ways behind them. The question thus arises whether individuals of the world’s 
wealthy nations have a duty of justice to assist those in need.
In addition to suffering from the same defects as the previously discussed 
remedial duty – i.e. being underdetermined and unclaimable, hence imperfect – 
the duties in question are, as it were, “secondary.” What I mean by this is that the 
duty to aid the inhabitants of this country originates in the failure of the primary 
duty-bearers. We are not to blame for the inhabitants’ indigence and our duties 
to help them do thus not stem from an injustice we have perpetrated against 
them for which we now owe them recompense. Given that the primary respon-
sibility lies with the small group of oligarchs, Miller is right that the secondary 
duty-bearers “cannot be required to act.”60 Accordingly, the oligarchs’ refusal 
to fulfill their duty of justice to refrain from their harmful, fraudulent activities 
results in individuals elsewhere incurring not duties of justice, but rather duties 
of virtue to aid those in need.
By applying the conclusions of this section to Figure 1, we end up with the 
schema given in Figure 2. As this overview shows, we have found that in the 
absence of institutions to determine and allocate individual duties to the poor, 
most of these are best understood as duties of virtue. No doubt this result will be 
considered disappointing by those authors wishing to establish duties of justice 
to alleviate subsistence needs. However, I hope to have shown that if the con-
cept “justice” is to be a fruitful concept, it ought to be clearly distinct from its 
partner concept “virtue.” Accordingly, I have suggested that the realm of justice 
be limited to those rights and duties that fulfill the conditions of determinacy 
and claimability. If we were to abandon these prerequisites, then the important 
distinction between justice and virtue would be rendered obscure, resulting in 
“duties of justice” that are both indeterminate and unclaimable. What could be 
60.  Miller. National Responsibility and Global Justice. 258.
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the motivation for such an approach? Many authors wish to avoid what they 
view as the stigma of having the duties stemming from subsistence needs brand-
ed as duties of virtue, as they believe these to be of lesser importance than duties 
of justice. They therefore insist on classifying our duties to the poor as duties of 
justice in order to emphasize the fact that we truly have very strong reasons to 
fulfill certain duties to the poor. In doing so, however, they forget that duties of 
virtue provide us with strong moral reasons for certain courses of action as well. 
In fact, Chapter 2 refuted several arguments why perfect duties would be more 
important than imperfect duties or why duties of justice would carry a greater 
moral weight than duties of virtue.61 
61. It must be noted that those duties that are judged to be duties of virtue in this overview – with the likely 
exception of duty 2.b – are deemed so due to the absence of an institutional scheme that could allocate 
the duties in question. For example, all nations could conceivably contribute to an emergency fund, man-
aged by the UN, to which funds they would have a right when disaster strikes their country. In this case 
all countries that commit to such a scheme would have a duty of justice to contribute to it. Similarly, the 
institutional duties in this schema could become duties of justice if, for example, there would be a global 
institution to clarify and allocate the duties of each. In the absence of such an institution, however, we 
Cause of poverty Who has duties? What duties? Basis for 
according duties
Status of duties
1. 
Natural disaster 
(no one is to 
blame)
All, but 
gradations of 
duty and ability 
to help are taken 
into account
Positive duties 
of aid
Remedial 
responsibility
Duties of virtue61
2. 
Direct harm
a. 
The agent that 
has harmed
a. 
Negative duties 
to refrain from 
harming and 
positive duties 
to remedy
a. 
Outcome 
responsibility
a.
Duties of justice
b. 
All, but 
gradations of 
duty and ability 
to help are taken 
into account
b. 
Positive duties 
of aid
b. 
Remedial 
responsibility
b.
Duties of virtue
3. 
(Global) 
institutional 
harm
All those 
participating in 
the institutional 
scheme
Negative duty 
to refrain from 
participating in 
unjust schemes, 
and positive 
duties to remedy 
and reform
Outcome 
responsibility
Duties of virtue
Figure 2
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§ 4.3 – Do Subsistence Needs Give rise to a human right to Subsistence? 
No doubt many human rights scholars and philosophers of human rights would 
disagree with the conclusion of the previous section that duties arising from glob-
al subsistence needs are duties of virtue (except for the duty to refrain from direct 
deprivation). They will, I expect, disagree more fervently when they realize that, 
on the account I have provided, the designation of these duties as duties of virtue 
also means that global subsistence needs do not give rise to a human right to an 
adequate standard of living (as only duties of justice can have correlative rights). 
After all, I understand having a right as the ability to claim the performance of 
the correlative duty from either specific or all duty-bearers.
Unwilling to accept this conclusion, critics of the position presented here 
could attempt several counterarguments. This section will discuss two such 
counterarguments. Firstly, they could hold that the position that global subsis-
tence needs do not give rise to a human right to subsistence – whereas we do 
recognize, say, a human right not to be tortured – relies, at least in part, on a 
false dichotomy between civil-political rights and socio-economic rights, where-
by the former are held to give rise to negative duties and the latter to positive 
duties. Secondly, they could argue that, like socio-economic rights, civil-political 
rights can also give rise to problems of claimability, forcing us either to give up 
claimability as a necessary trait of rights or to adopt the unattractive position 
that civil-political rights are, in certain circumstances, not claimable and there-
fore not truly rights either.
Let us begin with the first counterargument. Onora O’Neill’s work is often tar-
geted by those who put forward the first counterargument for maintaining too 
strict a division between civil-political rights (or “liberty rights” as she calls 
them) and subsistence rights. Liberty rights, she holds, are doubly universal: all 
have the right to freedom of movement, for example, which places duties on all 
others to refrain from impeding others to go where they choose. These duties 
can be easily performed by all for all, as they simply require forbearance. Sub-
sistence rights, by contrast, require positive action on the part of others, e.g. to 
(help) provide a person in need with food, shelter or health care. Such duties, 
according to O’Neill, are therefore “enactable by all but not for all.” Understand-
ably, it is not possible for me alone to provide food for all those suffering from 
must conclude that the duties in question are duties of virtue.
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famine (whereas it is possible for me to respect everyone’s right to freedom of 
movement). Consequently, the right to food “cannot be claimed by each from 
all.”62 Rights to goods and services thus necessarily require institutions to dis-
tribute the duties among a great number of agents. Until such institutionaliza-
tion has taken place, however, it is not possible to claim a right to food against 
any individual in particular. Absent institutionalization, the right does therefore 
not exist.
In Basic Rights, Henry Shue sets out to disprove the traditional distinction 
between liberty and subsistence rights, as found in the work of O’Neill, among 
others. Firstly, he argues, subsistence rights are more negative than they are of-
ten made out to be. The right to food for instance involves duties of forbearance 
as well: we all have a duty to not interfere with the food supply of others.63 Simi-
larly, the right to health includes universal negative duties to refrain from actions 
that could damage the health of others.64 Secondly, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, Shue points out that negative rights are in fact far more positive than they 
appear to be. Article 6 of the ICCPR states, for example, that “[n]o one shall be 
actively deprived of his life.” This might seem to involve solely negative duties 
of forbearance. Yet, the right to life, a classic liberty right, also requires a police 
force to help prevent violations of the right and to arrest violators. It requires, 
furthermore, a judicial system to try these violators, as well as prisons in which 
to incarcerate them. Finally, citizens will need to contribute to the creation and 
maintenance of these institutions through the taxes they pay. In brief, the en-
forcement of the right to life requires a great deal more than mere forbearance, 
and indeed involves quite some expenditure. In other words, it calls for positive 
duties.65 Shue concludes that the traditional idea that rights can be neatly divided 
between those that give rise solely to negative duties of forbearance and those 
that instead require solely positive duties of aid is “thoroughly misguided.” In-
62. O’Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue. 148.
63. For an example of a case, in which a government has violated its negative duties to refrain from interfer-
ing with the food supply of a community, see: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Yakye 
Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Judgment of June 17, 2005. Series C No 125.
64. For an example of a case, in which both a government and a corporation (the Nigerian National Petro-
leum Company, which is the majority shareholder in a consortium with Shell Petroleum Development 
Corporation) have violated their negative duties to refrain from any actions with grave, detrimental 
health impacts, see: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Ogoni People v. Nigeria. Jud-
gment of May 27, 2002. ACHPR/COMM/A044/1. 
65. A similar critique of the traditional position that negative rights require solely negative duties is pro-
vided by Jeremy Waldron: “The right not to be tortured generates a duty not to torture people, but it 
also generates a duty to investigate complaints of torture, a duty to pay one’s share for the political and 
administrative setups that might be necessary to prevent torture, and so on” (Waldron. Liberal Rights. 
25). Also see: Etinson, A. (2013). Human Rights, Claimability and the Uses of Abstraction. Utilitas, 
25(4), 463–486. 467.
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stead, all rights give rise to the same set of three duties, namely negative duties 
to avoid depriving, positive duties to protect from deprivation, and positive du-
ties to aid the deprived.66 Therefore, if O’Neill maintains that subsistence rights 
are not claimable prior to an adequate allocation of the corresponding duties, 
she must also believe that traditional liberty rights, absent the allocation of the 
corresponding duties, are not claimable either. Given that liberty rights call for 
positive action as well, which cannot be enacted by all for all, they too are not 
to be considered proper rights until institutionalization has taken place. Surely 
O’Neill would wish to avoid such a conclusion. If so, it seems she must give up 
her position that the allocation of duties is an existence condition for rights.
This seemingly strong counterargument is, however, rather easy to refute. 
We need not disagree with Shue that rights of all sorts require institutionaliza-
tion for their enforcement, yet this does not dispel the basic asymmetry between 
these rights. After all, “enforcement presupposes that the proper allocation of 
obligations has been identified. It is, after all, obligations, and not rights that 
will need enforcing.”67 To illustrate: the protection of liberty rights will indeed, 
as shown above in the case of the right to life, require governments to take 
measures (to institute a police force, judicial body, prison system, and so forth), 
such that this right is adequately enforced. All these measures, however, rely on 
our prior understanding of what liberty rights require of whom, viz. all must 
practice non-interference in their interactions with all others. The normative 
relationship is thus already clear, and institutional measures are required solely 
to enforce it. Conversely, no such clarity is available in the case of subsistence 
rights. Such rights do not only require institutional measures to enforce an al-
ready clear normative relationship, but also rely on institutions to clarify who 
must do what for whom. The reason for this is that prior to institutionalization it 
remains unclear how the duties corresponding to such positive-action-requiring 
rights are distributed. It is only once such constructions (welfare systems, health 
care programs, social housing projects, etc.) are in place that we can fully know 
who owes what to whom regarding subsistence rights. The asymmetry between 
the two sorts of rights therefore remains.68
66. Shue. Basic Rights. 52. 
67. O’Neill. Transnational Economic Justice. 135–6. 
68. Alan Gewirth makes a related point when he argues that, though negative rights may require positive 
action for their enforcement, the ground for such positive action is itself still negative, namely “that 
potential offenders refrain from the prohibited actions” (Gewirth. Private Philanthropy and Positive 
Rights. 64). The distinction between negative and positive rights, he maintains, is thus still valid.
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Another way of putting the same point is that liberty rights are both genu-
ine rights and independent moral norms that transcend their actual institution-
alization. Conversely, subsistence rights, if they are to be genuine rights, must be 
made claimable within an institutional structure. The downside of this is that, as 
O’Neill does in fact conclude, subsistence rights are genuine rights only by virtue 
of convention; they are therefore not pre-institutionally existing rights, but rath-
er special rights. Many scholars have taken issue with this position, arguing that 
the right to an adequate standard of living does exist prior to the allocation of 
duties. These authors consider the right to be a truly pre-institutional or natural 
right. However, the downside of this position is that the deontic implications re-
main fully indeterminate; who must do what for whom is left unsettled, leaving 
the right unclaimable (and therefore, according to O’Neill, not genuine). There-
fore, O’Neill would conclude that in the case of the right to subsistence, it ap-
pears to be difficult to view the right both as a pre-institutionally valid right, and 
as a genuine, i.e. claimable, right with specific corresponding duties. In the end, 
however, O’Neill seems to wish to call subsistence rights neither special rights, 
nor universal rights simpliciter. Instead, she designates them “distributively uni-
versal special rights.”69 They are special rights, because the performance of the 
correlative duty can be claimed only in virtue of a special, specified relationship 
with a particular duty-bearer (or particular duty-bearers). Yet they are also uni-
versal rights, because all may enter into such a special relationship.70
Elizabeth Ashford provides a second argument contesting the conclusion that 
subsistence needs give rise to duties of virtue and that, therefore, there is no 
human right to an adequate standard of living. The view that claimability is the 
existence condition of rights, she argues, will ultimately endanger the status of 
civil-political rights as genuine rights as well. Placing herself squarely in a Kan-
tian tradition, O’Neill adopts precisely such a view: if it is not clear from whom 
I can claim the performance of the duties corresponding with my right (as is the 
case with subsistence rights, prior to allocation), then one cannot meaningfully 
hold that I possess the right in question. By discussing cases of additive harms,71 
Ashford attempts to prove that O’Neill’s condition for the existence of rights, i.e. 
claimability, is untenable. Ashford does not deny that in the case of subsistence 
69. O’Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue. 136.
70. Ibid. 136n.
71. Ashford also explores multiplicative harms (whereby the actions of A and the actions of B are harmless 
on their own, but cause great harm when they are combined), but it seems to me that such cases can be 
easily parried by O’Neill, so I do not discuss them here.
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rights it is often difficult to know who is responsible for providing the necessary 
aid. Rather, she maintains that often it is equally challenging to assign responsi-
bility in cases of liberty rights violations. She makes use of Derek Parfit’s exam-
ple of “The Torturers’ Union” to make her point. Fearing prosecution for human 
rights violations, the members of this union decide to arrange the torture in such 
a manner that the electric shock administered by each is spread out over a great 
number of victims, so that each of them contributes but a fraction of the total 
amount of harm caused to each prisoner. None of them thus cause (by himself) 
serious harm to any specific victim. By collaborating, however, the cumulative 
effect of their coordinated effort remains the same: a great deal of harm for all 
the victims, resulting in human rights violations.
This case may be somewhat out of the ordinary, Ashford concedes, yet it 
still presents us with a straightforward infringement of the right to be free from 
torture. Ashford maintains that for O’Neill, by contrast, it would be very diffi-
cult to view this as a violation of rights. If we imagine a situation, elaborating on 
the example of the Torturers’ Union, in which it has become fully impossible to 
match specific victims to specific perpetrators, Ashford contends that O’Neill’s 
claimability condition cannot be satisfied. At the same time, O’Neill must agree 
that the case of the Torturers’ Union presents us with a grave violation of human 
rights. Therefore, Ashford concludes, “it is not plausible to claim [as O’Neill 
does] that serious harms can only count as human rights violations unless we 
can identify the agent or agents specifically responsible for any particular vic-
tim’s suffering from such a harm.”72  
Taking a Poggean perspective on the principal cause of global poverty, it 
seems Ashford means to present the Torturers’ Union as analogous to the prob-
lem of global poverty: a great many agents worldwide conspire to (knowingly 
or not) impose, uphold and profit from an unjust global order, predictably caus-
ing extensive violations of the human right to an adequate standard of living, 
without any particular agent being solely responsible for the harm suffered by 
any particular victim. If, Ashford maintains, the case of the Torturers’ Union 
presents us with an apparent human rights violation, despite the impossibility of 
matching violators with victims, then the case of global poverty must likewise 
present us with an infraction of human rights, despite the impossibility of allo-
cating responsibility in a precise fashion.
72. Ashford. The Duties Imposed by the Human Right to Basic Necessities. 197.
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Accordingly, Ashford deems the clarification and allocation of duties to be 
indeed “essential to the realization of human rights, but not [pace O’Neill] to 
their existence.”73 Human rights do not come into existence at the moment their 
corresponding duties have been appropriately allocated. Rather, Ashford holds, 
it is far more plausible “that the right exists all along, founded on the universal 
status of human beings, and that it grounds the shared positive and negative 
duties that would realize the right.”74 Ashford does thus not diminish the impor-
tance of allocating duties; she simply asserts that the question whether or not a 
right is claimable (and, if so, from whom) should be separated from the question 
whether or not the right in question exists.
Instead, O’Neill states that we cannot, prior to the allocation of duties, view 
subsistence rights as proper rights. Failing the institutionalization of subsistence 
rights, there is no sense in which a right-holder suffering from famine in Soma-
lia can exert effective control over a specific duty-bearer, such that the former 
can ensure that the latter performs his duty. It is for this reason that O’Neill 
concludes that, unless the right-holders can identify the duty-bearers, “claims to 
have rights amount only to rhetoric: nothing can be claimed, waived or enforced 
if it is indeterminate where the claim should be lodged.”75 
Concerning Ashford’s claim that her examples of additive harms show that 
the distribution of responsibility in the case of liberty rights is equally unclear 
as it is in the case of subsistence rights: to this O’Neill could respond that she 
simply rejects Ashford’s assumption that on O’Neill’s account “each agent’s re-
sponsibility for the human right violation is based . . . on the harm that can be at-
tributed to his own behavior in isolation” rather than “on the predictable overall 
impact of his behavior when conjoined with the behavior of the other agent.”76 
She could argue that the only thing Ashford has shown is that when assigning 
responsibility for human rights violations, we must not merely view the conduct 
of individuals in isolation. Rather, we must also take into account the context in 
which they act, which will at times involve taking into account the role played by 
the actions of others. Take the gruesome practice of stoning a person to death. 
Each individual stone thrown will not likely be a lethal blow, but the cumulative 
effect of dozens of stones will do the job. There is nothing in O’Neill’s account to 
prevent her from assigning responsibility in such a case. Participating in a prac-
73. Ashford. The Inadequacy of our Traditional Conception. 221. Emphasis added.
74. Ibid. 235. Cf. Ashford. The Duties Imposed by the Human Right to Basic Necessities. 217.
75. O’Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue. 129.
76. Ashford. The Duties Imposed by the Human Right to Basic Necessities. 198.
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tice such as stoning is simply a violation of one’s negative duty to refrain from 
harming, which we all owe towards all others. The same goes for participating 
in such a scheme as the Torturers’ Union, which is set up with the clear intent 
to commit serious human rights violations, without the risk (or so the torturers 
hope) of being found guilty of such violations. 
Furthermore, there is no clear analogy between the example of the Tor-
turer’s Union and the case of global poverty as we have discussed it under the 
heading of “(global) institutional harm.” One does not make a clear decision to 
participate as a consumer and as a citizen of a wealthy country in the global po-
litico-economic order with, moreover, the clear intent to contribute to the harm-
ing of others. By contrast, one does make a conscious decision to participate in 
the Torturers’ Union’s scheme, which, one imagines, one would only do if one 
were intent on inflicting harm on others.
Like Ashford, the interest theory of rights does not view claimability as an 
existence condition of rights either. Proponents of the interest theory could reject 
the conclusion that global subsistence needs do not give rise to a human right by 
arguing that all that is needed for the existence of a right is the duty-grounding 
nature of a particular interest that the right is meant to protect. On this view, 
the allocation of duties is thus certainly necessary for the fulfillment of rights, 
but it does not form the condition for the right’s existence. Here, we could ask 
these critics if they realize the possible implications of rejecting claimability as 
existence condition of human rights. Most accounts of rights accept that by not 
performing a duty correlative to a right, one has not merely acted wrongfully, but 
one has also wronged the right-holder(s). By rejecting claimability, however, one 
in fact rejects the idea that a right-holder necessarily has a claim on those bearing 
the corresponding duties and, consequently, the idea that she is wronged when 
the duties corresponding to her right are not performed. For if she cannot claim 
the performance of the correlative duties, if she does not even know from whom 
she could claim such performance, in what sense can she then be wronged by 
their non-fulfillment?77 Who exactly has wronged her? We, therefore have good 
reason to doubt the tenability of an argument that is opposed to taking claima-
bility as existence condition of rights, but that at the same time wishes to assert 
that the holder of a right is wronged when the correlative duty is not performed.
77. Cf. Hope. Kantian Imperfect Duties. 409.
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At the end of the previous section we had concluded that the individual duties 
to fulfill subsistence needs are duties of virtue (except for the duty to refrain 
from directly causing a lack of subsistence goods). In this section, we considered 
two arguments against this conclusion, both of which were refuted. As a conse-
quence, we cannot escape the further conclusion that global subsistence needs 
do not give rise to a human right to an adequate standard of living. This may be 
viewed as a defect or an undesirable aspect of what we called the “perspective 
of duties” (in Chapter 2). The perspective of duties, it was explained, starts from 
duties and proceeds to identify our rights. Instead, the more common perspec-
tive of rights starts by identifying rights independently of duties and from there 
proceeds to define the corresponding duties. One of the reasons for adopting the 
perspective of duties instead of the perspective of rights was that the latter can 
lead to unclaimable rights. By starting from the duties related to global subsis-
tence needs, this chapter has been able to reveal the human right to an adequate 
standard of living as an unclaimable right. 
The conclusion that this is not a genuine human right, however, may be 
seen by some to count as a defect of the perspective of duties. On the one hand, 
a right that cannot be claimed is indeed of little value. What would be the point 
of having such a “right” when it is unclear from whom one can claim the per-
formance of the correlative duties? On the other hand, the claim of those who 
adopt the more common perspective of rights that the allocation of duties is cer-
tainly necessary for the realization of a right, but not for its existence, seems to 
resonate with certain intuitive normative judgments. To say that a starving child 
does not have a right to food, because she cannot lodge her claim with any spe-
cific duty-bearer, seems to amount to unnecessary hairsplitting. Furthermore, 
the proponents of the perspective of rights may argue that, though it is clear 
that the fulfillment of subsistence rights will require the allocation of duties, the 
reason why such rights need to be fulfilled in the first place remains unclear, 
from the perspective of duties. By contrast, “a rights approach can provide us 
with a justificatory basis for making ‘perfect,’ so to speak, our imperfect duties” 
by means of the allocation of duties. Such an approach “provides a moral argu-
ment for assigning these duties,”78 whereas such a moral argument seems more 
difficult from the perspective of duties. In the case of the malnourished child, for 
example, the rights-based argument is that she does have a right to food (given 
that it protects a fundamental human interest) and that, if corresponding duties 
78. Tan. Justice Without Borders. 52.
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have not been allocated, we are under a duty to set up a scheme that can realize 
such allocation, so that her right may be fulfilled.
Yet, those who adopt the perspective of duties could retort, as for example 
O’Neill does, that one need not assume the primacy of rights in order to provide 
a moral argument for the allocation of duties. O’Neill argues that justice requires 
rejecting, as non-universalizable, principles of action that predictably lead to injury 
(in this case, extremes of poverty and wealth, which create relations of domina-
tion, vulnerabilities and dependencies).79 In order to condemn certain actions or 
states of affairs no primacy of rights need be assumed. The moral argument for 
the creation of institutions that can allocate duties is thus as follows: in order to 
minimize the possibility of injurious (i.e. non-universalizable) action and remedy 
the occasions when such action does occur, institutions will need to be created 
in order to define and assign the relevant rights and duties. Being defined and 
allocated within a specific institutional context, however, these rights are, strictly 
speaking, not universal human rights, but rather special rights that take shape 
within a particular institutional structure. O’Neill argues that these subsistence 
rights may be distributively universal: they cannot give rise to universal duties as, 
say, the right to be free from torture can, but the correlative special duties can be 
distributed in such a way that the claims of all right-holders are covered.80
Though the perspective of duties and the perspective of rights judge the 
status of subsistence rights and their correlative duties differently, they both be-
lieve the creation of institutions to provide the most adequate means to ensure 
no one is deprived of necessary subsistence goods. The only difference is that 
proponents of the latter position consider the right to precede the allocation 
of duties through institutionalization, whereas the former regard institution-
alization as a necessary condition for the right’s existence. If we are to retain 
the view that having a right consists in exercising control over another (that is, 
in being able to claim the performance of the correlative duty from another), 
then we must conclude that in the absence of allocating institutions there is 
no human right to subsistence. If having a right is to mean more than a moral 
appeal to unknown others, we need to stick to the idea that possessing a right 
requires the ability to claim the performance of duties from identifiable others. 
If we are to avoid the admittedly unsatisfactory conclusion that fulfilling global 
subsistence needs is, therefore, a matter not of justice but rather of virtue, then 
we must endeavor to embed the corresponding duties in an institutional setting.
79. O’Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue. 164.
80. Ibid. 130.
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§ 4.4 – Conclusion: The Mutual Dependence of Just Institutions and Virtue
The previous chapter (§3.1 specifically) provided a brief overview of the treat-
ment of our duties arising from global subsistence needs in human rights doc-
uments. We found that the duties of states have been clarified quite well, but 
that the elucidation of individual duties is still in much need of further research. 
Human duties declarations that arose as a reaction to the lack of attention for 
individual duties in human rights documents, were no great help either. In order 
to provide some clarity, therefore, the present chapter set out to investigate the 
current philosophical debate on global subsistence needs and their correlative 
individual duties. Hereby it was our explicit intention to present – by means of 
an examination of these individual duties of aid – a demonstration of one of the 
advantages of the perspective of duties, namely its greater ability to distinguish 
between genuine and inauthentic rights. Accordingly, we structured this chapter 
around three questions: (1) Who has what duties in fulfilling subsistence needs?, 
(2) What is the status of our duties concerning the fulfillment of subsistence 
needs?, and (3) Do subsistence needs give rise to a human right to subsistence?
Regarding the first question, §4.1 provided an overview of all the possi-
ble individual duties concerning the fulfillment of subsistence needs (see Figure 
1). We distinguished three separate causes of the non-fulfillment of subsistence 
needs, which trigger either remedial or outcome responsibility resulting in either 
negative or positive duties (or both). Next, the need arose to clarify the status of 
these duties. This task was undertaken in §4.2. Basing ourselves on the exposi-
tion of duties provided in Chapter 2, the duties springing from subsistence needs 
were deemed imperfect and therefore duties of virtue, save for the duty to refrain 
from directly depriving others of their means of subsistence. 
Finally, §4.3 considered two possible counterarguments against the conclu-
sion that our duties to the global poor are duties of virtue, in order to retain the 
possibility of viewing subsistence rights as genuine human rights. Both these ar-
guments were refuted, however, rendering inescapable the conclusion that global 
subsistence needs do not give rise to a human right to subsistence. Given the 
definition of a right developed in Chapter 2, according to which having a right 
should be understood as the ability to claim the performance of the correlative 
duty from a specific duty-bearer (or specific duty-bearers), I conclude that in the 
present condition, that is, in the absence of allocating institutions, the right to 
subsistence is not a genuine human right. 
This conclusion should lead neither to the belief that therefore our duties to 
the global poor are not important, nor that these duties of virtue cannot become 
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duties of justice. Regarding the latter point, we could say that our conclusion 
that under present circumstances these duties are duties of virtue underlines 
the importance of the creation of institutions and legislation that can specify 
and allocate these duties, perhaps eventually rendering them duties of justice. 
Miller, too, views the creation of certain global institutions that can distribute 
our sundry duties to fulfill the subsistence needs of the global poor as the only 
way in which what he terms the “justice gap”81 can be narrowed, even if it can 
perhaps not be entirely filled. Indeed, the importance of allocating institutions is 
underwritten by those involved in human rights practice as well. They argue that 
a good way to guarantee subsistence rights is by enshrining the right to food, for 
example, in the country’s constitution.82 An even better solution, however, is to 
draft so-called framework legislation83 on the right to food. As the UN’s Food 
and Agriculture Organization states: 
A framework law on the right to food can give a precise definition of 
the scope and content of this human right, set out obligations for state 
authorities and private actors, establish necessary institutional mech-
anisms and give the legal basis for subsidiary legislation and other 
necessary measures to be taken by the competent state authorities.84
The necessity to render duties perfect by implementing national or international 
legislation is thus clearly recognized. The hope is that by embedding subsistence 
rights, such as the right to food, within an institutional and legal setting, their 
fulfillment will be guaranteed.
No institutional scheme or set of laws is perfect, however. There will always 
be cases that slip through the cracks. Even institutional schemes that are largely 
81. The justice gap is the “gap between what people in poor countries can legitimately claim as a matter of 
justice … and what the citizens of rich countries are obliged, as a matter of justice, to sacrifice to fulfil 
these claims” (Miller. National Responsibility and Global Justice. 274). Similarly, Feinberg emphasizes 
the importance of allocation in the case of so-called Good Samaritan duties: “Positive duties to rescue 
are every bit as serious as negative duties not to harm. Unlike the latter, however, they must be divided 
into parts, allocated in shares, and (often) executed by appropriate specialists” (Feinberg, J. (1984). The 
Moral and Legal Responsibility of the Bad Samaritan. Criminal Justice Ethics, 3(1), 56–69. 68).
82. The right to food is present in the constitutions of, inter alia, South Africa (Article 27(1)), Kenya (Article 
43(1)) and Brazil (Article 7(IV)).
83. Framework legislation lays down rather general principles and duties concerning, in this case, the right 
to food, which can subsequently be further defined by additional legislation issued by the relevant (na-
tional or international) authorities.
84. Bojic Bultrini. Guide on Legislating for the Right to Food. 4. Cf. De Schutter, O. (2010). Countries 
Tackling Hunger with a Right to Food Approach: Briefing note 1. UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food. 13: “National parliaments should be encouraged to work towards the adoption of framework laws 
that establish a participatory mechanism aimed at the adoption of a national strategy for the realization 
of the right to food.”
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just and generally complied with will not be able to completely prevent cases of 
unfulfilled rights. It is herein that the importance of duties of virtue lies: when 
there are no institutions to allocate duties and ensure their performance (as 
is the case, I have argued, with our current duties to the global poor), or such 
institutions do not function flawlessly (which will, most likely, always be the 
case), duties of virtue function as a necessary and indispensable complement to 
the sphere of justice. Our duties of virtue include, among others, duties to help 
those who, as said, slip through the cracks and duties to push for reform of the 
prevailing institutions so that fewer cracks remain. 
The fact that such duties are most adequately described as duties of virtue 
– as such political engagement, if it is to be meaningful, will require a consider-
able amount of time and effort, forcing one to exercise discretion in choosing the 
causes to which one dedicates these resources – does not mean that they are any 
less important. It is only from the perspective of rights that duties that do not 
stem from rights are dismissed as “mere” duties of virtue, as if it were another 
term for “supererogatory acts.” From the perspective of rights, duties to aid the 
poor do not exist if they do not stem from rights. For this reason, proponents 
of this perspective must obstinately insist that duties to aid the global poor are 
duties of justice which stem from human rights to have subsistence needs met. 
The very idea that we could have important duties to aid the poor that are not 
duties of justice stemming from human rights is dismissed out of hand. By in-
stead adopting the perspective of duties, we can recognize such duties and their 
importance as well as provide a greater clarity with regard to both our duties 
and our rights. 
The creation of and compliance with just institutions, i.e. justice, is not 
enough. It is, to say the least, doubtable that the liberal dream of just institutions 
without virtuous people, can be realized. Virtue therefore remains necessary. 
The drafters of the UDHR, incidentally, recognized this, which is why, I argued 
in the previous chapter, they adopted Article 29(1): “Everyone has duties to the 
community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is 
possible.” The following chapter will continue in this vein by providing an ac-
count of the function and importance of civic duties and civic virtue.
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ChApTEr 5 – DuTIES TO ThE COMMuNITy AND CIVIC 
VIrTuE
Die Pflicht ist insofern nicht Beschränkung der Freiheit, sondern 
nur der Abstraktion derselben, das heißt der Unfreiheit: sie ist das 
Gelangen zum Wesen, das Gewinnen der affirmativen Freiheit.1
Perché così come gli buoni costumi per mantenersi hanno bisogno 
delle leggi, così le leggi per osservarsi hanno bisogno de’ buoni cos-
tumi.2 
The discussion in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2) has already shed considerable light 
on our duties to the community. We distinguished three different categories of 
such duties: civic duties of justice (such as the duty to obey the law and to pay 
taxes), sacrifices demanded for the common good (such as the various duties of 
civic participation), and the duty to perform one’s duties from the motive of duty, 
which requires civic virtue. It was, furthermore, established that, save for the 
first category, these duties are best placed in the realm of virtue. Finally, it was 
determined that the community to which these duties are owed is best under-
stood as the (national) political community, for which reason we may also refer 
to duties to the community as “civic duties.”
Still, as became clear in Chapter 1, duties to the community are far from 
uncontroversial. The “sacrifices demanded for the common good” (regarding 
which I will mostly focus on the duties of civic participation) and the duty to 
perform one’s duty from a particular disposition are especially contentious.3 The 
present chapter will, therefore, only be concerned with these two sets of duties. 
It will provide an instrumental argument for (1) the necessity (and the good) of 
civic duties (particularly those of civic participation), and (2) for the importance 
of the cultivation of civic virtue (necessary for the willing performance of one’s 
1. Hegel, G. W. F. (1986). Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissen-
schaft im Grundrisse. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. §149 Zusatz.
2. Machiavelli, N. (2013). Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio. Milan: Bur Rizzoli. Libro primo. 
XVIII. 109.
3. This is not to say that the duty to obey the law has not led to an enormous debate on political obligation. 
Yet, in general, the duty to obey the law of one’s country is less controversial than the duty, say, of polit-
ical participation (by voting, attending neighborhood assemblies, etc.) and the duty to perform both of 
these duties from the motive of duty. This also became apparent from our discussion of the human duties 
declarations in Chapter 1: duties to serve the community and calls for a global ethic were criticized 
especially vehemently.
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duties, that is, from the motive of duty) as well as maintain that it is (3) impera-
tive that the state take an active role in the promotion of both.
Parallel to the discussion between the proponents and the critics of the hu-
man duties declarations, and roughly in the same period (more or less the past two 
decades4), we have witnessed a lively debate within political philosophy between 
liberals and republicans. Most importantly for our purposes, the republican theo-
rists have argued, firstly, for a renewed focus on our (civic) duties and, secondly, 
for the necessity to not concentrate on just laws and institutions alone (as many lib-
erals do), but to also pay attention to the disposition of citizens: the state ought to 
cultivate in them “the disposition to give public ends precedence over private de-
sires in both political action and deliberation,”5 that is, the state ought to stimulate 
the development of civic virtue. The present chapter will discuss these two points 
(respectively in §5.1 and in §5.2) and will therefore be structured as follows: Sec-
tion 5.1 will set out the importance of a renewed emphasis on civic duties. In brief, 
in §5.1.1 a renewed emphasis on duties will be found necessary for two reasons: 
firstly, it is to lead to the stimulation of a different, more active understanding of 
citizenship and, secondly, the performance of civic duties plays a crucial role in the 
preservation of our rights. This justification for promoting civic duties is, further-
more, purely instrumental in nature, thus maintaining its distance to the approach 
presented by intrinsic republicans, who would promote civic duties because they 
retain them to be an integral part of the good life. 
Subsequently, in §5.1.2, it will be shown that specifically duties of civic 
participation are beneficial to both the political community as a whole and the 
individual citizens within it. Four such beneficial functions of civic participation 
will be presented, following a discussion of John Stuart Mill’s discussion of the 
good of civic participation. 
The second point often put forward by republican scholars – that concern-
ing the necessity of the cultivation of civic virtue – will be discussed in §5.2. 
The argument will be made that our rights and freedom are more secure when 
4. Though of course the revival of republicanism within the field of historical scholarship (due chiefly to 
the works of J.G.A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner) dates back to the late seventies of the past century.
5. Burtt, S. (1990). The Good Citizen’s Psyche: On the Psychology of Civic Virtue. Polity, 23(1), 23–38. 
35–6. The equation of civic virtue with a settled disposition to work towards the common good instead 
of one’s own particular interests has been a trait of republican thought since its earliest beginnings, and 
it remains a central tenet of the work of republican scholars today: see e.g. Aristotle. (1944). Politics. 
(H. Rackham, Trans.). Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press. 1279a18–1279a33; Cicero. On 
Obligations. I 85; Montesquieu, C. de. (1989). The Spirit of the Laws. (A. M. Cohler, B. C. Miller, & H. 
S. Stone, Eds. & Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bk. IV, Ch. V; Rousseau. The Social 
Contract. Bk. I, Ch. 7 [7]; Skinner, Q. (1986). The Paradoxes of Political Liberty. The Tanner Lectures 
on Human Values, VII, 225–250. 242, 182; Maynor, J. W. (2003). Republicanism in the Modern World. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 182.
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civic virtue is widespread. When, by contrast, civic virtue is by and large absent, 
the state will need to take recourse to either the coercion or the enticement of 
its citizens, that is, by appealing to citizens’ self-interest. Such a political com-
munity, devoid of civic virtue, is doomed to remain unstable, as the majority of 
its citizenry will withdraw its compliance with the laws once such compliance 
ceases to be in their interest. Consequently, the conclusion will be that the state 
may legitimately take measures to cultivate civic virtue. In order to reach this 
conclusion, §5.2.1 will first provide a critique of a particularly strict, yet quite 
common version of liberal neutrality, which compels the state to remain neutral 
on all matters of virtue and thus forbids the state from taking any measures to 
foster it. Subsequently, §5.2.2 makes the point that the cultivation of virtue by 
the state is legitimate on the strict condition that the state limits itself to the 
promotion of civic (not personal) virtue and refrains from the imposition of a 
comprehensive doctrine. Finally, §5.2.3 will present three legitimate means of 
promoting such civic virtue.
In the conclusion, finally, I will suggest that this chapter as a whole has 
demonstrated the interdependence of the two realms of morality: justice and vir-
tue. Specifically, this chapter will render apparent the great importance of duties 
of virtue for the preservation of just institutions and the protection of individual 
rights and freedom. In doing so, it will belie the common assumption that duties 
of virtue are of little importance.
§ 5.1 – An Instrumental Argument for Civic Duties: A rebuttal of Two Coun-
terarguments
In Chapter 1 we saw that the drafters of the various human duties declarations 
provided a number of reasons for a renewed focus on our duties. They argued, 
for example, that especially Western liberal democracies overemphasize individ-
ual rights and personal liberty, to the detriment of our duties to the community 
and an understanding of freedom as involving necessarily a sense of responsi-
bility. This imbalance between rights and duties, between freedom and respon-
sibility, results, they concluded, in an unbridled individualism which could lead 
to conflict and discord. The effective and reliable protection and realization of 
human rights, furthermore, relies on all of us performing our duties. Therefore, 
rather than weakening or endangering human rights, a renewed emphasis on 
our duties would only strengthen human rights.
174
Human Duties and the Limits of Human Rights Discourse
400088-L-bw-Boot
Republican scholars provide very similar arguments for a renewed empha-
sis on duties. Individuals who “would enjoy the rights of a citizen without being 
willing to fulfill the duties of a subject” commit an “injustice, the progress of 
which would cause the ruin of the body politic.”6 It is this fear, expressed here 
by Rousseau, for an understanding of freedom as license, for a view of the indi-
vidual as detached from the community and for an insistence on absolute rights 
uncoupled from duties, that has contributed to the popularity of the republican 
position and has led people to doubt the desirability of (certain aspects of) the 
liberal political model. The overwhelmingly negative response to the human du-
ties declarations, however, indicates how a large number of people still views 
duties as inhibitions to their freedom, rather than as an expression of as well as a 
necessary condition for their freedom, indicating the strong lasting influence of a 
particular current of liberal thought. In order to better understand this negative 
reaction we must consider its intellectual roots. Accordingly, in the first subsec-
tion, I will provide a brief sketch of this specific strain of liberalism, which ab-
solutizes freedom and rights at the cost of duties. This position will be shown to 
run into two problems: firstly, it leads to a passive and detached understanding 
of citizenship and, secondly, it actually leads to the endangerment of our rights.
Subsequently, in the second subsection, I will discuss an argument directed 
specifically against duties of civic participation. Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of 
democracy, known as competitive elitism, will hereby be treated as an exemplary 
rejection of more participatory theories of democracy that greatly value duties of 
civic participation. Following the exposition of Schumpeter’s argument, a case 
for the instrumental importance of duties of civic participation will be made. 
Such duties will be presented as beneficial to both the political community as a 
whole and the individual citizens within it.
§5.1.1 – Two problems with Limitless Freedom
The current of liberal thought responsible for the apprehension over civic duties 
we found in the reaction of human rights scholars to the human duties declara-
tions can be traced back to the work of Thomas Hobbes and his understanding 
of freedom (or liberty7), which has proven quite influential. Hobbes viewed lib-
6. Rousseau. The Social Contract. Bk. I, Ch. 7 [7].
7. Hobbes views these as synonyms. See, e.g., Hobbes. Leviathan. Ch. 21, 145: “Liberty, or Freedome, 
signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition.”
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erty as finding “no stop, in doing what [one] has the will, desire, or inclination to 
doe.”8 Accordingly, liberty depends on the “Silence of the Law”9 and is best un-
derstood as “Immunitie from the service of the Commonwealth.”10 For Hobbes, 
freedom thus consists in the absence of restrictions, which clearly include civic 
duties (“service of the Commonwealth”).
Over a century and a half later, Benjamin Constant would name this under-
standing of liberty “liberty of the moderns.” Whereas the liberty of the ancients 
consisted chiefly in the positive liberty to participate in the governing of the 
republic, the liberty of the moderns is mainly negative. Not unlike Isaiah Ber-
lin’s later definition of negative liberty, Constant understood the liberty of the 
moderns as freedom from interference by the state, which was to be secured by 
a set of rights. He argued that ancient liberty required too great a sacrifice of 
citizens – as self-governance calls for regular attendance of assembly meetings 
in order to actively participate in political debates and the voting process – who 
no longer view political freedom, but rather individual independence as their 
primary need. For the ancients, liberty still meant the “sharing of social power 
among the citizens of the same fatherland.” By contrast, the “aim of the moderns 
is the enjoyment of security in private pleasures; and they call liberty the guaran-
tees accorded by institutions to these pleasures.”11 Accordingly, “one must never 
require from them [the moderns] any sacrifices to establish political liberty. It 
follows that none of the numerous and too highly praised institutions which in 
the ancient republics hindered individual liberty is any longer admissible in the 
modern times.”12 It is by being steeped in this liberal tradition that critics of the 
human duties declarations seem to view duties automatically as restrictions to 
freedom, or as providing “governments with excuses to limit the exercise of hu-
man rights,”13 as if rights and duties were necessarily mutually exclusive rather 
than complementary. From such a point of view, duties of active citizenship must 
simply be rejected as a hindrance to individual liberty.
Another century and a half later, Ronald Dworkin would introduce the idea 
of individual rights as political trumps. He argued that if someone has a right to 
8. Ibid. Ch. 21, 146.
9. Ibid. Ch. 21, 152.
10. Ibid. Ch. 21, 149. Note how this understanding of freedom views freedom and the performance of civic 
duties as mutually exclusive.
11. Constant, B. (1988). The Liberty of Ancients Compared with that of Moderns. In B. Fontana (Ed. & 
Trans.), Political Writings (pp. 307–328). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 317. Emphasis ad-
ded. 
12. Ibid. 321.
13. Knox. Horizontal Human Rights Law. 3.
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have or do something, “then it is wrong for government to deny it to him even 
though it would be in the general interest to do so.”14 Rights would thus gener-
ally prevail over considerations of the common good or the general welfare. In 
fact, for Dworkin, it seems any weighing of rights against the rights of others 
or considerations of the common good is tantamount to their abrogation.15 This 
liberal position, which views rights as nearly absolute, has received substantial 
criticism from those who argue instead for the necessity to “take duties serious-
ly.” For example, one can hear an echo of Rousseau’s words cited above in Mary 
Ann Glendon’s rejection of “rights talk:” “in its [i.e. rights talk’s] silence con-
cerning responsibilities, it seems to condone acceptance of the benefits of living 
in a democratic social welfare state, without accepting the corresponding per-
sonal and civic obligations.”16 The argument is that rights uncoupled from duties 
stimulate a perverse kind of freedom understood as doing whatever one wishes, 
of which republicans have always spoken disparagingly. Aristotle, for example, 
rejected the idea of freedom as doing as one pleases,17 and he would have reject-
ed the conception of freedom prevalent in modern liberal democracies today, 
which views freedom simply as being left alone within one’s own private sphere, 
as not being forced to do anything one does not want to, including serving the 
community.18 The Hobbesian strand of liberalism discussed here attempts to 
expand this private sphere as far as possible, the “eventual aim being to achieve 
what Isaiah Berlin has called ‘a maximum degree of non-interference compatible 
with the minimum demands of social life’.”19 Duties to the community are there-
fore but unwelcome obstacles to the unimpeded realization of limitless liberty 
or viewed as potentially perilous restrictions of rights. The predominance of this 
current of liberalism in human rights circles can, as said, be deduced from the 
nearly unanimous rejection of “duties to the community” in scholarly commen-
taries on human duties declarations and on certain human rights documents 
such as the African Charter. It is, therefore, this variety of liberalism that must 
be contested.
14. Dworkin. Taking Rights Seriously. 269. Cf. xi and 169. Also see: Dworkin, R. (2011). Justice for Hedge-
hogs. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 329
15. Dworkin. Taking Rights Seriously. 198ff.
16. Glendon, M. A. (1991). Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse. New York: The Free 
Press. 14.
17. Aristotle. Politics. 1310a28–1310a33. Similar rejections of freedom as license can be found throughout 
the republican tradition. See, e.g., Cicero (On Obligations. I. 70) and Rousseau (Rousseau, J.-J. (1984). 
A Discourse on Inequality. (M. Cranston, Trans., M. Cranston, Ed.). London: Penguin Books. 58: “they 
mistake for liberty an unbridled license which is the opposite of freedom”).
18. Kraut, R. (2002). Aristotle: Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 208.
19. Skinner. The Paradoxes of Political Liberty. 248.
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To be clear, it is by no means my intention to say that the protection, by means 
of rights, of personal liberty has not been an enormous achievement. On the 
contrary, the knowledge to be secure in one’s rights is a great good. The problem 
does not lie in the effort to secure rights; it lies, rather, in the one-sided under-
standing of the relationship between rights and duties, according to which duties 
are merely undesirable limitations of our rights and should therefore be kept at 
a bare minimum. This unbalanced view, in fact, has two negative consequences. 
Firstly, by paying attention solely to what we as citizens stand to receive from 
the community (in the form of rights), that is, what the community must do for 
us, we are left with a passive and detached understanding of citizenship: passive, 
because citizens will tend to view the essence of their citizenship simply as the 
possession of rights,20 and detached because such a one-sided understanding of 
citizenship leads to the image of the lone rights-bearer over against everyone 
else (recall our discussion of the Marxist critique of 18th century human rights 
declarations in §3.2.2). By focusing exceedingly on individual rights, and by 
being suspicious of any duties to the community, we are encouraged to think of 
ourselves as separate from the community, which in turn increasingly appears 
as a threat to the private enjoyment of our rights, rather than as the necessary 
condition for the development of our personality.21 The renewed emphasis on 
duties is meant to remedy this understanding of passive and detached citizenship 
and wishes to complement (not replace) the image of the citizen as the holder of 
certain rights with the view of citizenship as involving the performance of civic 
duties. When rights and duties are more in balance, the idea of rights as trumps 
will also be adjusted. Rights will not (and ought not to) always enjoy precedence 
over any claims the community makes on us.22
The second undesirable consequence of the lopsided understanding of the 
relation between rights and duties is that the diminished interest in our civic 
duties actually endangers the reliable protection and realization of our rights. 
For certain civic duties it is not difficult to imagine how their performance con-
tributes to the security of our rights, for instance the civic duty to obey the law 
and the duty to pay taxes (and thus contribute to the maintenance of the shared 
social welfare system). Yet, it may be less evident how other civic duties contrib-
20. Kymlicka. Contemporary Political Philosophy. 288.
21. As, for example, Article 29(1) UDHR suggests by stating that one’s personality can only be fully devel-
oped within a community.
22. In fact, we have seen already (in §1.3.1) that not all human rights are absolute and that our exercise of 
these rights is limited by public safety, the protection of health and morals, the rights of others, and so 
forth.
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ute to the protection of our rights, for example the duties of civic participation. 
Generally, civic participation is meant to indicate those actions, performed by 
citizens, which aim to contribute to the addressing or resolution of matters that 
are not merely private concerns, but rather concerns common to all members 
of a community. Civic participation is thus participation, in some way, in public 
affairs. One can hereby think of a variety of duties, such as the duties of polit-
ical participation,23 to be informed about current affairs, and to address patent 
injustices (by writing to your representatives, starting or supporting a petition, 
organizing or participating in a protest). These duties contribute to the protec-
tion of our rights in the following manner: the protection and fulfillment of 
rights depend on the rule of law, good legislation and democratic institutions. 
The mentioned duties that fall under the heading of “civic participation” help 
uphold these three key elements. For example, an active citizenry can function 
as a check on overambitious and corrupt politicians by calling them to account 
(by voting them out of office, raising awareness about their ties to big business, 
or organizing demonstrations against them). A greater participation of citizens 
in the democratic process (on a municipal, national or regional level) would, 
furthermore, help improve legislation, as politicians would be made more aware 
of the needs of the public.
It follows that even if one views rights as primary to or more important than 
duties, one should still applaud a renewed emphasis on the latter. By shirking 
one’s duties, convinced that they are but limits to one’s rights and unbound free-
dom, one thus in fact imperils those very rights and that very freedom one holds 
so dear. Rather than a threat to our rights, we ought to therefore view a renewed 
emphasis on our duties to the community as contributing to the safeguarding of 
those very rights: “unless we place our duties before our rights, we must expect 
to find our rights themselves undermined.”24 
We have thus found that a renewed emphasis on duties is necessary for 
(1) stimulating a different, more active understanding of citizenship and (2) for 
the preservation of our rights. We may add, as this will be of importance in 
23. This can take many forms; one can participate politically by voting, attending neighborhood assemblies, 
joining a political party, running for office, and so forth.
24. Skinner. The Paradoxes of Political Liberty. 250. Cf. 248–9. Also see Viroli, M. (1988). Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau and the “Well-Ordered Society.” (D. Hanson, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 184–5. A similar argument is offered in some of the human duties declarations. The DHSR, for 
example, maintains that the “rights of the individual and his or her social responsibilities are indissolu-
bly linked. They mutually reinforce each other and for that reason deserve express recognition of their 
equal value and importance to life in society” (Article 5). Far from radical or dangerous, therefore, the 
renewed focus on our duties is in fact meant to benefit the protection and realization of our rights.
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what follows, that our reasons for advocating civic duties are therefore solely 
instrumental; such duties are not promoted, in other words, because their per-
formance is viewed as an integral part of the good life. Even the stimulation of a 
different understanding of citizenship is done because of its importance for the 
stability of the political order, and not because it is deemed intrinsically valuable. 
Yet, despite this instrumental importance of civic duties, some still challenge 
their necessity. In what follows, one such argument against the necessity of civic 
duties (specifically, duties of civic participation) is laid out. Certain, elitist theo-
ries of democracy do not only question the necessity of duties of civic participa-
tion, they also argue that too much citizen participation can actually constitute 
a threat to the political community.
§5.1.2 – The Good of Civic participation vs. Competitive Elitism
In this subsection, I mean to establish the instrumental importance of the perfor-
mance of duties of civic participation, both for the development of the individual 
citizen and for the health of the political community as a whole. Eventually, four 
beneficial functions of the performance of such duties will be presented. In ar-
riving at these four functions, a discussion of John Stuart Mill’s understanding of 
civic participation as a “school of public spirit” will play a crucial role.
Before making the case for duties of civic participation, however, let us con-
sider a counterargument. There are those who would argue against such civic 
duties by maintaining that the role of the citizen consists solely in producing a 
government through elections. Joseph Schumpeter, for example, criticized what 
he termed “classical democracy” and the many civic duties it demanded of its cit-
izenry. According to Schumpeter, classical democracy (unrealistically) presup-
poses a citizenry well informed on a wide range of topics and able to formulate 
an own position with regard to these sundry issues. Subsequently, citizens elect 
representatives to execute that position. Schumpeter held this view to be overly 
optimistic with regard to the intellectual abilities of the average citizen as well as 
vis-à-vis the electorate’s desire to actively participate in the business of govern-
ment.25 Citizens are neither able nor have any desire to participate in the drafting 
of policy or to otherwise participate politically. Rather, democracy simply boils 
down to the election of leaders who will then do the deciding for us. It is but a 
25. Schumpeter, J. A. (1976). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: George Allen & Unwin. 
269–70.
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method, “an institutional arrangement of arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for 
the people’s vote.”26 Schumpeter thus maintains a strict division of labor: once 
citizens have voted into office a government, they are from that point onward to 
refrain from any form of participation. Even the writing of letters to your repre-
sentatives is to be banned.27 
Significantly, Schumpeter often draws an analogy between the business-
man and the politician. Just as in the market place various competitors vie for 
the favor of the consumer whose role is merely to choose between various al-
ternatives, so too democracy can be described as a “free competition for a free 
vote,”28 whereby the citizen is viewed as a passive consumer. According to this 
so-called “economic theory of democracy,” the prudent citizen, like the sensi-
ble consumer, will choose that representative who is most likely to further the 
citizen’s particular interests (as opposed to the common good). Government 
thus ends up consisting of an incongruous collection of representatives, each 
representing a particular interest (group). Any policy that would ensue, could 
therefore not be an expression of the general will, aimed at the common good, 
but is rather merely an articulation of what Rousseau termed the “will of all,” 
i.e. “nothing but a sum of particular wills.”29 Given such an understanding of 
government and the view of citizens as consumers striving to further their own 
interests as best as possible, all that rests for the government to do, is the ag-
gregation of competing interests. Richard Dagger rightfully wonders how such 
interest-aggregation could ever generate allegiance when the resulting policy 
happens to clash with my particular interests, for “[w]here self-interest does not 
dictate obeying the law, there is simply no reason to obey.”30 As a consequence, 
the state will come to rely heavily on coercion, as motives other than the desire 
to evade punishment are not available to a theory of democracy and citizenship 
“that regards the public as a loose collection of atomistic individuals and politics 
[following Schumpeter’s economic analogy] as simply another way to advance 
or defend one’s personal interests.”31 Indeed, if one rejects (as Schumpeter does) 
the ideas of a general will and the common good,32 and one strives to exclude as 
far as possible the citizenry from the task of governing, it becomes exceedingly 
26. Ibid. 269.
27. Ibid. 295.
28. Ibid. 271.
29. Rousseau. The Social Contract.. Bk. II, Ch. 3 [2].
30. Dagger. Civic Virtues. 107.
31. Ibid. 105.
32. Schumpeter. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. 251.
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difficult to view the government and its laws as anything other than external 
obstacles to the realization of the citizen’s own interests, to be bypassed and 
undermined whenever possible. 
One sign of the prevalence of the above described theory of democracy and 
citizenship – a sign, that is, that citizen participation is not considered (neither by 
the government, nor by the citizens themselves, it seems) a necessary ingredient 
for a healthy democracy, nor as an integral element of democratic citizenship – is 
the relatively low percentage of citizens who bother to make the trip to the polling 
station. Only a little over half of the voting age population showed up for the most 
recent elections in the Netherlands.33 The last parliamentary elections in the Unit-
ed Kingdom (in 2010) saw a voter turnout of less than two thirds of the eligible 
voters (65.77%). In the United States, elections for Congress, when they coincide 
with the presidential elections, have seen a voter turnout of roughly 66% since the 
beginning of this century, whereas less than half of eligible Americans have voted 
in the last three midterm elections. France, finally, saw a mere 55.4% of its eligible 
voters show up for the last parliamentary elections in 2012.34
But why do such low numbers constitute a problem? What is wrong with 
political apathy (which involves more than merely staying away from the polls)? 
Alternatively (to rephrase the same question in a positive fashion), what are the 
advantages of citizen participation in the democratic process? Some would argue 
that such apathy is in fact unproblematic, for several reasons.35 First, as Schum-
peter holds, more participatory accounts of democracy attribute “an altogether 
unrealistic degree of initiative” to citizens.36 If people fail to participate (by voting, 
attending neighborhood meetings, or joining a political party) they apparently do 
not attach much value to political participation. Politics does not play a large role 
in their life and they prefer to spend their time in a different manner. If in a par-
ticular election certain interests of theirs are at stake, then perhaps they will make 
the way to the polls, but otherwise (in keeping with the citizen-as-consumer view) 
they do not see how it will benefit them. Second, one could argue that as long as 
a certain amount of voters shows up (though how many exactly are needed, is dif-
ficult to say), the electoral process will not crumble. Therefore political apathy, so 
long as it does not spread to all citizens, does not pose a threat.
33. According to the Dutch online database Kiesraad, only 54% of the eligible voters actually voted for 
the 2014 municipal elections and less than half of the eligible voters (47.76%) participated in the 2015 
provincial elections. The database can be consulted at: www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl.flie
34. These data can be found at the online database of the International Institute for Democracy and Elector-
al Assistance (IDEA): http://www.idea.int/vt/. 
35. Here I draw from Richard Dagger’s work: Dagger. Civic Virtues. 133–4.
36. Schumpeter. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. 270.
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Third, elite theories of democracy such as Schumpeter’s go one step further 
by arguing not only that political apathy is harmless but that, moreover, it is de-
sirable. The basis for this position is a very low estimation of citizens’ knowledge 
of current events. If citizens are to participate in politics in any way, we must 
first assume that they have thoroughly informed themselves of the myriad issues 
and formed an independent position regarding these questions. Their political 
will must thus be “something more than an indeterminate bundle of vague im-
pulses loosely playing about given slogans and mistaken impressions.”37 Elitist 
theorists of democracy are at best skeptical that the average citizen is capable 
of such subtle political reasoning and consequently fear that a greater influence 
of citizens on the political process would result in the rise to power of populists 
and demagogues. Therefore, political apathy amongst the uninformed masses is 
hardly something to be lamented.
Despite these seemingly strong arguments against civic participation, I will ar-
gue, largely in keeping with the theory of democracy known as developmental 
democracy, that in fact political participation by the citizenry is “necessary not 
only for the protection of individual interests, but also for the creation of an 
informed, committed and developing citizenry. Political involvement is essen-
tial to the ‘highest and harmonious’ expansion of individual capacities.”38 Four 
beneficial functions of the performance of duties of civic participation will be 
presented, belying the position (discussed above) that the performance of such 
civic duties is unnecessary for the health of the political community or even det-
rimental to it. Hereby particular attention will be given to Mill’s understanding 
of civic participation as a “school of public spirit.” 
Republicans of all stripes would agree that democratic practice fosters cer-
tain capabilities and character traits, though opinions may differ as to why this 
is of such importance. For example, one could find that the cultivation of certain 
capacities and dispositions is essential to the realization of the good life (in an 
Aristotelian sense), which is judged to lie in the life of the active citizen. Alter-
natively, one might argue that the development of citizens’ capacities and the 
promotion of civic virtue are necessary for the maintenance of a country’s dem-
ocratic institutions and for the preservation of our rights. The former position is 
often referred to as intrinsic republicanism, whereas the latter is termed instru-
37. Ibid. 253.
38. Held, D. (2006). Models of Democracy (Third edit.). Cambridge: Polity Press. 92.
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mental republicanism.39 In what follows, an instrumental argument in favor of 
duties of civic participation will be presented. In doing so, Mill’s Considerations 
on Representative Government will prove a helpful guide.
Mill begins the third chapter of this work by discussing the possibility of 
a good despotic monarchy. For the sake of argument, he is willing to grant the 
possibility of an all-seeing, thoroughly informed and hardworking monarch dis-
posing over merely honest and talented civil servants (picked out by himself; 
after all, the sovereign also has a keen eye for talent). Yet, even if we were, for 
the sake of argument, to grant all this, we must still ask ourselves “[w]hat sort 
of human beings can be formed under such a regimen? What development can 
either their thinking or their active faculties attain under it?”40 Thus, apparently, 
the question of how to organize a government is also a question of the “sort of 
human beings” we wish to form by means of the particular organization of gov-
ernment we decide upon. Absolute power, even when wielded by a benevolent 
lord, inevitably results in an utterly passive citizenry, Mill maintains, in evident 
disapproval. The wish is, therefore, to set up a form of government that will 
bring forth active citizens instead.
Given that Mill argues that only some form of participation in public affairs 
can bring about the intellectual and moral development he has in mind, and giv-
en that democracy alone renders possible such participation for all (as opposed 
to, for example, the absolute monarchy discussed above, or a form of aristocracy 
in which only the “best” participate), he concludes that only a democracy will 
be able to produce active citizens. Ideally – Mill here refers to ancient Athens –, 
there would be a complete and personal participation of all in government. Yet, 
since all cannot, in our large modern nation states, participate fully in the con-
ducting of the affairs of state, we must content ourselves with a representative 
democracy.41 
Nevertheless, even a representative government provides us with plenty of 
opportunities to perform some small public functions. Mill mentions jury duty, 
39. These terms are employed by, e.g., Sandel (Sandel, M. J. (1996). Democracy’s Discontent: America in 
Search of a Public Philosophy. Cambridge (Mass): Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 26) and 
Peterson (Peterson, A. (2011). Civic Republicanism and Civic Education: The Education of Citizens. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Others scholars prefer the pairs Aristotelian–instrumental republica-
nism (Kymlicka. Contemporary Political Philosophy. 294), civic humanism–classic republicanism (Ra-
wls, J. (2005). Political Liberalism (Expanded Ed.). New York: Columbia University Press. 205–6), Ari-
stotelian–Roman republicanism (Burtt. The Good Citizen’s Psyche.) or virtues as ends–virtues as means 
(Galston, W. A. (1988). Liberal Virtues. The American Political Science Review, 82(4), 1277–1290. 
1279–81).
40. Mill, J. S. (2008). Considerations on Representative Government. In J. Gray (Ed.), On Liberty and Other 
Essays (pp. 203–467). New York: Oxford University Press. 239.
41. Ibid. 256.
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but we could also think of participatory policy making, attending neighborhood 
meetings, and taking part in referenda and elections. Mill aptly notes that, for 
the most of us, our work places and private lives do not encourage us to take into 
consideration the greater common good. It is the performance of civic duties 
such as those mentioned above that places us outside of our limited personal 
sphere and “introduces the mind to thoughts or feelings extending beyond indi-
viduals.”42 Any kind of participation in public affairs, however small, encourages 
us to take into consideration the interests of others, to make decisions based not 
on our personal preferences but on what is best for the common good. Civic 
participation forms a “school of public spirit,” which causes one “to feel himself 
one of the public, and whatever is for their benefit to be for his benefit.” Instead, 
if one never performs civic duties, and remains encapsulated always within one’s 
private sphere, one never manages to think “of any collective interest, of any 
object to be pursued jointly with others, but only in competition with them, and 
in some measure at their expense.”43
Two closely related functions of civic participation can already be distilled 
from this brief discussion of Mill. First, such participation has an educative 
function44 (the “school of public spirit”). One learns how to, in Rousseau’s terms, 
make the transition from a mere “man” guided solely by private interests, to a 
“citizen” who acts in accordance with the general will and takes the common 
interest into consideration.45 In other words, one develops, through the perfor-
mance of duties of civic participation, civic virtue. This is, as it were, a moral 
education. Second, this education stimulates the citizen to view herself as part of 
a larger whole; it imbues her with a feeling of belonging to the community. This 
is called the integrative function. Ank Michels adds a third function of civic par-
ticipation by arguing that it ensures good government. Participation by citizens 
results in legislation that better takes into account the common interests of all, 
instead of the private interests of the influential few.
I would include a fourth function of civic participation, which we could call 
the emancipative function of civic participation. The idea is that a greater partic-
ipation in public affairs will result in a greater knowledge of one’s rights vis-à-vis 
one’s government as well as one’s fellow citizens. Furthermore, for those who 
42. Ibid. 254.
43. Ibid. 255.
44. For a treatment of the first three functions of civic participation mentioned here, see e.g. Michels, A. 
(2006). Citizen Participation and Democracy in the Netherlands. Democratization, 13(2), 323–339. 
326.
45. Rousseau. The Social Contract. Bk. I, Ch. 7 [7].
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regularly participate, the threshold to stand up and fight for these rights when 
infringed, will be far lower than for those who have never found the way to pub-
lic forums: “the rights and interests of every or any person are only secure from 
being disregarded when the person interested is himself able, and habitually 
disposed, to stand up for them.”46 
It has thus become apparent how civic participation can have a positive in-
fluence on both the citizens and the state in which they live. Civic participation 
leads to (1) the creation of true citizens (in the Rousseauian sense) who take into 
consideration the rights of others as well as the common good of the community 
at large, of which they (2) consider themselves an integral part. It is plain that 
the community at large should benefit from an abundance of such citizens. Yet, 
we have seen that civic participation is also beneficial for the citizens themselves. 
Participation brings a degree of influence, which in turn could (3) lead to bet-
ter (or at least more representative) legislation. Lastly, their participation brings 
citizens knowledge of the workings of government, their rights and their duties, 
making them (4) more assertive.47 Therefore, contrary to certain theories of de-
mocracy (such as Schumpeter’s) that deny the importance of civic participation, 
we have presented four beneficial effects of the performance of such duties, both 
for the individual citizen and for the political community as a whole.
In closing I note once more that the argument in favor of duties of civic 
participation is an instrumental one: the regular performance of such duties has 
beneficial effects both for the citizens themselves and for the political communi-
ty at large. A possible intrinsic value of such performance is therefore emphati-
cally not taken into account.
§ 5.2 – The Importance of Civic Virtue
Where the previous section focused on the second category of civic duties (of 
the three we distinguished in Chapter 3) – that is, civic duties demanded for the 
common good, especially duties of civic participation –, the present section will 
46. Mill. Considerations on Representative Government. 245.
47. Recent empirical research has also demonstrated that civic participation has these beneficial effects. 
Ank Michels, for example, concludes on the basis of her empirical research on the effects of four diffe-
rent types of civic participation, whereby she took into consideration 120 cases from different Western 
countries, that civic participation has positive effects on, inter alia, citizens’ skills and virtues, their 
ability to influence government and on the legitimacy of legislation and policy: Michels, A. (2011). Inno-
vations in Democratic Governance: How Does Citizen Participation Contribute to a Better Democracy? 
International Review of Administrative Sciences, 77(2), 275–293.
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center on the third category of civic duties – that is, the duty to perform one’s 
duties from the correct motive, namely from the settled disposition to give pre-
cedence to the common good over one’s own personal interests. It is this settled 
disposition we have in mind when we speak of civic virtue. 
The call, in some form, for civic virtue is common to many human du-
ties declarations. Many commentators have taken issue with such appeals for a 
“global ethic” or for the stimulation of “voluntary self-obligation,” as they fear 
it will encourage states’ paternalistic tendencies. No longer would states limit 
themselves to the prescription and enforcement of rules regulating our external 
conduct. Now they could also concern themselves with our motives for acting; 
states will judge not only whether or not we have wronged (i.e. violated the 
rights of) others, but also whether or not we are good. Thus, Pavlos Eleftheri-
adis, in a paper in which he assesses a proposal for a new “British Bill of Rights 
and Responsibilities” issued by the UK government, worries that the enjoyment 
of rights will be considered conditional on one’s civic virtue: “Failure to exhibit 
civic virtue in your own motives may result in the loss of the remedy that would 
normally entail your right.”48
In this section I wish to provide an argument for the importance of the 
cultivation of civic virtue by the state that can avoid such pitfalls. My intention 
hereby is not to provide a defense of the various human duties declarations them-
selves or those who drafted them, but instead to demonstrate the importance of 
widespread civic virtue for the stability of a political community as well as show 
that the state may take certain measures to cultivate civic virtue and still respect 
important liberal principles such as respect for individual rights and freedoms as 
well as liberal state neutrality (although an overly strict understanding of liberal 
neutrality will be shown to be untenable, in Subsection 5.2.1). 
As has become clear from the discussion of Mill’s work on representative 
government, the task of government ought not to be limited to the prescription 
of rules alone. After all, any law can be broken or abused and so long as there is 
no civic virtue in place there are no guarantees for widespread compliance, the 
absence of which brings with it a threat not only to the rights and liberties of all, 
but also to the democratic order as such. Therefore, if the laws of the land are 
to be reliably followed, government must also concern itself with the business 
of character formation: “No constitution will ever be good and solid unless the 
law rules the citizens’ hearts. So long as the legislative force does not reach that 
48. Eleftheriadis. On Rights and Responsibilities. 40.
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deep, the laws will invariably be evaded.”49 In other words, the reliable perfor-
mance by all citizens of the civic duty to obey the law (an example of the first 
type of civic duties we distinguished, namely the civic duties of justice) hinges on 
widespread civic virtue (crucial to the third type of civic duties, i.e. performing 
one’s duties from the motive of duty). Furthermore, as argued in the previous 
section, the performance of the second type of civic duties (chief among which 
are the various duties of civic participation) is key to the formation of civic vir-
tue. Put more succinctly, the civic duties of justice to obey the law and respect 
the rights of others depend on widespread civic virtue, the fostering of which in 
turn depends on the performance of duties of civic participation.50
That good laws and political institutions alone do not suffice, but must be 
supplemented by civic virtue, has been a common theme of republican writers 
throughout the centuries. Thus, in the Discorsi Machiavelli maintains that when 
“custom is corrupted, good legislation is of no avail.”51 “Corruption,” for Ma-
chiavelli, is a technical term; a citizen is corrupt when she ignores the calls of 
the common good whenever the good of the community conflicts with her own 
private interests.52 Machiavelli is therefore making the argument that a system 
of laws, however good they may be, will not suffice to protect citizens against 
arbitrary interference by others if most people in the state do not possess a set-
tled disposition to obey the law, for citizens could be tempted to break the law 
if they had good reason to believe it would be in their best interest. A political 
community could be in possession of the most just system of taxation and redis-
tribution imaginable, yet if the majority of the citizens is lacking in civic virtue, 
that system will inevitably fall prey to free riders and to the affluent segment of 
the political community exploiting loopholes in the tax code whenever they have 
reason to believe it will be in their own best interest not to contribute. 
Furthermore, the widespread presence of civic virtue in a political commu-
nity also provides more of a guarantee that our politicians legislate not to further 
their own good, but rather to promote the good of the community as a whole. 
Finally, we spoke earlier of how the performance of civic duties may cultivate 
civic virtue. We can also imagine, however, that once civic virtue has taken root 
49. Rousseau, J.-J. (1997). Considerations on the Government of Poland and on its Projected Reformation. 
In V. Gourevitch (Ed. & Trans.), The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings (pp. 177–260). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. OC (Oeuvres Complètes) III, 953. Emphasis added.
50. Though there are other sources of civic virtue as well, such as public education and the laws and insti-
tutions themselves, which will be discussed later on.
51. Machiavelli, N. (1970). The Discourses. (Leslie J. Walker, Trans.). New York: Penguin Books. Bk. 1, Ch. 
17.
52. See, e.g., ibid. Bk. 1, Ch. 18.
188
Human Duties and the Limits of Human Rights Discourse
400088-L-bw-Boot
we will be more motivated to continue participating in democratic institutions, 
thus strengthening and vitalizing them. In brief, the widespread presence of 
civic virtue, firstly, renders our rights and freedom more secure from arbitrary 
interference. Furthermore, it preserves our laws and political institutions by, 
secondly, warding off their self-interested manipulation as well as by, thirdly, 
encouraging participation. It is for these reasons that “republican laws must be 
supported by habits of civic virtue or good citizenship.”53 
Yet, how can such civic virtue be cultivated by the state, while at the same 
time respecting the principle of state neutrality? The eventual answer will be 
that a strict version of neutrality cannot be maintained, as will be argued in 
§5.2.1. If state neutrality does not allow government to take any steps in culti-
vating virtue, it is unable to produce the attitudes and dispositions needed for 
the stability of the political community. For when civic virtue is entirely absent, 
the state will have to rely heavily on coercion or the enticement of the citizens’ 
private interests. Certainly, a democratic order will not be stable if the majority 
of its citizenry will withdraw its compliance with the laws once such compliance 
ceases to be in their interest.54 The necessity of character formation by the state 
is thus evident and the strict understanding of liberal neutrality – barring the 
state from such character formation and instead limiting the scope of legitimate 
state action to the setting up of the basic structure and the drafting of laws – 
must therefore be rejected.
At the same time, however, any time statecraft involves “soulcraft” we must 
be fully aware of the risks involved. The forming of character and the influenc-
ing of our dispositions have often been the pastime of tyrants. It is therefore of 
the utmost importance to distance any acceptable case for the cultivation of civic 
virtue from such nefarious precedents. This dissociation will be undertaken by 
means of the treatment of two questions, each of which will be discussed in its 
own subsection: (1) To what extent is the moral character of citizens of the state’s 
53. Pettit, P. (1997). Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 245.
54. Indeed, this intuition is confirmed by studies in the field of social sciences, concerned with compliance 
with legal norms, such as Tom R. Tyler’s classic Why People Obey the Law. He distinguishes instrumen-
tal reasons for complying with the law, which amount to a weighing of the probability that one will be 
punished if one does not comply, from normative commitments. These, in turn, can be divided between 
personal morality (obeying the law, because one considers it just) and legitimacy (obeying the law, 
because one retains that the law enforcing authority has the right to prescribe actions). Tyler’s research 
clearly points out that relying on coercive measures alone (and thus solely on instrumental reasons) is 
not at all conducive to the stability of a state. His findings are backed up by an entire body of existing 
research indicating “that in democratic societies the legal system cannot function if it can influence peo-
ple only by manipulating rewards and costs:” Tyler, T. R. (2006). Why People Obey the Law. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 22. Such societies are, furthermore, under constant threat of instability. 
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concern? In other words, when is it legitimate for the state to concern itself 
with its citizens’ virtue? (2) In what manner may the state cultivate such virtue? 
Subsection 5.2.2, while discussing the first of these two questions, will maintain 
that the state may take measures to promote civic virtue, but must refrain from 
interfering with citizens’ personal virtue by imposing a comprehensive moral or 
religious doctrine. In this sense, an important form of state neutrality is main-
tained – as the state remains neutral with regard to comprehensive doctrines –, 
even though strict liberal neutrality – barring the state from any involvement 
with its citizens’ virtue – is rejected. Finally, §5.2.3 will answer the second ques-
tion by presenting three legitimate ways for the state to cultivate civic virtue.
§ 5.2.1 – The problem of Strict Liberal Neutrality
A very early account of the neutral state can be found in the work of Kant. The 
division of The Metaphysics of Morals into a doctrine of right and a doctrine of 
virtue is instructive on this point: whereas the latter instructs us to strive after 
our own moral and intellectual perfection and to promote the happiness of oth-
ers, the former makes the argument that the sphere of right – and therefore the 
sphere of politics – ought not to concern itself with personal virtue or the hap-
piness of others (lest it become paternalistic55), but must instead be restricted 
to “the concept of freedom in the external relation of people to one another.”56 
Politics must be limited to the protection of the right of each; it may only en-
sure “the restriction of each individual’s freedom so that it harmonizes with the 
freedom of everyone else;”57 it must categorically refrain from any interference 
with matters of the citizens’ good. This position of state neutrality has proved 
extremely influential in the further history of liberalism. And indeed the critique 
of human rights advocates on certain aspects of the human duties declarations 
is reminiscent of Kant’s position: they maintain that a document aspiring to the 
same quasi-juridical status as the Universal Declaration58 has no business calling 
for the creation of a global ethic, since “voluntary self-obligation” is a matter of 
55. Paternalism can roughly be understood as the idea that the state ought to take measures to improve the 
happiness, welfare or interests of its citizens, as it views its citizens as unable to make the right decision 
for themselves. A paternalistic state thus literally views itself as a father who needs to care for and edu-
cate his unmündige children. This is roughly how Jonathan Quong defines his “judgmental definition” 
of paternalism: Quong, J. (2011). Liberalism Without Perfection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 80.
56. Kant. Theory and Practice. Ak 8:289.
57. Ibid. Ak 8:289–90.
58. As is the case for both the UDHRe and the DHSR.
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free self-constraint and thus of virtue. The sphere of justice is limited to the pro-
tection of the rights and the freedom of each. These limits are at the same time 
the boundaries of legitimate state action and of legitimate legislation.
Similarly, in formulating his famous “harm principle,” Mill excludes one’s 
good (either physical, intellectual or moral) from legitimate reasons for inter-
fering with citizens’ liberty of action. Only the prevention of harm is a valid 
reason for compelling another. Whether or not the performance or omission of 
particular actions will make her happier or a better person can, therefore, never 
be a reason for compelling her to act in certain ways rather than others.59 More 
recently, this common tenet of liberalism figures prominently in the work of 
Rawls. He argues that freedom may only ever be limited for the sake of freedom 
itself, never for the promotion of some good (be it economic benefits or some 
interpretation of human excellence).60 The fostering of civic virtue through the 
imposition of certain duties of civic participation, for example, does therefore 
not fall within the purview of justice and is consequently not a valid objective 
for government to pursue. Indeed, the principle of liberal neutrality dictates that 
the government is to refrain from imposing or even promoting any particular 
comprehensive theory of the good life, including that of the good citizen.
At the same time, however, even liberals who extol the value of liberal neu-
trality recognize the importance of civic virtue. Thus, later on (in §5.2.2) we will 
see how Rawls recognized the importance of virtue for the political stability of a 
community. Yet, such liberal scholars do not seem to allow for any means of vir-
tue promotion, except for the wholesome influence of living under just laws and 
institutions (which will be further discussed in §5.2.3). Thus, the old charge of a 
paradox inherent to liberalism returns: “because they [i.e. strict liberals] require 
‘neutrality’ by government among competing conceptions of the good life, they 
bar government from cultivating the civic virtue upon which a stable political 
order depends.”61 There is no place in the work of many liberals for an active role 
of the state in encouraging the formation of virtue – not even civic virtue – as 
this would endanger the state’s neutrality in their eyes. Let us consider the work 
of Rawls to explore the consequences of this position.
Rawls’s understanding of moral psychology supposes that when people live 
under laws and institutions they recognize to be just, they will be more disposed 
59. Mill, J. S. (2008). On Liberty. In J. Gray (Ed.), On Liberty and Other Essays (pp. 1–128). New York: 
Oxford University Press. 14.
60. Rawls. A Theory of Justice. 213, 214, 288–92.
61. Fleming, J. E., & McClain, L. C. (2013). Ordered Liberty. Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press. 
81.
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to do their part in maintaining those laws and institutions. When we, further-
more, witness others doing their part in maintaining these arrangements “with 
evident intention,” we develop trust in them, which, in turn, brings about a 
stronger bond with both them and with the just arrangements we cooperate in 
maintaining: “Thus if those engaged in a system of social cooperation regularly 
act with evident intention to uphold its just (or fair) rules, bonds of friendship 
and mutual trust tend to develop among them, thereby holding them ever more 
securely to the scheme.”62 Rawls supposes, moreover, that these bonds of friend-
ship and mutual trust will grow stronger as the just laws and institutions are 
successfully maintained over time. The strength of these bonds, finally, leads to 
the formation of the “cooperative virtues,” such as “justice and fairness, fidelity 
and trust, integrity and impartiality,”63 without which a liberal political commu-
nity would succumb to instability. 
As ingenious as Rawls’s account of the development of what we have been 
calling “civic virtue” is, it suffers from one considerable defect, namely it suppos-
es ideal circumstances: virtue develops when institutions are just, which all will-
ingly cooperate in maintaining, and which remain stable over time. In non-ideal 
circumstances, however, many citizens cooperate merely for prudential reasons 
(e.g., because they fear punishment or because, for the moment, it benefits their 
private interests) and do no more than is legally required of them, institutions 
are not entirely just, and the political community suffers from instability. It is 
fair to say that in such circumstances the source of virtue, as Rawls (and many 
others liberals) understands it, is absent or at least dysfunctional. Consequently, 
on this liberal account, the (non-ideal) society that needs civic virtue most is also 
the least able to foster it. Thus, if we accept the view that the only permissible 
way for a state to engender virtue is through the good influence of its institu-
tions, “then in hard times, when public life in a liberal state becomes stagnant or 
rancorous, civil society lethargic, and the family embattled, the state would be 
obliged to sit idly by and watch helplessly from the sidelines as the wellsprings of 
the virtues necessary for order and liberty slowly evaporated.”64
It thus seems that Rawls’s position runs into problems once we move from 
virtue formation in ideal circumstances to non-ideal circumstances. Yet, this is 
not just a problem for Rawls. Indeed, it is a commonplace claim of contemporary 
62. Rawls. A Theory of Justice. 412. Cf. Rawls. Political Liberalism. 163.
63. Rawls. A Theory of Justice. 413.
64. Berkowitz, P. (1999). Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 31.
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liberal theory that justice is limited to setting up basic structures; the possibility 
that the state may (and indeed must) also concern itself with (the promotion of) 
civic virtue is thereby excluded. The reason contemporary liberals often provide 
for the exclusive focus on the basic structure of society – namely that it pro-
foundly influences the life plans of citizens – is true enough, but so is the state-
ment that a just basic structure relies on civic virtue for its stability. By denying 
the validity of this latter point, it would seem that many contemporary liberals 
cherish the hope that “good laws will work without good men or women,”65 a 
hope which, I suggest, is in vain.
To recap: an overly strict version of liberal state neutrality – compelling the 
state to remain neutral on all matters of virtue and thus forbidding the state from 
taking measures to foster civic virtue – is untenable as it is unable to produce 
the attitudes and dispositions on which the stability of the political community 
depends. By restricting government action to the setting up of the basic structure 
and the drafting of laws, Rawlsian liberals have effectively deprived themselves 
of the necessary tools to ensure stability in non-ideal circumstances. Given this 
serious problem with strict liberal neutrality, the necessity for the state to con-
cern itself with its citizens’ virtue has become apparent. Yet, it still remains for 
us to clarify when such cultivation of virtue by the state is legitimate and when 
it is not. This question will be answered next. 
§5.2.2 – When Is It Legitimate for the State to Concern Itself with Its Citizens’ 
Virtue? 
In brief, the answer this subsection will provide is as follows: So long as the 
state’s goal in cultivating civic virtue is not the imposition of a particular concep-
tion of the good life (the intrinsic republican position), but rather the safeguard-
ing of the stability of the political community as well as the rights and freedom 
of those who dwell within and without66 it (the instrumental republican posi-
tion), it is legitimate for the state to concern itself with its citizens’ virtue. This 
position is, furthermore, compatible with a less strict understanding of liberal 
65. O’Neill, O. (1990). The Great Maxims of Justice and Charity. In Constructions of Reason: Explorations 
of Kant’s Practical Philosophy (pp. 219–233). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 220: “Plato had 
hoped that good men would need no laws; deontological liberals hope that good laws will work without 
good men or women.”
66. Indeed, the beneficial effects of civic virtue are not limited to the state of which one is a citizen. We will 
return to this matter in the conclusion of this dissertation.
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state neutrality: the state is to remain neutral with respect to comprehensive doc-
trines, but may take measures to foster civic virtue, which is of public concern. 
One of the fathers of modern liberalism, Immanuel Kant, warns against a gov-
ernment that would wish “to make the people happy in accordance with [its] 
concepts” and labels such sovereign power despotic.67 This helps us to answer 
our first question as to when it is not legitimate for a state to take an interest in 
the cultivation of the virtue of its citizens. Intrinsic republicanism would argue 
that, given that man is a social and political animal, participation in public life 
is the quintessential good life, thus equating being a virtuous person with be-
ing a virtuous citizen. On this account, the state encourages civic participation 
and fosters civic virtue in order to help its citizenry achieve the good life. In 
this manner, intrinsic republicanism wishes to impose what Rawls would have 
called a “comprehensive doctrine.” It first posits wherein the full development of 
human beings lies and subsequently structures its political institutions, drafts its 
laws and encourages its citizenry in such a way as to help all its citizens realize 
this definition of a fully accomplished human life. Thus the very first sentences 
of Aristotle’s Politics, a work often viewed as an example of intrinsic republi-
canism, make the point that the state is a partnership that is founded (like all 
partnerships) for the realization of some good, which he later seems to equate 
with the active life of the citizen.68 In modern pluralistic societies, however, 
one cannot assume any widespread agreement about what constitutes the good 
life. When a state, therefore, promotes civic virtue because it believes it to be 
conducive to the achievement of human flourishing, such promotion constitutes 
an illegitimate imposition of a particular comprehensive moral doctrine on the 
citizenry. Such a state would indeed be attempting to make its citizens happy ac-
cording to its own understanding of happiness and may rightfully be denounced 
as paternalistic.69
67. Kant. Theory and Practice. Ak 8:302.
68. Though there is some evidence that Aristotle takes this position (e.g. Aristotle. Politics. 1325a33), Ar-
istotle also often speaks of the good life in more general terms, namely as human flourishing (eudaimo-
nia), which he defines as a “life conjoined with virtue furnished with sufficient means for taking part in 
virtuous action” (ibid. 1323b40–1324a1). If the good life is read in the latter, more general sense, one 
could also understand Aristotle to be saying that the state is a partnership founded for the realization of 
the good life for all, however individual citizens may understand that life. 
69. Another case of illegitimate state concern for citizens’ virtue would be the imposition of a particular 
religion: the state would, for example, make it its concern to prevent its citizens from having sex before 
they are married, to force women to dress in a certain manner and to make sure that all actively partici-
pate in and contribute to the religious services. Apostasy would, of course, be outlawed and all must live 
in accordance with particular religious dietary laws. The state is here not concerned with creating good 
citizens; rather, it wishes to create good men and women, as defined by the state religion. It does not 
194
Human Duties and the Limits of Human Rights Discourse
400088-L-bw-Boot
By contrast, one could also make an instrumental argument for the culti-
vation of civic virtue by the state. The point would then no longer be that the 
state promotes civic virtue in order to help realize the state-sponsored version of 
the good life for all, but rather that civic virtue is necessary for the preservation 
of our freedom and our political community. Thus, a state may encourage civic 
virtue – that is, it may encourage us to be good citizens –, but it may not encour-
age personal virtue – i.e., it may not strive to make us good men and women:70 
“attempts to encourage ‘good morals’ or to compel actions dictated by . . . moral 
standards must be confined to norms of civil morality; they cannot properly ex-
tend to norms of good behavior predicated upon controversial ‘comprehensive’ 
moral and religious beliefs.”71 Herein lies the answer to our question: if the goal 
in cultivating civic virtue lies in the strengthening of the political community, 
it is quite acceptable, but if the goal is to impose a particular conception of the 
good life, then it is illegitimate and must be rejected. 
Concrete examples of instrumental arguments for civic virtue can be found in 
some of the human duties declarations. The drafters of the UDHRe, for example, 
considered what Hans Küng termed “voluntary self-obligation” the document’s 
main aim.72 The drafters believed such voluntary self-obligation to be crucial for 
the effective realization of human rights, which cannot depend on legal coercion 
alone, but must instead be able to rely on citizens binding themselves through eth-
ical incentives (as opposed to the legal incentive of coercion). In a similar fashion, 
the drafters of the DHSR called for the development of a global ethic, which was 
meant to strengthen international human rights law.73 The drafters of both docu-
ments were convinced that legal rights alone are not able to secure a rightful con-
dition and that therefore the rights discourse must be supplemented by a concern 
for the development of citizens’ dispositions. The call for civic virtue, common to 
these two documents, is thus argued for instrumentally.
Quite surprisingly, therefore, many human rights advocates nonetheless de-
nounced these declarations as paternalistic. It was, among other things, the call 
restrict itself to the cultivation of civil morality, needed to maintain a stable democratic order; instead, 
it imposes a comprehensive religious doctrine in order to make its people good in accordance with its 
concept of goodness. Such a state would indeed be, as Kant said, despotic.
70. It is Aristotle who poses the question whether good citizens must also be good men. In the end, he 
concludes that not all citizens need be good men, which once more belies the common reproach that 
Aristotle is an intrinsic republican: Aristotle. Politics. 1276b16–1277a6.
71. Spragens, T. A. (2004). Legislating Morality in Liberal Democracies. In A. Etzioni, A. Volmert, & E. 
Rothschild (Eds.), The Communitarian Reader: Beyond the Essentials (pp. 55–60). Oxford: Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishers. 56.
72. Küng. Human Responsibilities Reinforce Human Rights. 168.
73. UNCHR. Human Rights and Human Responsibilities. 20.
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for a global ethic that was deemed dangerous, as critics feared that states would 
abuse this call by imposing a particular mode of conduct they deem “moral.” 
These critics fear, in other words, that states may start to show perfectionist 
tendencies, whereby perfectionism can be understood as the idea that states 
should play an active part in promoting the good life. Yet, at times, even the 
great thinker of strict liberal neutrality, John Rawls, recognized the necessity for 
a democratic state to concern itself with the cultivation of what he called “po-
litical virtues.” Though Rawls’s account of justice as fairness remains neutral in 
important respects and strives for overlapping consensus, it does recognize the 
importance of certain political virtues for the simple reason that these virtues 
describe “the ideal of a good citizen of a democratic state.”74 These virtues are the 
virtues of fair social cooperation, which include the virtues of civility, tolerance, 
reasonableness (or spirit of compromise) and a sense of fairness. Rawls supposes 
that political and social cooperation would rapidly collapse if all citizens were to 
pursue solely their own interests or those of their group. The stability of social 
cooperation relies on the majority of the participants cooperating willingly. 
Earlier we had said Rawls supported a strict version of state neutrality, for-
bidding the state from actively concerning itself with the cultivation of citizens’ 
virtue, relying instead solely on the beneficial effects of living under just laws 
and institutions (as will be further discussed in §5.2.3). Sporadically, however, 
Rawls himself appears to be conscious of the untenability of such a strict form 
of neutrality. For example, in Political Liberalism he holds that if a state takes 
measures (such as discouraging religious and racial discrimination) to strength-
en and promote the virtue of tolerance, it does not thereby become perfectionist: 
“Rather, it is taking reasonable measures to strengthen the forms of thought and 
feeling that sustain fair social cooperation between its citizens regarded as free 
and equal.”75 Thus, at rare instances, even Rawls recognizes the legitimacy (and 
great importance) of the state’s concern for the way its citizens think and feel; he 
appears to recognize here that we all have an interest in the state instilling those 
political virtues in its citizens that are necessary for a just and stable democratic 
order. Indeed, it seems clear that such cultivation of civic virtue differs greatly 
from the state advancing and promoting a particular comprehensive doctrine 
and is therefore still compatible with his political liberalism. In fact, in an illumi-
nating discussion, Rawls compares political liberalism to classical republicanism 
74. Rawls. Political Liberalism. 194–5. Cf. Rawls, J. (2001). Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. (Erin Kelly, 
Ed.). Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 142.
75. Rawls. Political Liberalism. 195.
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and civic humanism (corresponding, respectively, to what we have been call-
ing instrumental and intrinsic republicanism). He thereby understands classical 
republicanism as the view that the “safety of democratic liberties requires the 
active participation of citizens who possess the political virtues needed to main-
tain a constitutional regime” and concludes that such a position is by no means 
incompatible with political liberalism.76 Rawls himself thus provides us with 
several hints pointing towards the necessity of the cultivation of civic virtue by 
the state and the compatibility of such cultivation with a more moderate version 
of liberal neutrality: the state may take steps to cultivate civic virtue so long as 
the goal of such cultivation is not the imposition of a particular conception of 
the good life, but rather to ensure the stability of the political community. Civic 
virtue may be fostered. Personal virtue may not.
The earlier discussion (in Subsection 5.1.2) of the work of another prom-
inent liberal – John Stuart Mill – confirmed that often liberals have been con-
cerned with character formation. In fact, Mill himself even went so far as to 
maintain that the “principal element” of the idea of good government is “the 
improvement of the people themselves.”77 Frequently, critics of liberalism have 
argued that liberal democracy presupposes certain character traits and dis-
positions that it, however, does not have the tools to create or sustain: “The 
procedural republic, it turns out, cannot secure the liberty it promises because 
it cannot inspire the moral and civic engagement self-government requires.”78 
However, the examples of Mill and (certain sparse passages in) Rawls might 
be able to prove this criticism unfounded. Certainly, this critique is germane to 
particular strains of liberalism (as found in the works of, e.g., Hobbes, Constant, 
Schumpeter as well as in the greater part of Rawls’s political philosophy), but it 
is not so clearly applicable to a different strain of liberal political philosophy (to 
be found in, for example, the work of Mill, William Galston and in a number 
of rare passages of Rawls’s writings). In fact, of late there have been several 
attempts to conceptualize a political philosophy that could unite liberalism and 
republicanism, precisely because of the belief that a particular strand of liberal-
76. Ibid. 205. Civic humanism, by contrast, promotes active participation of citizens in public life not be-
cause it is conducive to the stability of the political community, but rather because participation in 
public life is the quintessential good life for the political animals that humans are. As such, it is a com-
prehensive doctrine and therefore incompatible with political liberalism, which eschews comprehensive 
doctrines in order to achieve an overlapping consensus (ibid. 206).
77. Mill. Considerations on Representative Government. 243.
78. Sandel. Democracy’s Discontent. 323. The “procedural republic” is Sandel’s term for what he views as 
the prevailing (liberal) public philosophy in the United States, which he finds excessively neutral and 
overly rights-based. For a similar formulation of this “paradox of liberalism” see Fleming & McClain. 
Ordered Liberty. 85.
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ism and instrumental republicanism are potentially compatible.79
A final example illustrating that liberalism is not necessarily hostile to the 
notion of character formation by the government – and thus another reason why 
the outrage expressed by many human rights advocates at the promulgation of 
the various human duties declarations is rather curious – can be found in the 
Universal Declaration itself, a document not known for its anti-liberal character. 
In §3.2, it was argued that the drafters of the Universal Declaration intended it 
to contain a strong formative function. This becomes apparent from the second 
paragraph of Article 26, which states that education ought to be “directed to 
the full development of the human personality” as well as to the promotion of 
certain virtues (“understanding, tolerance and friendship”), which contribute to 
the protection and fulfillment of the human rights of all. Education, according 
to the drafters of the UDHR, ought to not only educate children in the fields of 
mathematics, languages, physics and so forth, but it must also instill in them 
certain virtues. Thus even the foundational human rights document calls for 
character formation. 
Having argued that it is necessary for the stability of a democratic state, that 
it can be legitimate so long as the state refrains from imposing a comprehensive 
moral or religious doctrine, and that even prominent liberals and human rights 
documents call for it, concerns that the formation of citizens’ dispositions by the 
state will lead to despotism or to a perfectionist utopia need no longer concern 
us. The cultivation of civic virtue by the state has thus been shown to be compat-
ible with fundamental liberal principles, such as respect for rights and (a more 
moderate version of) liberal state neutrality.
§ 5.2.3 – In What Manner May the State Cultivate Civic Virtue? 
Though the end of the promotion of civic virtue has been judged legitimate, the 
means by which the state undertakes such promotion could very well still be ille-
gitimate. Is the state allowed, for example, to censure books and media arguing 
for “the virtue of selfishness?” May it install Orwellian “telescreens” in its citi-
zens’ homes in order to monitor their behavior and private conversations at all 
times? Ought it to be permissible for the state to use hypnopedia, as in Huxley’s 
Brave New World, in order to saturate citizens’ minds with civic virtue? The an-
79. For example: Dagger. Civic Virtues; Fleming and McClain. Ordered Liberty.
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swer must be “no” in each of these and similar cases, even if we agree with the 
values being promoted and allow the state to promote them. 
What, then, are acceptable ways for the state to instill civic virtue? I will 
distinguish three possibilities that are increasingly directly aimed at the cultiva-
tion of civic virtue. Firstly, one could view the very act of living under just laws 
as a legitimate way of cultivating civic virtue. Aristotle, for example, argued that 
we can be made good by laws.80 By telling us what we may and may not do, the 
laws function as a normative guide and as a key tool for the development of our 
character. Similarly, Kant argued that by preventing “the outbreak of unlawful 
inclinations” the law actually greatly facilitates “the development of the moral 
predisposition to immediate respect for right.”81 The laws do thus not only in-
fluence our external actions, but also the internal disposition that accompanies 
those actions. In other words, “the good moral education of a people is to be 
expected from a good state constitution.”82 More recently, Rawls has argued in 
a similar manner that just institutions (as defined by justice as fairness) instill a 
sense of justice in those who live under these arrangements. Rawls agrees with 
our earlier argument concerning the importance of civic virtue. He thus main-
tains that even when fully just principles are in place, first-person and free-rider 
egoism may still threaten the stability of the social system. Therefore, “[t]o insure 
stability men must have a sense of justice or a concern for those who would be 
disadvantaged by their defection, preferably both. When these sentiments are 
sufficiently strong to overrule the temptations to violate the rules, just schemes 
are stable.”83 Just laws and institutions are therefore in need of a widespread 
sense of justice among the citizenry, if they are to be stable. Rawls’s solution for 
the development of this sense of justice is the benign influence of those very laws 
and institutions that were in need of a sense of justice in the first place. 
This may appear to be a circular argument, but for Rawls it functions in-
stead as a criterion for the laws and institutions that are to be set up: the basic 
institutions of a stable constitutional regime ought to be set up in such a manner 
that they “encourage the cooperative virtues of political life.”84 When just insti-
80. Aristotle. (1934). Nicomachean Ethics. (H. Rackham, Trans.). Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University 
Press. 1130b24.
81. Kant, I. (1996). Toward Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Project. In M. Gregor (Ed. & Trans.), Practical 
Philosophy (pp. 316–351). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ak 8:375–6n. Emphasis added.
82. Ibid. Ak. 8:366. Cf. Kant. Theory and Practice. Ak 8:304, where Kant argues that the “subjects’ liberal 
way of thinking” is instilled in them by the constitution itself.
83. Rawls. A Theory of Justice. 435. Rawls understands a “sense of justice” to be “a settled disposition to 
adopt and to want to act from the moral point of view” (ibid. 430). It may therefore be viewed as akin to 
our usage of “civic virtue.”
84. Rawls. Justice as Fairness. 116.
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tutions function well over time, Rawls assumes that these virtues will thereby 
be encouraged. Rawls’s point here appears to be one of moral psychology. He 
maintains that it is a psychological law that our recognition of the benefits of 
living under enduring laws and institutions – provided they respect the two 
principles of justice of course –, “not only encourages mutual trust among citi-
zens generally but also nurtures the development of attitudes and habits of mind 
necessary for willing and fruitful social cooperation.”85 Such laws and political 
institutions generate their own support, in the sense that “those who grow up 
in the well-ordered society in which that conception [i.e. a stable conception of 
justice] is realized normally develop ways of thought and judgment, as well as 
dispositions and sentiments, that lead them to support the political conception 
for its own sake.”86 In this manner, just laws and institutions, themselves in need 
of civic virtue in order to be stable, actually generate the desired virtuous dispo-
sition on their own.87 
The problem with this method of fostering civic virtue is, as mentioned in 
§5.2.1, that its usefulness appears to be limited to ideal theory. In non-ideal cir-
cumstances, where the laws and institutions are not such that they generate their 
own support, other methods of instilling civic virtue will be needed.
A second legitimate method by which the state may cultivate civic virtue 
has already been discussed in our exposition of Mill’s work, namely through 
the promotion of duties of civic participation. As civic participation consists in 
actions, performed by citizens, which address matters of public concern, it can 
help us to see beyond our own private interests and to take into consideration 
the common good as well as the interests of others. It helps us realize that we 
are not self-sufficient loose atoms, but rather that we are a part of a community 
that sustains us and that we, in turn, are obliged to help sustain. In Mill’s words, 
civic participation forms a “school of public spirit.”
The state may choose to render certain duties of civic participation obliga-
tory, such as the duty to vote, the duty of military or civil service and the duty to 
serve as a juror. In these cases, participation becomes a legal duty. Often, howev-
er, such participation is deemed a matter of virtue, as is the case with neighbor-
hood meeting attendance, being informed about current affairs and addressing 
patent injustices. In these cases, civic participation is a civic duty of virtue, the 
85. Ibid. 117. Emphasis added. Cf. Rawls. A Theory of Justice. 414–5.
86. Rawls. Justice as Fairness. 125. Emphasis added.
87. Contemporary republicans similarly stress the productive role the laws and institutions can play in 
cultivating civic virtue: see, e.g., Peterson. Civic Republicanism and Civic Education. 88–90; Pettit. 
Republicanism. 251. 
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performance of which, however, may be encouraged by the government by in-
forming the public about possibilities of civic participation, providing informa-
tion concerning government plans and policy decisions, and by teaching young 
citizens in school about the importance of civic participation. As mentioned ear-
lier, empirical research corroborates the claim that civic participation promotes 
the formation of civic skills and virtue. The problem, however, is that when 
civic participation is not legally required, it is often restricted to fairly limited 
segments of the society as a whole,88 namely those segments that tend to be more 
educated and better informed. Civic participation is therefore an effective tool 
for the formation of civic virtue, though problems of inclusion limit its success.
A third, perhaps more inclusive approach would be to teach civic virtue in 
schools. The education system must teach children how to take the standpoint 
of the (world89) citizen, that is, to be tolerant of others, to take into consid-
eration the common good, to compromise, and to consider the public cause 
their business. Of course, viewing education as the best medium for instilling 
certain virtues is at least as old as Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics. In 
more modern times, we can find a fervent argument for public education in the 
work of Rousseau. He argues that education is to attach the child to the political 
community and teach her that she is nothing without it. Furthermore, education 
must be public in order to create a united and equal citizenry; Rousseau is very 
much opposed to a situation in which the children of the wealthy are educated 
differently and separately from poorer children;90 one imagines that such a sys-
tem of education fails to create civic bonds and ties of solidarity between various 
groups in society, but instead pits them against one another. To avoid such an 
undesirable outcome, education must be public and thus the same for all if it is 
to have the desired effect:
If children are raised in common in the midst of equality, if they are 
imbued with the laws of the state and the maxims of the general 
will, if they are taught to respect them above all things, if they are 
surrounded by examples and objects that constantly speak to them . 
. .  of the invaluable goods she [the republic] bestows on them, and 
88. Michels. Innovations in Democratic Governance. 290–1.
89. A most notable example of an attempt to develop a curriculum on global citizenship education is provid-
ed by Oxfam (Oxfam (2009). Education for Global Citizenship. Retrieved from http://www.oxfam.org.
uk/~/media/Files/Education/Global%20Citizenship/education_for_global_citizenship_a_guide_for_
schools.ashx. The curriculum aims to encourage “children and young people to care about the planet 
and to develop empathy with, and an active concern for, those with whom they share it.” 
90. Rousseau. Considerations on the Government of Poland. OC III, 967.
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of what they owe her in return, let us not doubt that this way they 
will learn to cherish one another as brothers, never to want anything 
but what the society wants.91 
Of course, such a complete identification of the individual with the society 
(along with his questionable recommendations in Considerations on the Gov-
ernment of Poland that all teachers must be Poles and that children may not play 
freely but that rather even their games must be regulated and serve a common 
goal) prevents us from accepting Rousseau’s account wholesale. Still, we need 
not accept all of Rousseau’s eccentricities if we are to accept his basic point: 
education ought to play a great part in attaching children to the political com-
munity, teaching them crucial civic skills and instilling civic virtue. Even if we 
accept the right to freedom of education (i.e. parents’ right to have their child be 
educated in a school that shares their religious or other beliefs), as is fitting for a 
pluralist society, we could still make the argument for an obligatory civics class 
to be taught in the same manner in all schools. One can imagine themes like the 
importance of tolerance for people with other sexual preferences to be unaccept-
able to very religious schools. Still, it appears to me that the state would be justi-
fied in nonetheless forcing these schools to teach their students about tolerance, 
as “it is impossible to live in peace with people one believes to be damned.”92
Similarly, one could argue that a democracy needs independent and critical 
citizens, who do not blindly follow authority but who can think for themselves, 
and that schools are perfectly placed to teach such skills. Again, there are un-
doubtedly parents (e.g., in relatively closed and traditional communities) who 
would prefer their children not learn such skills. Yet, we could respond that a 
democracy cannot be sustained by an uncritical citizenry that is either unable or 
unwilling to think for itself. Therefore, the government is justified in ensuring all 
children are taught to think independently by means of the educational system.
In sum, though we ought not to go as far as Rousseau in promoting the 
educational system as a seedbed of civic virtue, and we ought to leave room 
for diversity by ensuring freedom of education, we are nonetheless justified in 
maintaining that certain personal convictions and skills are not merely a private 
matter; when it comes to dispositions and skills that are necessary for the preser-
91. Rousseau, J.-J. (1997). Discourse on Political Economy. In V. Gourevitch (Ed. & Trans.), The Social 
Contract and Other Later Political Writings (pp. 3–38). Caambridge: Cambridge University Press. OC 
III, 261.
92. Rousseau. The Social Contract. Bk. IV, Ch. 8 [34].
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vation of a pluralist democratic state, personal convictions are of public concern 
and the state is entitled to instill particular dispositions and teach certain skills 
by means of obligatory civics classes or other educational tools. 
We have thus presented three legitimate means of civic virtue promotion by the 
state: (1) by living under just laws and institutions, (2) by promoting duties of 
civic participation, and (3) by utilizing the educational system. What is at stake 
in all three of these methods is creating critical, responsible and tolerant citi-
zens, not because the state wishes to realize the good life for them, but rather 
because such citizens are needed for a stable political community. If this condi-
tion of “instrumentality” is respected and the methods of civic virtue promotion 
are acceptable, then it is just that, to a certain extent, one’s private disposition 
be of public concern.
§ 5.3 – Conclusion: Virtue as Complement to Justice
Chapter 3 did a lot of work in clarifying the second set of controversial duties we 
set out to clarify, viz. duties to the community. Among other things, it made clear 
what duties we are talking about and what the status of these duties is. The first 
category of duties, the so-called civic duties of justice (containing such duties as 
the duty to obey the law and pay taxes), seemed relatively unproblematic. However, 
the two remaining civic duties (the sacrifices for the common good and the duty to 
perform one’s duties willingly, which requires civic virtue) are a good deal more 
contentious. In our discussion of the human duties declarations in Chapter 1, we 
saw how critics feared that a renewed emphasis on (civic) duties might endanger 
our rights and that calls for a “global ethic” or for “voluntary self-obligation” run 
the risk of encouraging states’ paternalistic tendencies. The present chapter there-
fore set out to take away such fears and show how instead a renewed emphasis on 
our civic duties and a concern for civic virtue are in fact beneficial to our rights 
and our freedom as well as for the stability and health of the political community.
First, Section §5.1 focused on the civic duties Cassin had termed “sacrifices 
demanded for the common good.” Such duties were found necessary for two rea-
sons: (1) the performance of civic duties leads to an understanding of citizenship 
that is more active as well as more aware of the individual citizen’s place within 
the political community as a whole; (2) the regular performance of civic duties 
is essential for the security of our rights. Furthermore, specifically with regard to 
duties of civic participation, we found (following our discussion of John Stuart 
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Mill) four separate functions of the performance of such duties (educative, inte-
grative, the stimulation of good government, and emancipative).
Subsequently, Section 5.2 provided an argument for the importance of the 
cultivation of civic virtue by the state that can avoid the hazards of paternalism. 
Firstly, §5.2.1 demonstrated that an overly strict version of liberal state neutrality 
is untenable, as it deprives us of the tools to cultivate civic virtue in non-ideal 
circumstances, whereas the need for civic virtue becomes evident immediately 
once we postulate a society in which it is wholly absent: in such a society, no 
one performs one’s duties from conviction or from a sense of duty, but rather 
solely from fear for punishment or some other prudential reason (e.g., one does 
not cheat one’s customers, not because it would be wrong, but rather because 
one does not wish to lose their business; or a politician’s refusal to be corrupted 
stems not from the motive of duty, but simply because she fears she will not 
be reelected if it should be discovered). This community deprived of virtue is 
unstable, as all would cease to comply as soon as compliance would no longer 
be in their best interest. The stability of a political community, i.e. the reliable 
protection of rights and the preservation of its basic structure, thus relies on 
widespread civic virtue. Therefore, I concluded, the state may take measures to 
actively promote civic virtue. Strict liberal neutrality, which bars the state from 
any active involvement with citizens’ virtue, is thus shown to be unsustainable.
Having established the importance of the fostering of civic virtue by the 
state, the next task was to further specify when it is legitimate for the state to 
concern itself with its citizens’ virtue. This question was taken up in §5.2.2. In 
brief, it was argued that the state may take measures to promote civic virtue, but 
may not interfere with citizens’ personal virtue by imposing a comprehensive 
moral or religious doctrine. In this manner, an important aspect of state neu-
trality is maintained (as the state remains neutral with regard to comprehensive 
doctrines), even though strict liberal neutrality (barring the state from any in-
volvement with its citizens’ virtue) is rejected.
Having argued thus far that the state may actively encourage civic virtue 
and when this may be done, it remained for us to clarify how the state may do 
so. Three different ways in which the state may legitimately cultivate civic virtue 
were therefore presented in §5.2.3: through the beneficial influence of just laws 
and institutions, through the promotion of duties of civic participation and by 
means of the educational system. 
More generally, this chapter contains a larger, but less explicit claim: though it 
is possible and at times very useful to draw a clear conceptual distinction be-
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tween justice and virtue, in practice we have found that often the two spheres 
of morality depend upon one another. True enough, the state’s main task is to 
ensure justice, that is, to protect individual rights and freedoms as well as to set 
up and maintain just institutions. Yet, as I hope to have shown in this chapter, 
the preservation of such laws and institutions as well as the stable guarantee 
of individual rights and freedoms depends on the regular performance of civic 
duties of virtue as well as on the widespread presence of civic virtue. Thus, this 
chapter has provided a demonstration of the conceptual point made in Chapter 
2, namely that duties of virtue are not any less important than duties of justice 
and that, in fact, the performance of the former is of paramount import for the 
preservation of just institutions. Furthermore, as in Chapter 4, this chapter has 
demonstrated the importance of starting from our duties when inquiring what 
we ought to do. For if one, instead, adopts the perspective of rights, one remains 
blind to the duties of virtue discussed in this chapter, duties which have been 
shown to function as indispensable support to the sphere of justice, but which 
possess no correlative rights.
The calls for “voluntary self-obligation” and “human duties” (as found in 
the human duties declarations, but also, I have argued (in Section 3.2), in the 
Universal Declaration) are therefore more than warranted and do not deserve 
the fierce criticism they have received. Rather, those who insist on a strict form 
of liberal neutrality and categorically exclude state promotion of civic virtue as 
well as those who adopt the perspective of rights, risk endangering that which 
they hold most dear: the preservation of justice. Moreover, such calls do not pose 
any threat to individual rights. Rather, our rights discourse is hereby placed in a 
larger context, one in which justice and virtue, though conceptually distinct, are 
recognized to be interdependent spheres of morality.
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CONCLuSION
For surely such fellows are the most charming spectacle in the world 
when they enact and amend such laws as we just now described 
and are perpetually expecting to find a way of putting an end to 
frauds in business . . . because they can’t see that they are in very 
truth trying to cut off a Hydra’s head.1
They constantly try to escape/ 
From the darkness outside and within/
By dreaming of systems so perfect that no one will need to be good.2
In the Lectures on Ethics Kant imagines a world in which the strict compliance 
with the prescriptions of justice renders redundant the commands of virtue:
If we picture a man who acts only by right and not by kindness, he 
can always close his heart to any other man, and be indifferent to 
his wretched and pitiable fate, if he is but conscientious in observing 
his bounden duty to everyone, and does but accord to every man his 
right, as a sacred and most awesome trust that has been given to 
man by the ruler of the world.3
The passage is exemplary of the liberal belief that just government is in no need 
of a virtuous citizenry, but can suffice with just laws and institutions. This pres-
ents us with a strange inversion of Joel Feinberg’s Nowheresville, which he de-
scribes as a world much like our own, but for one significant difference: no has 
any (or even knows of the concept of) rights, though the inhabitants are quite 
virtuous and regularly perform kindnesses.4 Instead, we are now imagining a 
community that knows only of rights and rights-corresponding duties, but lacks 
1. Plato. The Republic. Book IV. 343.
2. Eliot, T. S. (1948). Choruses from “the Rock.” In Collected Poems 1909 – 1962. New York: Harcourt 
Brace & Company. Chorus VI. 160.
3. Kant. Lectures on Ethics. Ak 27:415. This quote is followed by: “If he gives to no man a jot over his 
due, but is also punctilious in withholding nothing from him, he is acting righteously, and were we all 
to behave thus, and perform no act of love or kindness, but left the rights of every man inviolate, there 
would be no misery in the world,” save that which stems from sickness and natural disasters); cf. ibid. 
Ak 27:432–3.
4. Feinberg. The Nature and Value of Rights. 143ff.
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the idea of (duties of) virtue. We may call this community Commonplaceville, 
as this understanding of political community is typical of much contemporary 
work on political and legal philosophy. Arguably, such a community can be dis-
tilled from the writings of many contemporary political and legal philosophers, 
who would argue that all we require is a certain set of rights protected by just 
laws and institutions. Citizens need then only refrain from violating the rights 
of others, supposedly rendering the performance of duties of virtue and the 
possession of a virtuous disposition dispensable. The sphere of action not oc-
cupied by rights-based duties is considered to be entirely neutral, normatively 
speaking, allowing the agent to act in whichever way she pleases in that sphere. 
Any restriction of freedom – that is, any duty – not directly resultant from the 
rights of others, is therefore viewed with suspicion, as an illegitimate restriction 
of rightful freedom. 
It is this understanding of a political community that has been challenged 
by the various human duties declarations of the past two decades, and it is the 
dominance of this view that accounts for the nearly unanimously negative recep-
tion of these declarations. The presence of duties of virtue in these declarations 
is considered to pose a potential threat to our rights: as rights are meant to en-
sure a sphere of free agency, which may be limited only by the rights of others, 
any duties (which are viewed as limitations of freedom) beyond duties of justice 
are viewed as endangering our rights and thus as impinging on that sphere of 
free agency. The talk of “voluntary self-obligation” and a global ethic is, further-
more, viewed as an unmistakable sign of the drafters’ paternalistic tendencies: 
the disposition of citizens ought not to be of any concern to the state and has no 
place in declarations aspiring to the same status as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.
In this dissertation, the debate between the drafters and the critics of the 
human duties declarations (expounded in Chapter 1) has functioned as a spring-
board for considering some more general, philosophical questions regarding, for 
instance, the interplay between duties and rights as well as the relation between 
justice and virtue. The greater point made in this study concerned the benefits of 
the adoption of the perspective of duties instead of the more common perspective 
of rights. Firstly, this shift of perspective allowed us to appreciate the importance 
of (duties of) virtue, which is all too often lost out of sight when one adopts the 
perspective of rights with its exclusive focus on matters of justice. By shifting per-
spective we are able to recognize the full scope of human duties, instead of focus-
ing on rights-corresponding duties alone. Secondly, approaching normative ques-
tions from the perspective of duties rather than the perspective of rights permits 
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us to define the content of duties more precisely as well as allocate them to specific 
duty-bearers. This ability is crucial in sorting genuine from spurious rights and 
thus halting the deleterious effects of human rights proliferation.
Regarding the latter point, Chapter 2 showed how the perspective of duties 
can provide a strict criterion with which one can distinguish genuine from spuri-
ous rights: namely, if the correlative duties are found to be duties of virtue, then 
the alleged right does not exist, as only duties of justice possess corresponding 
rights. This criterion was then applied to a concrete case study in Chapter 4: by 
examining our duties to the global poor and finding them to be – in the absence 
of global institutions that can clarify and allocate them – duties of virtue, we 
arrived at the conclusion that, at present, global subsistence needs do in fact 
not give rise to human rights to subsistence. The great advantage of focusing on 
our duties in this case is that we avoid unclaimable rights from arising, which 
threaten to diminish the force of human rights discourse as a whole and which 
engender false expectations.
The significance of the former point – viz. that the perspective of duties 
provides a richer moral landscape involving both (duties of) virtue and (du-
ties of) justice – was demonstrated by emphasizing the importance of duties of 
virtue that go unnoticed by the perspective of rights. Thus, Chapter 5 argued 
that good laws and institutions, which constitute the domain of justice, do not 
suffice to safeguard the stability of a democratic political community; instead, 
the latter additionally requires the regular performance of civic duties as well as 
widespread civic virtue. Similarly, in Chapter 3, we found that the drafters of 
the Universal Declaration acknowledged the importance of instilling a sense of 
duty in citizens worldwide for the protection and realization of human rights. 
The idea being that just laws and human rights will function better and be more 
widely accepted when they are supported by such a disposition. There is thus a 
class of duties that the perspective of rights cannot account for, which, however, 
is crucial to the securing of those rights.
It is for these reasons that I have distanced myself from the criticism of re-
dundancy heaped upon the human duties declarations. The second most common 
point of critique – that the human duties declarations pose a danger to our rights 
– is equally unfounded. Many critics look with suspicion upon calls for a global 
ethic and voluntary self-obligation, arguing that the drafters of these declarations 
wish citizens to be not simply law-abiding, but good. Yet, Chapter 5 has demon-
strated that calls for virtue need not be problematic, so long as they are limited 
to civic virtue and do not extend to personal virtue. Moreover, the promotion of 
civic virtue is actually beneficial to justice, as it can help ensure the stability of a 
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political community. A political community, by contrast, in which none comply 
with the laws and respect the rights of others from conviction, remains exposed 
to the threats of corruption and disorder. Chapter 3, furthermore, demonstrated 
that even the foundational human rights declaration – the Universal Declaration – 
recognized the importance of instilling certain virtues in the citizenry in order to 
better secure the respect for and the fulfillment of human rights, rendering the ve-
hement criticism from contemporary human rights scholars all the more puzzling. 
Nor does the call for a renewed emphasis on our duties present a danger to 
human rights. Rather, as mentioned, it helps us preserve the strength of human 
rights discourse. A new focus on our duties allows us to gain a better understand-
ing of what is at stake when rights are proclaimed, as was demonstrated in Chapter 
4. Proclaiming rights without considering what will be required of whom to fulfill 
them is certainly convenient, but this approach risks human rights inflation, which 
threatens to weaken the status of all human rights. A focus on duties is without 
question less appealing than a focus on rights. Yet, without asking ourselves who 
ought to do what for whom in order to realize rights, claims to rights are bound 
to remain ineffective. Consequently, a call for a renewed focus on our duties is not 
only harmless, but actually of great benefit to our rights.
The importance of a renewed focus on our duties has thus been made clear, 
allowing us to definitely put to bed the charges of superfluity and danger. Yet, I 
feel I must reiterate that establishing the importance of duties does not imply the 
triviality of rights, or even that duties are more important than rights. Not with-
out reason did this dissertation start out with a discussion of the historical shift 
from the primacy of duties to the primacy of rights. The Italian scholar Norberto 
Bobbio has adequately shown how much was gained by this shift: the individ-
ual went from being solely a part of a greater whole in which she had (nearly) 
no rights but only duties, to assuming center stage of the political arena, which 
henceforth would be committed to securing her rights; the state would from 
then on be considered legitimate only to the extent that it respected the individ-
ual and her rights. It requires no argument to see how great an improvement this 
shift represented. Perhaps it is from such a historical perspective, therefore, that 
some critics view the recent calls for a renewed emphasis on duty as a step back 
in the wrong direction. 
It is not my intention to defend the various human duties declarations here. 
As said, they function rather as an occasion to discuss such matters as the rela-
tion between rights and duties, as well as the interplay between justice and vir-
tue. Yet, I do believe the previous chapters have convincingly shown the need for 
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a renewed emphasis on duties, including duties without corresponding rights, 
that is, duties of virtue. The point of such a renewed focus on duties is, emphat-
ically, not to detract anything from the importance of rights. However, I have 
argued for a duties-based perspective on morality: firstly, because it will have 
a salutary effect on our human rights discourse by distinguishing more strictly 
between genuine and inauthentic rights; and secondly, because a duties-based 
approach enlarges the moral playing field, by recognizing both duties of justice 
and duties of virtue. The latter include such fundamental duties as duties to aid 
the global poor and civic duties, which function as indispensable complements 
to the duties prescribed by the sphere of justice.
These two sets of duties of virtue, which were the subject of respectively 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, might appear to be at odds with one another, as du-
ties of global aid per definition make no distinction between fellow citizens and 
people generally, whereas the beneficiaries of civic duties appear to be limited to 
a particular political community and those residing in it. This is not necessarily 
the case, however. Civic virtue in particular need not be limited by national 
boundaries. We have defined civic virtue as the settled disposition to give prece-
dence to the common good over one’s own personal interests, yet this “common 
good” need not be limited to a particular state or political community. It may 
very well be extended beyond such limits and thus involve taking into consid-
eration the regional and global ramifications of one’s actions. Indeed, in §3.2, 
it was argued that Article 29(3) UDHR was meant to express the idea that the 
individual was not only a part of a national community, but also of the interna-
tional community as a whole. That same section additonally pointed out that the 
civic virtue that Article 26(2) UDHR proposes be instilled through the educa-
tional system has global aspects as well – since it is meant to further the aims of 
the United Nations (such as the promotion and maintenance of peace) – and may 
therefore properly be referred to as cosmopolitan virtue. Civic virtue on a global 
scale – cosmopolitan virtue – would amount to considering the interests of the 
larger, global community as one’s own interests: “a citizen of the world is one 
who recognizes duties and obligations to humanity as a whole and not merely 
to their national communities.”5 Our duties to the global poor are exemplary of 
such duties to humanity as a whole. Their performance will greatly benefit from 
the cultivation of cosmopolitan virtue. Far from being in potential conflict with 
one another, the duties discussed in Chapter 4 could thus actually benefit from 
5. Smith. Conceptions of Global Citizenship. 471.
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the duties discussed in Chapter 5 by, for example, extending the scope of civic 
virtue beyond the bounds of one’s national political community.
As the call for a renewed focus on our duties is not meant to diminish the impor-
tance of rights, thus the arguments made in defense of (duties of) virtue in this 
dissertation are not intended to disparage the importance of (duties of) justice. 
Rather, the argument was made that (duties of) virtue can function as an essen-
tial complement to (duties of) justice. It is an argument that points out the limits 
of justice and the faultiness of the popular belief that just laws and institutions 
are enough to maintain a healthy political community. 
Additionally, this argument does away with the common notion that one’s 
actions beyond one’s duties of justice are entirely discretionary. They are not. As 
was argued in Chapter 2, our imperfect duties of virtue are equally binding as 
our perfect duties of justice. One’s sphere of discretionary action is, therefore, 
constrained not only by one’s rights-corresponding duties, but additionally by 
such duties of virtue as the duty to aid those in need, the duty to contribute to 
the health of one’s community (conceived in a national or supranational sense), 
and even duties to oneself (though these have not been discussed here).
Yet, by demonstrating the dependence of justice on virtue, I do not deny the 
obverse: justice is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the development 
of virtue. For an illustration of this point we can take our recourse, as we have 
done so often throughout the course of this dissertation, to an insightful distinc-
tion from the work of Kant. In the text Religion within the Boundaries of Mere 
Reason Kant distinguishes between a political and an ethical community, where-
by the former is the organization of people under public laws of justice, which 
are all coercive laws (Zwangsgesetze), and the latter is a kingdom of virtue ruled 
by free Tugendgesetzen that may and cannot be enforced by external coercion. 
The necessary precondition for the forming of an ethical commonwealth is the 
prior existence of a political commonwealth, within which alone it can develop.6 
For without justice, the path to virtue would be ridden with too many obstacles. 
In other words, justice helps clear a path for virtue to develop. Thus, in Idea for 
a Universal History Kant states that constant war inhibits the maturing of our 
latent moral capacities.7 Similarly, in Toward Perpetual Peace Kant contends 
that we all believe that we would abide by the prescriptions of justice, if only we 
6. Kant. Religion. Ak 6:94.
7. Kant, I. (1963). Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View. In L. W. Beck (Ed.), L. 
W. Beck (Trans.), Kant: On History (pp. 11–26). New York: Macmillan. Ak 8:25–6.
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could be assured others would do likewise. The government provides precisely 
such assurance by compelling those who would not willingly comply with the 
law. All can thus trust that their lawful actions will not be taken advantage of by 
others. This mutual trust greatly facilitates the “development of the moral predis-
position to immediate respect for right.”8 It is, therefore, by removing obstacles 
to virtue that just laws and institutions facilitate its development.
Accordingly, the two realms of morality – justice and virtue – are to be con-
sidered as truly interdependent. We must, therefore, reject any choice between 
Nowheresville and Commonplaceville, as neither presents us with a desirable 
and viable form of community. Given, however, that the flaw of neglecting (du-
ties of) virtue is a far more common defect of contemporary political and legal 
philosophy than the neglect of justice and rights, the promulgation of the various 
human duties declarations – calling for a renewed emphasis on duties and virtue 
– is a welcome initiative to establish a balance between rights and duties, be-
tween freedom and responsibility, and between justice and virtue. The preced-
ing chapters can be read as a contribution to the realization of such a balance.
8. Kant. Toward Perpetual Peace. Ak 8:375–6n. Rawls, of course, makes a similar point in A Theory of 
Justice, which has been discussed in §5.2.1.
213
Human Duties and the Limits of Human Rights Discourse Conclusion
400088-L-bw-Boot
214
400088-L-bw-Boot
SuMMAry
Traditionally, normative questions have been framed and discussed in terms of 
duties: Moses’s two tablets command us to perform and refrain from performing 
certain actions; Cicero’s De officiis, arguably the most influential ethical treatise 
of Roman antiquity, discusses the duties that we are bound to perform; even Im-
manuel Kant – viewed by many as a source of inspiration for the birth of human 
rights – considered moral philosophy to be a study of man’s duties. Accordingly, 
the overarching question of Kant’s practical philosophy is not “What are my 
rights?,” but rather “What should I do?”. Today, instead, human rights discourse 
has become the global moral lingua franca. Whereas in the past, moral problems 
were analyzed in terms of duty (often to the exclusion of rights), today it has be-
come nearly impossible to speak about normative matters in a way that does not 
include rights. Even when we do speak of duties, they are considered to be de-
rivative of rights, which has now become the most fundamental moral category. 
The present dissertation is not a study of how this shift (from the dominance of 
duties to the dominance of rights in normative discourse) came about. Rather, it 
wishes to point out several problems with what I term the perspective of rights. 
Two problems in particular are discussed: firstly, the contemporary rights-based 
approach to morality is problematic, not because it promotes rights – any case 
made for a renewed attention for duty in this dissertation does not in any way 
wish to detract anything from rights –, but rather because it ignores or dispar-
ages those spheres of human normative agency that cannot be framed in terms 
of rights, leading to an impoverishment of moral discourse. An example of such 
a neglected moral category is that subset of our duties termed “duties of virtue,” 
which occupies a place of prominence in this work. Given that rights are consid-
ered to be the most fundamental moral category, duties are held to exist only to 
the extent that they stem from rights. It follows that duties of virtue, which do 
not have any correlative rights, tend to be neglected. 
A second problem with the rights-based perspective on morality is the ten-
dency to speak of human rights without also considering the duties involved, 
resulting in the promulgation of a plethora of human rights without much at-
tention for the corresponding duties. The detrimental consequence of this disre-
gard for duties is the oft-noted and oft-bemoaned inflation of human rights. The 
popularity of human rights discourse has led to a proliferation of either mutually 
incompatible or simply implausible human rights claims, which damages the 
credibility of human rights discourse as such.
215
400088-L-bw-Boot
Given these two serious problems with the perspective of rights – where-
by one starts by identifying rights independently of duties and from there pro-
ceeds to define the corresponding duties – the main thesis of the present study is 
that we ought to adopt instead a perspective of duties, whereby one starts from 
duties and from there proceeds to identify our rights (if, indeed, the duty in 
question involves corresponding rights). This shift of perspective, firstly, allows 
us to recognize the full scope of human duties (instead of focusing solely on 
rights-corresponding duties) – thus enriching our moral landscape – as well as, 
secondly, neatly clarify the content of those duties and allocate them to specific 
duty-bearers, which will bring to a halt the great proliferation of dubious human 
rights claims. The goal of this work is, in other words, firstly to salvage those 
duties that are often neglected due to the dominance of the perspective of rights 
– namely duties of virtue – and to argue for their importance, and secondly to 
counter the trend of rights proliferation by providing some conceptual clarity 
concerning rights and duties that will enable us to differentiate between genuine 
and spurious claims to the status of “right.”
In order to make these arguments, the dissertation is structured as follows. 
Chapter 1 discusses the debate that ensued from the promulgation of sundry 
human duties declarations over the past two decades. These declarations argued 
that especially Western liberal democracies overemphasize individual rights and 
personal freedom at the cost of our duties and of an understanding of freedom 
as involving necessarily a sense of responsibility. This imbalance between rights 
and duties, between freedom and responsibility, results, they maintain, in an 
unbridled individualism which could lead to conflict and discord. 
These human duties declarations have been sharply criticized by human 
rights scholars. In general, the critics argue that such declarations are either 
superfluous, as human rights documents already make ample mention of rights-
based duties, or, insofar as the human duties declarations contain duties that go 
beyond rights-based duties, they are dangerous. The first chapter explores the 
debate between the drafters of the various human duties declarations and their 
critics. This chapter, furthermore, provides an overview of the individual du-
ties present in the major human rights documents in order to assess the critics’ 
claim concerning the superfluity of human duties declarations. This discussion 
then culminates in the selection of two individual duties that are particularly 
contentious, namely duties to the community (which can be found in Article 29 
UDHR, but also, for example, in the African Charter) and duties of aid to the 
global poor (which can be understood to correlate with the human right to an 
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adequate standard of living stated in, e.g., Article 25 UDHR and Article 11 ICE-
SCR). These two duties function as case studies in chapters 3, 4 and 5.
Though this study thus starts with a discussion of the human duties decla-
rations and the criticism they have received, it must be stressed that the goal of 
the present study is not to mount a defense of these declarations. The discussion 
of political and juridical documents – that is, the human duties and human rights 
documents – is not the main concern of this study. Rather, the proclamations of 
human duties declarations as well as the ensuing debate concerning their desir-
ability serves as a springboard for reflections on the importance of a renewed 
focus on duties, the relation between rights and duties, the categorization of 
duties (perfect and imperfect duties, duties of justice and duties of virtue) and 
the relation between justice and virtue. 
Accordingly, Chapter 2 starts by clarifying the central terms: rights, du-
ties, justice and virtue. Furthermore, this chapter elucidates the relation between 
rights and duties, and argues that perfect duties of justice (that is, duties with 
corresponding rights) are not, as is so often erroneously held, more binding or 
of greater importance than imperfect duties of virtue (that is, duties without 
corresponding rights). Finally, the case is made for a duties-based perspective on 
morality instead of the by far more common rights-based perspective. In doing 
so, I have defended myself against critics who fear that a renewed focus on du-
ties will necessarily be detrimental to our rights. I, therefore, needed to explain 
that a renewed attention for duties does not at all amount to, say, surrendering 
our rights and freedom to state power. On the contrary, rather than weakening 
or endangering human rights, a renewed emphasis on our duties will prove to 
strengthen human rights, particularly by preventing the proliferation of unclaim-
able rights. Starting from duties rather than rights, furthermore, will enable 
us to recognize the importance of duties of virtue, to which the perspective of 
rights must remain blind as the duties it recognizes are limited to rights-based 
duties, that is, duties of justice. Such duties of virtue, as is made clear in Chap-
ters 4 and 5, are of crucial importance as complements to the sphere of justice.
It must be briefly pointed out that the exposition of the fundamental con-
cepts provided in Chapter 2 is distinctly Kantian in nature. The nature of rights 
and duties, the distinctions between the various types of duties as well as the du-
ties-based perspective on morality all find their origin in the work of Immanuel 
Kant, whereby I chiefly rely on The Metaphysics of Morals. The main reason for 
drawing from Kant’s work is that his distinction between types of duties – i.e., 
between duties with corresponding rights (duties of justice) and duties without 
corresponding rights (duties of virtue) – as well as his understanding of a right 
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as the ability to place others under obligations, allows us to provide some clarity 
in the jungle of rights claims by enabling us to distinguish genuine from spurious 
human rights. Chapter 2, in short, provides a theory of duties and rights, which 
allows us to resolve practical problems from the fields of human rights law and 
politics in the remaining three chapters, which discuss the two contentious du-
ties singled out in Chapter 1. The discussion of these two case studies is meant 
to illustrate the advantages of the perspective of duties.
 To begin, Chapter 3 examines what we can learn from human rights doc-
uments and human duties declarations regarding the nature of the duties correl-
ative to the human right to an adequate standard of living and the duties to the 
community. Regarding the former, we found that such documents do not at all 
sufficiently clarify the nature of individual duties concerning global subsistence 
needs. Chapter 4, therefore, undertakes to provide such clarity by asking, firstly, 
who has what duties in fulfilling subsistence needs, secondly what the status of 
such duties is (are they duties of justice or duties of virtue?), and thirdly, whether 
subsistence needs do indeed give rise to a human right to subsistence. It is in this 
manner that Chapter 4 demonstrates how starting from duties can allow us to 
discriminate more precisely between genuine and (as yet) spurious rights.
Regarding the duties to the community, by contrast, the study of the rel-
evant human rights documents – particularly the travaux préparatoires of the 
Universal Declaration – has proved to be far more fruitful. Still, many deem such 
duties owed by the individual to the community to constitute a threat to rights. 
In fact, it is these duties that are most often denounced by critics of the human 
duties declarations. Therefore, Chapter 5 illustrates that far from constituting a 
threat to our human rights, duties to the community are paramount to the pres-
ervation of a democratic political community, which, in turn, is instrumental in 
safeguarding our rights.
Finally, Chapter 5 also discusses the claim of several human duties declara-
tions that rights without morality cannot long endure; what is needed, the draft-
ers of such declarations claim, is “voluntary self-obligation.” Even legal rights 
that can be coercively enforced will be more reliably secured if all respect such 
rights willingly, rather than merely for prudential reasons. The present study is 
in agreement with such statements and provides arguments, in Chapter 5, that il-
lustrate why calls for a virtuous disposition need not serve a hidden paternalistic 
agenda, provided they are limited to appeals for civic rather than personal vir-
tue. Chapter 5 thus provides us with an illustration of the importance of (duties 
of) virtue as complement to the sphere of justice. As such, it also demonstrates 
the desirability of the perspective of duties, for it can recognize such ethical du-
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ties to the community, whereas the perspective of rights can at best view them 
as optional excellences.
219
Human Duties and the Limits of Human Rights Discourse Summary | Samenvatting
400088-L-bw-Boot
SAMENVATTING
Voor het overgrote deel van de geschiedenis van de morele en politieke filosofie 
zijn normatieve vragen in termen van plichten geformuleerd en besproken: de 
twee stenen tabletten van Mozes gebieden ons bepaalde handelingen uit te voe-
ren (of om ons juist daarvan te onthouden); Cicero’s De officiis, misschien wel de 
meest invloedrijke ethische verhandeling van de Romeinse oudheid, bespreekt 
de plichten die we moeten vervullen; zelfs Immanuel Kant – door velen gezien 
als een bron van inspiratie voor de geboorte van de mensenrechten – beschouwt 
de morele filosofie als een studie van plichten. Bijgevolg is de overkoepelende 
vraag van Kants praktische filosofie niet “Wat zijn mijn rechten?,” maar veeleer 
“Wat moet ik doen?”. In tegenstelling tot deze traditie, heeft tegenwoordig het 
mensenrechtendiscours de functie van wereldwijde morele lingua franca ver-
worven. Terwijl in het verleden morele problemen in termen van plichten werden 
bestudeerd (waarbij rechten zelden mede in overweging werden genomen), is het 
tegenwoordig bijna onmogelijk geworden om zonder gebruik van het concept 
“recht” normatieve kwesties te bespreken. Zelfs wanneer we wel over plichten 
spreken, worden deze als afgeleide van rechten beschouwd, die nu de meest fun-
damentele morele categorie zijn gaan vormen. Dit proefschrift is niet een studie 
van hoe deze verschuiving (van de dominantie van plichten naar de dominantie 
van rechten in het normatieve discours) tot stand is gekomen. Het wil veeleer de 
lezer wijzen op verschillende problemen met wat ik het rechtenperspectief noem. 
Twee problemen in het bijzonder worden besproken: ten eerste, de hedendaagse, 
op rechten gebaseerde benadering van de moraal is problematisch, niet omdat 
het rechten bevordert – de argumenten die in dit proefschrift worden gemaakt 
voor een hernieuwde aandacht voor de plicht willen op geen enkele wijze iets af-
doen aan het belang van rechten –, maar omdat het die sferen van het menselijk 
handelen buiten beschouwing laat of bagatelliseert die niet in termen van rech-
ten geformuleerd kunnen worden, hetgeen leidt tot een verarming van het mo-
rele discours. Een voorbeeld van een dergelijke verwaarloosde morele categorie 
(een die in dit werk een prominente plek inneemt) is de deugdplicht. Aangezien 
rechten worden beschouwd als de meest fundamentele morele categorie, erkent 
men het bestaan van plichten alleen  voor zover deze uit rechten voortvloeien. 
Hieruit volgt dat deugdplichten, die immers geen corresponderende rechten heb-
ben, vaak worden veronachtzaamd.
 Een tweede probleem met het rechtenperspectief op de moraal is de nei-
ging om over mensenrechten te spreken zonder enige rekening te houden met de 
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corresponderende plichten, hetgeen resulteert in de afkondiging van een reeks 
mensenrechten zonder enige aandacht aan de bijbehorende plichten te schenken. 
Het schadelijke gevolg van deze geringschatting van de plicht is de vaak opge-
merkte en vaak betreurde inflatie van de mensenrechten. De populariteit van 
het mensenrechtendiscours heeft geleid tot een wildgroei aan mensenrechten die 
oftewel onderling incompatibel of simpelweg ongeloofwaardig zijn, hetgeen de 
geloofwaardigheid van het mensenrechtendiscours als zodanig schaadt.
Gezien deze twee ernstige problemen met het rechtenperspectief – waarbij 
men begint met het identificeren van rechten onafhankelijk van de plichten, 
om van daaruit vervolgens de bijbehorende plichten te bepalen – is de centrale 
stelling van deze studie dat we beter kunnen kiezen voor een plichtenperspec-
tief, waarbij men uitgaat van de plichten en van daaruit vervolgens onze rechten 
identificeert (wanneer, tenminste, de desbetreffende plicht bijbehorende rech-
ten met zich meebrengt). Deze perspectiefverschuiving stelt ons, ten eerste, in 
staat om de volledige omvang van mensenplichten te erkennen (in plaats van 
ons uitsluitend te concentreren op plichten met bijbehorende rechten), waardoor 
ons morele landschap verrijkt wordt. Ten tweede kunnen wij hierdoor zowel de 
inhoud van deze plichten verduidelijken als ze toewijzen aan specifieke dragers 
van plichten. Dit zal leiden tot het stopzetten van de grote toename van dubieuze 
mensenrechten. Het doel van dit werk, met andere woorden, is om ten eerste 
die plichten te behouden die vaak worden verwaarloosd als gevolg van de domi-
nantie van het rechtenperspectief – namelijk de deugdplichten – en om te pleiten 
voor het belang van deze plichten. Ten tweede wil deze studie de wildgroei aan 
mensenrechten tegengaan door enige conceptuele duidelijkheid over rechten en 
plichten te verschaffen die ons in staat stelt om onderscheid te maken tussen 
terechte en onterechte aanspraken op de status van “recht.”
Om deze punten te maken, is het proefschrift als volgt opgebouwd. Hoofdstuk 
1 bespreekt de discussie die voortvloeide uit de publicatie van diverse mensen-
plichtenverklaringen. Deze verklaringen stelden dat vooral de westerse liberale 
democratieën individuele rechten en persoonlijke vrijheid benadrukken ten koste 
van onze plichten en van een concept van vrijheid dat noodzakelijkerwijs een 
verantwoordelijkheidsbesef met zich meebrengt. Dit gebrek aan evenwicht tussen 
rechten en plichten, tussen vrijheid en verantwoordelijkheid, resulteert, menen 
zij, in een ongebreideld individualisme dat tot conflict en verdeeldheid kan leiden.
Deze mensenplichtenverklaringen zijn scherp bekritiseerd door mensen-
rechtengeleerden. In het algemeen beweren de critici dat dergelijke verklarin-
gen ofwel overbodig zijn, aangezien mensenrechtendocumenten reeds uitgebreid 
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aandacht besteden aan uit rechten voortvloeiende plichten, ofwel gevaarlijk, voor 
zover de mensenplichtenverklaringen plichten bevatten die verder gaan dan de 
op rechten gebaseerde plichten. Het eerste hoofdstuk onderzoekt het debat tus-
sen de opstellers van de verschillende mensenplichtenverklaringen en hun critici. 
Dit hoofdstuk verschaft bovendien een overzicht van de individuele plichten die 
in de belangrijkste mensenrechtendocumenten vervat liggen om het punt aan-
gaande de overbodigheid van de mensenplichtenverklaringen te kunnen beoor-
delen. Deze discussie loopt dan uit op de selectie van twee individuele plichten 
die bijzonder omstreden zijn, namelijk plichten jegens de gemeenschap (die in 
artikel 29 van de Universele Verklaring van de Rechten van de Mens (UVRM) 
gevonden kunnen worden, maar ook bijvoorbeeld in het Afrikaans Handvest 
voor de Mensenrechten) en hulpverplichtingen met betrekking tot wereldwijde 
armoede (welke plichten men kan beschouwen als correlerend met het mensen-
recht op een adequate levensstandaard zoals vermeld in, bijvoorbeeld, artikel 
25 UVRM en artikel 11 van het Internationaal Verdrag inzake economische, 
sociale en culturele rechten). Deze twee plichten fungeren als “case studies” in 
de hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5.
Hoewel dit onderzoek dus begint met een bespreking van de mensenplich-
tenverklaringen en de kritiek die zij hebben ontvangen, is het doel van dit werk 
met nadruk niet om deze verklaringen te verdedigen. De bespreking van politie-
ke en juridische documenten – dat wil zeggen, de mensenplichten- en mensen-
rechtendocumenten – is niet de hoofdzaak van deze studie. De afkondiging van 
mensenplichtenverklaringen, evenals het daaruit voortvloeiende debat over de 
wenselijkheid daarvan, dient als springplank voor bespiegelingen op het belang 
van een hernieuwde focus op plichten, de relatie tussen rechten en plichten, de 
indeling van plichten (perfect en imperfecte plichten, rechtvaardigheidsplichten 
en deugdplichten) en de relatie tussen rechtvaardigheid en deugd.
Derhalve begint Hoofdstuk 2 met een verduidelijking van de centrale be-
grippen: rechten, plichten, rechtvaardigheid en deugd. Verder verheldert dit 
hoofdstuk de relatie tussen rechten en plichten, en stelt het dat perfecte recht-
vaardigheidsplichten (dat wil zeggen, plichten met bijbehorende rechten) niet, 
zoals zo vaak ten onrechte wordt beweerd, meer bindend of van groter belang 
zijn dan imperfecte deugdplichten (dat wil zeggen, rechten zonder bijbehorende 
rechten). Tenslotte wordt gepleit voor een plichtenperspectief op de moraal in 
plaats van het veruit meer gangbare rechtenperspectief. Daarbij moet ik mezelf 
verdedigen tegen critici die vrezen dat een hernieuwde focus op de plicht scha-
delijke gevolgen voor onze rechten zal hebben. Ik moet daarom uitleggen dat een 
hernieuwde aandacht voor de plicht geenszins een overgave van onze rechten en 
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vrijheid aan de staat behelst. Integendeel, in plaats van onze mensenrechten te 
verzwakken of in gevaar te brengen, zal blijken dat een hernieuwde nadruk op 
onze plichten de mensenrechten juist versterkt, met name door het voorkomen 
van de verspreiding van rechten die niet geclaimd kunnen worden. Door plich-
ten in plaats van rechten als ons uitgangspunt te nemen, zijn we bovendien in 
staat om het belang van deugdplichten te erkennen. Voor deze plichten moet het 
rechtenperspectief noodzakelijkerwijs blind blijven, omdat het enkel op rech-
ten gebaseerde plichten erkent, dat wil zeggen, rechtvaardigheidsplichten. Deze 
deugdplichten, zoals duidelijk wordt gemaakt in de hoofdstukken 4 en 5, vormen 
echter een cruciale aanvulling op de sfeer van rechtvaardigheid.
Het moet kort worden opgemerkt dat de uiteenzetting van de fundamentele 
begrippen in Hoofdstuk 2 een duidelijk Kantiaanse achtergrond heeft. De aard 
van de rechten en plichten, het onderscheid tussen de verschillende soorten plich-
ten, alsmede het plichtenperspectief op de moraal vinden alle hun oorsprong in 
het werk van Immanuel Kant, waarbij ik vooral een beroep doe op zijn late werk 
Die Metaphysik der Sitten. De belangrijkste reden om van Kants werk gebruik 
te maken, is dat zijn onderscheid tussen soorten plichten – dat wil zeggen, tussen 
plichten met bijbehorende rechten (rechtvaardigheidsplichten) en plichten zon-
der bijbehorende rechten (deugdplichten) – evenals zijn begrip van een recht als 
het vermogen om anderen een bindende verplichting op te leggen, ons wat meer 
duidelijkheid kunnen bieden in de jungle van rechtsaanspraken door ons in staat 
te stellen om echte van vermeende mensenrechten te onderscheiden. Hoofdstuk 
2 biedt, kort gezegd, een theorie van plichten en rechten die ons in staat stelt 
om in de resterende drie hoofdstukken praktische problemen op het gebied van 
de mensenrechten en de politiek op te lossen. In deze hoofdstukken worden de 
twee omstreden plichten besproken die uit Hoofdstuk 1 naar voren kwamen. 
De bespreking van deze twee case studies is bedoeld om de voordelen van het 
plichtenperspectief te illustreren.
Om te beginnen onderzoekt Hoofdstuk 3 wat mensenrechtendocumenten 
en mensenplichtenverklaringen ons kunnen leren over de aard van de plichten 
jegens de gemeenschap en de plichten die correleren met het mensenrecht op 
een adequate levensstandaard. Wat betreft de laatstgenoemde moeten we con-
cluderen dat deze documenten de aard van de individuele plichten met betrek-
king tot mondiale armoede in het geheel niet voldoende weten te verduidelijken. 
Derhalve is het het doel van Hoofdstuk 4 om deze duidelijkheid te verschaffen 
door, ten eerste, te vragen wie welke plichten heeft met betrekking tot het recht 
op een adequate levensstandaard; ten tweede, wat de status van deze plichten 
is (zijn het rechtvaardigheidsplichten of deugdplichten?); en, ten derde, of er 
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werkelijk sprake is van een mensenrecht op een fatsoenlijke levensstandaard. Op 
deze wijze laat Hoofdstuk 4 zien hoe wij door plichten als ons uitgangspunt te 
nemen beter in staat zijn om op meer precieze wijze tussen echte en (vooralsnog) 
slechts vermeende rechten te onderscheiden.
Met betrekking tot de plichten jegens de gemeenschap, daarentegen, heeft 
het bestuderen van de relevante mensenrechtendocumenten in Hoofdstuk 3 – met 
name de travaux préparatoires – wel vruchten afgeworpen. Desalniettemin be-
schouwen velen deze plichten die het individu aan de gemeenschap verschuldigd is 
als een  bedreiging voor onze rechten. Het zijn dan ook deze plichten die het vaakst 
door critici van de mensenplichtenverklaringen worden veroordeeld. Derhalve wil 
Hoofdstuk 5 laten zien dat verre van een bedreiging voor onze mensenrechten te 
vormen, plichten jegens de gemeenschap juist van cruciaal belang zijn voor het in 
stand houden van een democratische politieke gemeenschap, welke laatste weer 
van grootse waarde is voor de bescherming van onze rechten.
Tot slot bespreekt Hoofdstuk 5 nog de bewering van verschillende mensen-
plichtenverklaringen dat rechten zonder moraal geen lang leven beschoren is; de 
opstellers van deze verklaringen menen dat “vrijwillige zelfverplichting” nood-
zakelijk is. Zelfs rechten die afgedwongen kunnen worden, kunnen op meer 
betrouwbare wijze worden gewaarborgd wanneer allen dergelijke rechten uit 
vrije wil en overtuiging respecteren, in plaats van slechts om zelfzuchtige rede-
nen. Het voorliggende onderzoek sluit zich hierbij aan en biedt in Hoofdstuk 5 
verschillende argumenten die aantonen dat oproepen voor een deugdzame ge-
zindheid onder burgers geen verborgen paternalistische agenda hoeft te dienen, 
mits de oproepen zich beperken tot burgerlijke deugd in plaats van persoonlijke 
deugd. Hoofdstuk 5 geeft ons dus een voorbeeld van het belang van de deugd 
en deugdplichten als aanvulling op de sfeer van de rechtvaardigheid. Als gevolg 
toont het eveneens de wenselijkheid van het plichtenperspectief. Dit perspectief 
kan namelijk wel dergelijke ethische plichten jegens de gemeenschap erkennen, 
terwijl het rechtenperspectief deze hooguit als vrijblijvende opties voor handelen 
kan beschouwen.
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